Mason Norton

Resistance in Upper Normandy, 1940-44

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Edge Hill University, 2017
This thesis aims to make an original contribution to knowledge by looking at the phenomenon of resistance in the French region of Upper Normandy between 1940 and 1944 from a perspective of ‘history from below’, by looking principally at the testimonies of former resisters, and demonstrating a political history of resistance.

The introduction defines what is meant by Upper Normandy and justifies its choice as a region for this study, before analysing both the historiography and the epistemology of resistance, both locally and nationally, and then giving a justification and an analysis of the methodology used.

The main body of the thesis is then divided into four chapters. Chapter one looks at resistance that was designed to revolutionise society, by looking at Communist resisters and the idea of the grand soir, as well as the sociological origins of these resisters, and how this influenced their resistance action. Chapter two looks at more gradualist forms of resistance, which were conceived to slowly prepare for an eventual liberation and the struggle against Vichyite hegemony, arguing that these resisters formed a ‘resistance aristocracy’, aiming to slowly forge a post-Vichy vision of the polis. Chapter three analyses resistance purely from a patriotic angle, and identifies three different forms of patriotism, before arguing that resistance was part of a process to ‘remasculate’ France after the defeat of 1940, and that these resisters saw their engagement as primarily being one of serving France. Chapter four looks at auxiliary resistance, or resistance actions that were designed to help people, whether they were fleeing persecution or were active resisters, aiming to show that resistance went beyond just organisations and networks, and could be about facilitating other actions rather than direct confrontation.

The conclusion then argues for a new understanding of resistance, not as une organisation or even un mouvement, but as a form of la cité, or polis, engaged in creating a new form of polity. It shows that the political history of resistance is a combination of institutional politics and expression politics, and that resistance, even if not necessarily politicised, was political by its very nature.

Keywords: Resistance, France, Normandy, Twentieth Century, Second World War, Political History.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 4
Introduction 8
Chapter One: Towards *le grand soir*: Communism and Resistance 51
Chapter Two: An aristocracy of resistance? Gradualism and Resisting 87
Chapter Three: National Identities? Resistance and Patriotism 128
Chapter Four: In the Shadow of the Army of Shadows? Auxiliary Resistance 179
Conclusion 232
Annexe A: Selected Resisters Biographies 240
Annexe B: Maps 250
Bibliography 252
Acknowledgements

My first acknowledgement is to my Director of Studies, Daniel Gordon, for his constant support and helpful advice. I suspect that in recruiting me firstly to a PhD studentship in French History, and then to a Graduate Teaching Assistantship in History, he was taking a considerable risk, particularly as my academic background was based more towards French Studies than History. That I can now think of myself as a historian, and have managed to complete this thesis is, I hope, a repayment of his faith.

Edge Hill University as an institution has been welcoming towards me, and I have greatly enjoyed the support that the Department of English & History has afforded me. In particular, I would like to thank Roger Spalding, as Head of History, and who has been a wise second supervisor, standing in when Daniel was on sabbatical, and Alyson Brown, who has been responsible for looking after the postgraduates in the department, and who has been a calm, understanding and supportive line manager, as well as offering me opportunities to develop beyond the PhD. Mike Bradshaw as Head of Department has given much support administratively, as have the departmental secretaries in Trish Molyneux, Sheila Lewis, and Carole Brocken. The company of fellow historians, and also Emma Deeks and Anthony Grant in English, has been an additional pleasure. I should also address special thanks to the Graduate School for their support in providing financial assistance towards the many archival visits that have been involved in the writing and research of this thesis, and to the International Office for their co-operation in facilitating my secondment as part of the Erasmus scheme to the Université de Rouen in France in 2014-15.

The welcome and assistance that the Université de Rouen have given me also deserves recognition, right from the moment that I began to embark upon my review of the secondary literature that enabled me to formulate a research proposal. Olivier Feiertag served as an advisor, which enabled me to use the facilities at Rouen more officially during my spell
in Normandy, and which gave me an academic base during my lengthy furrow through French archives. He has also invited me to speak in seminars at the university which have developed further my ideas, and has been extraordinarily generous with his time. But also, I have cause to be thankful to others at Rouen- Raphaëlle Branche gave useful advice in training sessions around the nature of research and oral history in France, and Jean-Claude Vimont was a stimulating instructor around the methodology and historiography of the Occupation. One of my regrets is that Jean-Claude, a warm and generous colleague and mentor to many of us, passed away before the completion of this thesis, and is not here to see it. Ludivine Bantigny as well influenced much of my thinking around the concept of *le politique* and the nature of history as a discipline more generally, and showed me the importance of gender, for which I am also thankful, and which shaped this thesis in a way that I did not foresee when I began my research. I am also thankful for advice from Bénédicte Percheron, Pierre Miléo (whom I must also thank, along with his wife Françoise, for his hospitality), and Michel Baldenweck, whom in many ways has been my *concurrent*, but who has been generous with his time, and whose research has been undoubtedly informative, even if our interpretations of the Resistance, and indeed, the nature of French history and politics, are rather different. As such, I hope that this thesis gives both of us cause for much in the way of further discussion, debate and research.

The research of this thesis has, as I have indicated, involved many trips to France, and that, without any question, has been the greatest joy of my doctoral research. Scientists largely carry out their research in a laboratory; scholars of France have an entire country to play with. I have benefited from the aid of a number of libraries and archives in France, and most especially the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime, and the Archives Départementales de l’Eure. At the former, Marie-Christine Hubert has been welcoming, and without her assistance, and that of the staff at both Rouen and Evreux, this thesis would not
have seen the light of day. I have also enjoyed, and have much to be thankful towards, the Bibliothèque Universitaire at Mont-Saint-Aignan, the Bibliothèque Jacques Villon in Rouen, and the Bibliothèque Municipale at Evreux, whilst the CARAN at Pierrefitte, and the BnF in Paris, have also offered valuable assistance. The Musée de la Déportation et de la Résistance at Forges-les-Eaux have allowed me access to private archives, and I am grateful to Guy Cressent, for agreeing to speak to me and show me some of his father’s records and testimonies. Similarly, I am thankful to Pierre Jouvin and his daughter Catherine Voranger for the chance to speak to them about the Resistance, and to the late Bernard Lawday, whom I interviewed in 2011 in relation to another project, and who convinced me that the Resistance in Upper Normandy was a neglected topic that needed to be focused upon. That he too, passed away before completion, is something that I regret. Finally, I have been grateful for hospitality and accommodation in France from Maurice Bouchu, Francis & Brigitte Joron, Europe-Echanges, and Réjane Lhote, to name but a few.

I have benefited from talking to fellow researchers, both academics and amateurs, who are too numerous to fully list here, but with particular thanks in France to Jean-Paul Nicolas, Pierre Largesse, John Barzman, Claude Malon, François Rouquet, Gaël Eismann, Michel Croguennec, the late Norbert Dufour, Thierry Lamiraud, Delphine Leneveu and Alya Aglan. I consider that I have been very lucky as a postgraduate to be able to present in France, and all of the papers that I have given in France have prompted stimulating debate and enabled me to strengthen my work. In Britain, I have benefited from the support of both the Association for the Study of Modern & Contemporary France, and the Society for the Study of French History, which have given me financial support, and through various conferences, the ability to test my ideas- the company of fellow researchers makes, I think, the field of French history such a strong one. In addition, the comments of Jackie Clarke, Andrew Knapp, Paul Smith, Lindsey Dodd, David Lees and Julian Wright have been useful
in making my arguments stronger, and I have enjoyed the welcome of the Centre of Resistance Studies, directed by Chris Warne and Martin Evans, at the University of Sussex for various events and initiatives. Also at Sussex, Rebecca Shtasel, whose doctoral research is on Le Havre during the war, has been helpful, and a welcome face in the reading rooms at Rouen, and like everyone else in the field, I am grateful for the kind encouragement and perceptions of Rod Kedward, arguably the ‘godfather’ of the study of the French Resistance. On a final note, my special thanks must go to Malcolm Crook, who taught me as an undergraduate at Keele, whose lectures and seminars were an inspiration, and convinced me that academic life was one worth leading, and that French history is of almost infinite richness. All of this, though, is accompanied with the standard disclaimer that any mistakes within the text remain solely my responsibility. Also, all translations from French into English given in this thesis are my own, unless credited otherwise.

Academic life is full and fulfilling, but there is of course, the private side and a home life. It has brought great joys, but also its chagrins, though I have always avoided la pitié. Therefore, my final thanks go to my personal friends, for their warmth, encouragement and best wishes over the years, and above all, to my parents Roy and Mary, who never asked for a sometimes infuriating historian- but have supported this one staunchly enough, with much love, and with much understanding. For that, I am very grateful indeed.

Mason Norton

Hathern, 2017
Introduction

The Mémorial de Caen is a museum dedicated to the history of the Second World War, but also the years of the Occupation in France. A succession of different spaces look at aspects such as daily life, anti-Semitism, collaboration, and the battle for Normandy to name but four, and this reflects, in its own way, the turn away from a purely military conception of the history of World War Two in France.

Almost discreetly amongst the exhibits is a small plaque, commemorating Normandy’s role within the French Resistance. In Boos, just outside Rouen, in June 1940, just two days after de Gaulle’s appel du 18 juin, a farm labourer called Etienne Achavanne cut the phone lines to the airbase, which was being used by the Luftwaffe. A British air raid struck the base, which was caught unprepared, and destroyed a number of aircraft on the ground. Achavanne was arrested soon after, and executed by firing squad on July 4, 1940, at Bonsecours.¹ He therefore became not just the first saboteur in France, but also the first fusillé, the word given to those who were executed by firing squad. Yet the plaque is necessarily discreet- no photo exists of him, and very little is known about him. Only a handful of monuments exist to commemorate his memory- in Bonsecours and in Boos (a bus stop and a square respectively), and a primary school in his home village in the Eure-et-Loir. Attempts by historians to uncover more have encountered various difficulties, and failed to make much headway.²

The Allied bombings of 1944 seem to dominate the memory of les années noires in Upper Normandy, as reflected by the images shown as part of the exhibition by the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime on 1914-1944.³ But if marginalised by memory, it

² Pernaut, op.cit., p.12.
³ Exhibition D’une guerre à l’autre, 1914-1944, held at the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM), Rouen, April 7-July 12, 2014.
does not follow that there was no resistance in Upper Normandy. The plaque at the Mémorial de Caen is testament to that, and the works of Michel Baldenweck and Julien Papp show that although the number of resisters was small in both the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure, resistance was far from non-existent. There were acts of resistance in Normandy just as there were acts of resistance in virtually all parts of France. The difference is that some of these areas have been subject to more attention from academic historians than what has been the case for Normandy- the history of the Resistance in Upper Normandy has not yet been fully historicised within a critical framework. This thesis aims to fill this gap.

What Upper Normandy? Why Upper Normandy?

At the time I started this thesis, Seine-Maritime and the Eure formed the region of Haute-Normandie, or Upper Normandy, but January 2016 saw this region merge with Basse-Normandie (Lower Normandy) to form Normandy- and furthermore, the division only came in administratively in 1960. As an administrative entity, Upper Normandy did not exist in 1940-1944. So what justifies the choice of Upper Normandy as the geographical field of study?

The answer lies in a mixture of practical considerations and epistemological rationale. It would be interesting to do a study of the Resistance in Normandy, but it quickly became clear that the material for five departments would be too great for a PhD thesis. By contrast, I was not sure that there was enough material or variety to justify just focusing upon one town or city. Moreover, there are some important differences between Upper Normandy and

---


5 There have been studies of the Resistance across all five departments, such as the summary offered by Jean Quellien, ‘la Normandie’ in François Marcot, Christine Levisse-Touzé and Bruno Leroux (eds.), *Dictionnaire Historique de la Résistance* (Paris, Robert Laffont, 2006), pp.300-301, or Raymond Ruffin, *La Résistance normande face à la Gestapo* (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1977).
Normandy as a whole—Upper Normandy is more industrialised, more densely populated, and geographically closer to Paris. Its politics have also leaned more to the Left, in particular the significance of the French Communist Party (PCF). So there were also cultural, social and political dimensions to take into account.⁶

This cultural dimension also informs the desire for this thesis to avoid being very strictly defined by the boundaries of the departments. The two departments considered in this study were both created in 1790. Yet the fact that it was not until 2005 that an adjective was created for residents of the Seine-Maritime shows that in the case of this particular department, there is no identity linked. If one is to write a history from below, then the parameters should have a clear justification ‘from below’—a point that Thompson makes when stating why he chose to look at the ‘English Working Class’ and not the ‘British Working Class’.⁷ These departments were created primarily for reasons of governance and administration—deliberately designed so as to reinforce the centralist Jacobinism of the French Revolution. What is particularly remarkable about Upper Normandy is the binary between urban and rural, and how this has governed and conditioned its politics, culture and society—and so focusing on officially designated locales such as the region or the department would have resulted in an epistemological tension.

In defining therefore the territory chosen, ‘history from below’ has been accompanied by ‘geography from below’.⁸ Whereas some geographers have chosen to define territories by administrative boundaries, others have chosen to follow the idea of the territory as an

---

⁶ These are aspects also mentioned in passing by Quellien, op.cit., p.300.
⁸ The term is used particularly to look at geographical studies in the developing world—for an example, see Michel Ben Arrous & Lazare Ki-Zerbo (eds.), Etudes africaines de géographie par le bas/African Studies in Geography from Below (Dakar, CODRESIA, 2009). This particular volume explores the tension between ‘from the top’, a political project often rooted in the era of colonialism, and ‘from below’, a historical process that sees the emergence of a different set of spatial dynamics reflecting the evolution of differing social forces.
‘inhabited space’, or espace vécue. This was the line of argument chosen by Olivier Feiertag and Yannick Marec, who put forward a ‘geohistorical’ approach to the history of Upper Normandy over the longue durée, and how it had been shaped by relations not with Lower Normandy but with Paris, based upon the geographical feature of the Seine basin. The idea of defining a territory by how it is inhabited and how it functions seems to allow for a geography defined by ordinary people and their everyday lives. In the case of Upper Normandy, this entails the fact that key to the topography and economy of both departments is the river Seine, which flows into the English Channel at Le Havre. The Seine estuary is to the heart of the identity of Le Havre, explaining its significance as a port; the course of the Seine also defined Rouen’s importance as a port, and bisects the city into rive droite and rive gauche. In parts, the Seine also forms the boundary between the two departments. So the Seine axis based upon the bassin has shaped the living and working realities of the people of Upper Normandy in a way that it has not for the rest of Normandy.

This separateness means that whilst one can talk of a Norman identity developing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the so-called ‘Second Industrial Revolution’, beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, and lasting up to the mid-1980s and the advent of the ‘post-industrial’ era, results in Upper Normandy existing as a separate ‘lived space’ distinct from the rest of Normandy- a combination of agricultural and industrial, of conservative and radical, of the culturally refined and the culturally deprived. Upper Normandy can be seen not just as being distinctly different from the rest of Normandy, it can also be used to

---

9 For a further exploration of this notion, which in some ways is a forerunner to the idea of ‘Geography from Below’, see Claude Raffestin, ‘Remarques sur les notions d’espace, de territoire et de territorialité’ in Espaces et Sociétés, No. 41, 1982, pp. 91-96.
10 Olivier Feiertag & Yannick Marec, Pour une histoire de l’axe Seine, Seminar at the Université de Rouen, October 2, 2013.
represent a ‘lived space’ that acts as a microcosm of the principal political and social tendencies of France between 1940 and 1944.

A perilous history? The historiography of the Resistance

The title of this sub-section is borrowed from Laurent Douzou’s work on the historiography of the Resistance and how it had evolved from the Liberation to 2004. Broadly speaking, Douzou sets out a pattern that largely concurs with Henry Rousso’s periodisation given in *Le Syndrome de Vichy*- the period of the glorification of the Resistance, known as *résistancialisme*, which ran from the Liberation to the early 1970s; the revisionist period of *le miroir brisé* or ‘the broken mirror’, which lasted from the 1970s and into the early 1980s; and from there on, a period of historicisation and ‘memory wars’ that characterised the period from 1980 through to the present day. This section wishes not to challenge this interpretation, but to nuance it, whilst also bringing the historiography into the present day, and look broadly at developments in the decade since Douzou published his work.

Firstly, it is important to show that the phase of *résistancialisme* actually had two sub-phases, and as a historiographical school of thought, had two variants that ran parallel to each other. The first phase was immediately in the aftermath of the war, when the Resistance legacy was at its apogee. Obviously this was a time still too recent for detailed historical analyses, so the gap was filled by political discourse, media and the cinema. The most notable film of this first phase was *La Bataille du Rail*, which depicted the heroic struggle of a group of railwaymen against German occupation. Vichyite collaborators are notably absent from the film, showing that the war was regarded as purely a Franco-German affair, one that pitted France against Germany. This was ultimately of a process to try and close the parenthesis of

---

13 Douzou, *op.cit*.
the Occupation- Vichy was declared illegal, and when it was suggested to de Gaulle upon arriving in Paris in August 1944 that he should go to the Hôtel de Ville to proclaim the Republic, he refused, saying that the Republic had never ceased to exist.\footnote{Matthew Cobb, \textit{The Resistance} (London, Simon \& Schuster, 2009), p.268.} The man who led the prosecution at Pétain’s trial later entitled his memoirs \textit{Quatre ans à rayer de notre histoire}, or ‘four years to erase from our history’.\footnote{André Mornet, \textit{Quatre ans à rayer de notre histoire} (Paris, Self, 1949).} Meanwhile, some resisters who returned home from deportation were told to forget that they had been resisters, even if that meant working for people who during the war had been collaborators.\footnote{Papp, \textit{Construction des mémoires collectives dans l’Eure : enjeux et protagonistes (1944-1951)} in Jacqueline Sainclivier \& Christian Bougeard (eds.), \textit{La Résistance et les Français : Enjeux stratégiques et environnement social} (Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1995), p.328.} One could conclude that the resistance legacy was being used as an attempt to actually close down the ambitions of the Resistance.\footnote{This is also the conclusion of Cobb- see \textit{op.cit.}, pp.276-279.}

This, along with the outbreak of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of tripartism in the early governments of the Fourth Republic, meant that the Communist interpretation of the Resistance began to vary from the Gaullist interpretation- and the singular myth of the Resistance began to fracture not with \textit{Le Chagrin et la Pitié} in 1971, but actually in 1947. \textit{Résistancialisme} was actually \textit{résistancialismes}, with Gaullist and Communist variants.\footnote{Wieviorka, \textit{La Mémoire désunie} (Paris, Seuil, 2009), pp.42-49.} The Gaullist vision prided itself on a select few acting on behalf of a silent and suffering majority to liberate France from German occupation. The Communist version also prided itself upon suffering- it styled itself as \textit{le parti des fusillés}, or the party of those who had been executed by firing squad- a figure that the Communists put at 75,000, which was at best an exaggeration.\footnote{Ibid.} The Communists saw their resistance as a continuation of the struggles of \textit{le peuple} against those who oppressed the people, be they French or foreign. It was little wonder that many French Communists made reference to Valmy in 1792, where the French

---

\footnote{15 Matthew Cobb, \textit{The Resistance} (London, Simon \& Schuster, 2009), p.268.}
Revolutionaries defeated an Austrian army invited to restore the full law of the monarchy.\footnote{Claude-Paul Couture, \textit{Les écrits de la Résistance en Seine-Maritime et leurs emprunts à la Révolution française} (Luneray, Bertout, 1986).} Resistance, as François Furet saw it, was for the Communists a legacy descended from the Jacobinism of the Revolution.\footnote{François Furet, \textit{Le passé d’une illusion} (Paris, Calmann-Lévy/Robert Laffont, 1996), p.410.} Put at its simplest, Gaullism and resistance emphasised the state, whilst Communism and resistance emphasised the people.

In the 1950s, \textit{résistancialisme} had to contend with a revisionist movement called \textit{résistantialisme}, which questioned the achievements of the Resistance, and portrayed many resisters as being little better than hoodlums.\footnote{Rousso, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.43-44.} Georges Guingouin and Robert Leblanc were just two of the \textit{maquis} leaders who faced accusations of crimes and offences committed on their watch, and were prosecuted for their alleged crimes, although neither man was convicted in the end.\footnote{Raymond Ruffin, \textit{Ces Chefs du Maquis qui gênaient} (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1980).} These revisionists (the most famous of which was Robert Aron) saw the period of post-war purging known as the \textit{épuration} to be a period of bloodthirsty score-settling- Aron’s \textit{Histoire de l’épuration} gave a figure for those who had been summarily executed that is now generally concluded to have been impossibly high.\footnote{Robert Aron, \textit{Histoire de l’épuration, tome I : De l’indulgence aux massacres, novembre 1942-septembre 1944} (Paris, Fayard, 1967); Cobb, \textit{op.cit.}, p.280.} Historical work began to be produced at this time, partly as a defence against this initial revisionism- the \textit{Comité d’Histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale} (CH2GM) was created in 1951, and Henri Michel, the organisation’s chair, defended the first doctoral thesis on the Resistance in 1962.\footnote{Published as \textit{Les Courants de pensée dans la Résistance} (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1963).} Many of the CH2GM’s correspondents were ex-resisters, and had often led the networks- this was the Resistance, or rather its upper orders, writing their own history.\footnote{Julian Jackson, \textit{The Dark Years: France 1940-1944} (London, OUP, 2001), pp. 6-8.}

Then in 1958, \textit{résistancialisme} gained new traction as de Gaulle returned to power, and the Gaullists set out about consolidating their position by the construction of a mythology. This was reinforced by a series of cultural practices, such as the \textit{Concours de la
Déportation et de la Résistance, which was inaugurated in 1964, the interment of the remains of Jean Moulin at the Panthéon in Paris in the same year, accompanied by a speech by André Malraux, and a renewed interest in the period amongst filmmakers. Yet questions had already started being asked though about just how passive or resisting the French had been, and how much many had profited from collaboration, particularly in the domain of literature, with novels such as Jean Dutourd’s Au Bon Beurre (1952).

This questioning became more prominent firstly with the era of revisionism referred to as le miroir brisé, which was heralded by Marcel Ophuls’ 1971 film Le Chagrin et la Pitié, which looked at the Occupation in and around the central French city of Clermont-Ferrand, and Robert Paxton’s 1972 book Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, which was translated into French in 1974. However, if this questioned the Resistance within the history of France during the Second World War, then the actual history of the Resistance itself remained disconnected from this. Instead, the conflict between the two résistancialismes reached fever pitch. The squabbling was typified by the massive Histoire de la Résistance, a project initially conceived to bring together a national narrative from the mass of research carried out by the historians and local correspondents of the CH2GM. One of the authors, Jean-Louis Vigier, abandoned the project after the second volume - the two remaining authors saw it through to its conclusion in 1981, fourteen years and ten volumes after it had started, by which time the CH2GM had become the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP), and gone beyond purely the history of the Resistance - a reflection of the change in the historiographical climate. But in what was an indictment of the nature of resistance historiography, rather than a conclusion, the final volume offered ‘conclusions’ - so diametrically opposed to each other had Henri Noguères and Marcel Degliame-Fouché

---

became, that they could not agree upon a mutual conclusion, and so wrote separate ones that
dissented from one another- both of which were published.\textsuperscript{31} The Resistance had become
incoherent, and as the film \textit{Papy fait de la résistance} showed in 1983, it had also become ripe
for parody.\textsuperscript{32}

The third phase of resistance history saw a group of professional historians go in
search of resistance history by looking at the archives. It was in some ways a reaction to the
two undeniable facts about resistance historiography- firstly, the resisters who had written
resistance history up to this point were now starting to pass away, and secondly, the debates
around resistance history had become increasingly absurd- what Rod Kedward in the mid-
1970s referred to as ‘crazy mirrors’.\textsuperscript{33} The idea was that testimony had become increasingly
biased, and therefore, untrustworthy. The IHTP was composed principally of professional
historians. As such, archival material was drawn upon, such as \textit{dossiers d’homologation}, and
given primacy in terms of methodology. With professional historians came new readings, and
new narratives. Historians such as François Marcot, Jacqueline Sainclivier, Michel Boivin
and Jean-Marie Guillon began looking at resistance within localities, with the first two
focusing upon sociology and structures, and the latter two framing their studies of the
Manche and the Var respectively within a political framework, willing to look to the earlier
stages of the Resistance between 1940 and 1942.\textsuperscript{34} The result of this shift was that by 1986,
Bédarida was able to claim at a round table organised by the IHTP that ‘the Resistance,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Papy fait de la Résistance} (dir. Jean-Marie Poiré, 1983).
\textsuperscript{33} H.R. Kedward, ‘The Communist Resistance in France, 1939-1941’ in Stephen Hawes & Ralph White (eds.),
\end{footnotesize}
which hitherto had been seen as the chosen territory of oral history now appears as the site of the triumph of written history’.35

Yet this was a simplification: oral history had never gone away. Archives, museums and associations had begun collecting testimonies, and historians working outside the mainstream of French academia made novel uses of oral testimony.36 Rod Kedward looked at resistance in the southern free zone using oral testimony, with two volumes published in 1978 and 1993 respectively.37 Historians working upon women’s history, such as Hanna Diamond, also drew upon the accounts of women to frame a wider account of the Resistance and the role played by women.38 At the same time as spoken testimony was in retreat amongst more historians whose approaches were considered more scientifique, it was gaining ground in the propagating of the memory of resistance. This reflected to some extent a wider problem within the history of the Second World War in France: there was an ever-growing number of theses and books on the topic by professional historians, but the ‘wars of memory’ were becoming ever more problematic. Henry Rousso claimed in Le Syndrome de Vichy that France was ‘ill from its memory’ (as opposed to an illness of memory—i.e. the memories were never-ending), and a book that he co-authored in 1994 with Eric Conan talked about ‘a non-passing past’.39

The 21st century has seen a slight change in resistance history. Though the process of historicisation has continued, there has been a turn back towards testimony as a basis for methodology. The techniques of oral history have developed considerably since the era of the

38 In fact, the Resistance and the Liberation was chosen as the theme for the inaugural issue of CLIO, France’s first gender history journal. See CLIO: Histoire, Femmes et Sociétés (No. 1, 1995), Résistances et Libérations France 1940-1945. See also Hanna Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France, 1939-1948: Choices and Constraints (Harrow, Longman, 1999).
39 Rousso, op.cit.; Henry Rousso & Eric Conan, Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas (Paris, Fayard, 1994).
CH2GM, and now it is not just the details stated that interest historians, but the form of the recollections. The focus is no longer purely on \textit{faits de résistance}, but also on motivations, ideas, how resistance was framed and conceived. Johanna Barasz has looked at \textit{vichysto-résistants}, resisters who both engaged in resistance and yet also had an adhesion to Marshal Pétain, even to the Vichy regime.\(^{40}\) Alya Aglan, for her \textit{habilitation}, wrote \textit{Le temps de la Résistance}, which looked at how resisters conceived the future, and how this influenced their action. She based her analysis upon diaries, letters, reflections, texts and propaganda written by active resisters.\(^{41}\) Fabrice Grenard’s \textit{habilitation} was a prosopographical analysis of the Limousin resistance leader Georges Guingouin which both uses the extensive Communist archives in the \textit{archives départementales} at Bobigny just outside Paris, but also analyses Guingouin’s own account of the period 1940-1944, oral testimony given by Guingouin, Communist propaganda that he edited not just in the Resistance but in the Inter-War years, and also oral history interviews that Grenard himself carried out.\(^{42}\)

The second development has been the widening of the subjects of study. There has been a widening in the definition of resistance, which has inspired historians such as Jacques Séminel working on the shelter of Jewish children from the Holocaust, Margaret Collins Weitz working on female resisters, and Denis Peschanski working on immigrants within the Resistance.\(^{43}\) So the parameters of what constitutes a resister have also changed considerably for many (though not all) historians since 1980.

The third development has been in the number of fields of study. No longer is the Resistance seen as the exclusive domain of military history; it is instead analysed by a variety

of different factors, such as social history (a collection of essays edited by Antoine Prost in 1997), labour history in the case of Claude Malon’s study of Le Havre, police history in the case of studies by Emmanuel Chevet and Christian Chevandier, the history of identities and cultural history for Cécile Vast, regional histories for Sylvain Gregori, and gender history in the case of Catherine Lacour-Astol, whose study of resisters in the Nord department was published as *Le Genre de la Résistance* in 2015. In the case of some of the above, there has also been an intersectionality of factors- societal analysis has informed Gregori’s and Vast’s work, local specificities for Lacour-Astol and Malon- so the range of tools available to the historian has increased, and allowed for new readings and new interpretations of the Resistance.

The conclusions to be drawn from this are that firstly, the historiography has continued to evolve, particularly since the late 1970s, when resistance history may perhaps have seemed in danger of becoming trapped in a cul-de-sac of fierce dispute and increasing irrelevance. Just as the works of Philippe Burrin and Pierre Laborie have permitted us to see that the French population of the time can no longer be seen as rigidly-set categories of collaborators and resisters, but introduced us to other forms of behaviour such as accommodation and passivity, so we can see that resisting and resisters had a wide variety of motivations. The second is that historians are now more conscious about the role of memory in shaping the history of the Resistance. Alya Aglan pointed out recently that the

---


45 Douzou, *op.cit.*

history and the memory of the Resistance have often been constructed at the same time; that is to say that resistance action, resistance memory, and resistance historiography are all very closely linked. This has impacted upon the historical writing, and historians now look beyond *faits de résistance* and take into account shapings, constructions and impressions of resistance histories.

The third and final conclusion to draw is that there is now a new fault line within the historiography of the Resistance. Whereas previously it had been between Gaullist and Communist *résistancialismes*, the new fault line is between *résistance-mouvement* and *résistance-organisation*. The terms were put forward in a 1997 essay by François Marcot, who saw the former concept (which grounded resistance within the much larger context of French society and smaller-scale adhesions to the resistance cause) as an expansion of the latter (which viewed resistance purely through the prism of organisations and networks and resisters who actively conspired or bore arms against the Nazis). This spirit was behind the *Dictionnaire Historique de la Résistance* in 2006, which aimed to sum up the state of play in resistance history and research, concentrating not just on individuals, groups, structures and regions, but also social groups and behaviours. However, when in 2013 Olivier Wieviorka’s *Histoire de la Résistance* was published, the approach was purely based on those who had been active resisters, and mostly upon those who had belonged to networks. Wieviorka’s approach was criticised by Marcot in an essay that appeared in *Le Débat* later that same year, and Marcot expanded further on his concept to even evoke the idea of *résistance-mouvement social*, or the Resistance being a small section of wartime society who had a small number of

---

47 Alya Aglan, *Table ronde : Écrire l’histoire de la Résistance*. Part of *Histoire et Mémoire de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, study day at the Université de Rouen, December 9, 2015.
48 A point also made by Robert Gildea when analysing the oral history interviews of the CH2GM - arguing that the testimony needs to be seen as people giving their accounts, but that this does not necessarily make it untrustworthy. See Gildea, *op.cit.*, p.10.
49 François Marcot, *Pour une sociologie de la Résistance : intentionnalité et fonctionnalité* in Prost (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.21-42.
50 Marcot et al (eds.), *op.cit.*
51 Wieviorka, *Histoire de la Résistance, op.cit.*
full-time resisters, but a larger number of occasional, part-time, even one-off resisters who nonetheless adhered to resistance principles and ideals.  

So this debate, and the recent developments in resistance history since the turn of the century, raises the question as to whether or not resistance history now consists of a divide between ‘The French Resistance’, looking at the organised, structured, even paramilitary resistance, and ‘resistance in France’, looking at the behaviour and forms of resistance. The first bases itself on an analysis of organisations and networks, and their operations; the second looks more at individual resisters and their actions and visions, presenting an image of a movement that is more heterogenous and less formally structured than a military-based interpretation of resistance offers.

The regional historiography for the area around Upper Normandy is not abundant. Most published material is based either upon journalism (such as articles in Paris-Normandie) or memoirs of ex-resisters. Since the 1970s, there have been a number of dissertations for the maîtrise or for the diplôme des études approfondies (and in the 2000s, the Master), which have either focused on, or looked at as part of their scope, the Resistance in the Seine-Inférieure. Some of these have revealed interesting insights into aspects of the Resistance within the department, but the quality of these dissertations is variable, and very few have actually looked at the department as a whole. Catherine Blanquet’s 1979 dissertation did, but was subtitled un essai sociologique, and was primarily a sociological analysis of dossiers held at the departmental Office National des Anciens Combattants (ONAC). It also seems to have been conceived in reaction to the previous CH2GM tradition of testimony, as the dossiers were never analysed individually, meaning that any sense of

---

52 François Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance?’ in Le Débat (No. 177, 2013/5), pp.173-185.
54 Catherine Blanquet, La Résistance en Seine-Inférieure : un essai sociologique (unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1979).
individual peculiarity or trajectory was lost. It should also be noted that the length of these dissertations, at around one hundred pages, did not necessarily lend itself to detailed analysis. A partial attempt at writing a history of the Resistance in Seine-Inférieure came in 2012, with Michel Baldenweck’s doctoral thesis entitled *De la Résistance au rétablissement de la légalité républicaine: histoire de la Seine-Inférieure, 1943-1946.* In terms of sheer volume, this is the most detailed work thus far on the Resistance in the department— the period leading up to the Liberation in 1944 covers approximately three hundred pages. Yet he himself, in writing two follow-up pieces, one covering the structure of the Resistance, and the second looking at its actions and accomplishments, acknowledged that ‘the history of the Resistance in Seine-Inférieure remains to be written’.56

But the shortcoming of Baldenweck’s approach is how resistance is conceived. It is conceived uniquely from a patriotic viewpoint, and the war is seen less as a struggle against Nazism, and more against Germany, evoking even the spectre of a ‘thirty years war’— a historiographical school of thought that emerged in 1947, and which has not really had much traction since.57 Moreover, it is conceived within the perspective of liberating the *Patrie* and restoring the state and legality. Whilst this thesis acknowledges that patriotism and statecraft were part of resistance history, it wishes to contend that this was not the sum of resistance.

The history of the Resistance in the Eure has, in contrast, been written— twice. Firstly, the former leader of the Resistance in the Eure, Marcel Baudot, became in due course the CH2GM’s correspondent for the department, and had also been the department’s chief archivist. He wrote in 1960 a work entitled *L’opinion publique d’un département français sous l’Occupation.*58 This work in fact contained a lengthy description of the Resistance in

55 Baldenweck, *op.cit.*
57 Baldenweck, *De la Résistance...,* pp.14-23. To see the origins of the idea of a ‘thirty years war’ see Albert Muller, *La seconde guerre de trente ans* (Paris, Universelle, 1947).
the Eure. This was followed by one of Baudot’s successors as departmental correspondent, this time of the IHTP, Julien Papp, who took advantage of the recently donated archives (donated, it should be noted, by Baudot himself), to write a history of the Resistance in the Eure in 1988. However, this again largely focused upon organised resistance, and at times tended towards quantitative history.59

Few attempts have been made to write a history spanning across the departmental boundaries, and the attempts that have been made have brought mixed results. Baudot’s 1974 work Libération de la Normandie focuses primarily upon the summer of 1944, and is mostly a military history.60 The best-known work is that of Raymond Ruffin, whose 1977 book La Résistance normande face à la Gestapo, eventually ran to five editions, the last coming out in 1999.61 Yet Ruffin’s style is unashamedly résistancialiste, and far-removed from the standard norms of historical work. The sources are unclear and the footnoting next to non-existent. The summary that one arrives at when looking at the regional historiography specifically is that it lags behind the national historiography- whilst there is work that looks at the Resistance in these individual departments, as per the paradigm of résistance-organisation, nothing as yet examines resistance in either of the departments as per the conceptions of Kedward & Gildea, or even Marcot, let alone across Upper Normandy as a ‘lived space’ to use Raffestin’s term. In short, the history of ‘the Resistance in Upper Normandy’ has been covered and analysed, but that is not the case for ‘resistance in Upper Normandy’, which is a slightly different object of study.

This is the gap in historical knowledge that this thesis aims to fill- the subject of the thesis is not the Resistance, but resistance. The first of our research questions that this thesis

59 Papp, op.cit.
60 Baudot, La Libération de la Normandie (Paris, Hachette, 1974).
61 Ruffin, La Résistance normande....
will address is thus: what was the nature of resistance (as opposed to the Resistance) in Upper Normandy?

Comment peut-on être résistant? Understanding resistance in France

So what is resistance? What makes a resister? In response to the second question, the answer being advanced here is a simple one. Just as Simone de Beauvoir famously wrote ‘One is not born a woman, one becomes a woman’,\(^6^2\) so we can say the same for a resister. A resister is made by a series of influences and factors, such as environment, politics, education, upbringing and culture, but these then cristalise into motivations for wanting to resist, and then the act of resistance itself. It is by committing the act that one becomes the resister.

Resistance was as much about opportunity as what it was about ideology, perhaps even more so. To this end, it is important to look at ‘the capacity to resist’, which was one of the determining characteristics of qualifying resistance for Howard Caygill.\(^6^3\) This is an epistemology in line with E.P. Thompson’s notion of agency in *The Making of the English Working Class*.\(^6^4\) When considering resistance, the capacity to resist is as important as the motivation to resist, because that then defines the nature of the resistance.

But if we can say that it is the act of resistance that makes the resister, then what is resistance? Michel Baldenweck’s view is that the Resistance was a patriotic struggle.\(^6^5\) In this view, the Resistance is conceived purely in terms of the *raison d’État*, and national interest, resisters doing no more than being *enfants de la Patrie*. This is a top-down view of history, whereas this thesis aims firmly to be a ‘history from below’. Moreover, claiming that resistance was purely a patriotic action therefore implies that those who held office at Vichy

\(^6^4\) Thompson, *op.cit.*
and collaborated with the occupiers were not truly French. Yet one’s ability to prove one’s adhesion to being French was one of the most prominent rhetorical features of the time: there was a famous poster of Pétain, and a caption underneath asking people if they were more French than him.\(^{66}\) Moreover, Baldenweck’s thesis also makes the claim that public opinion in the Seine-Inférieure was ‘plutôt maréchaliste’.\(^{67}\) Certainly there was a massive public adhesion to Pétain across France in 1940.\(^{68}\) Would that therefore mean that the majority of French people were not truly French for much of the Second World War? The philosophical debate could become absurd quite quickly, because then a debate about what it means to be French would then follow, and some sort of essentialist conception would have to be devised within the realms of objectivity- yet such an essentialist conception does not, and cannot exist, beyond the mere fact of possessing a French passport and French citizenship. Certainly many resisters conceived their actions as patriotic, and this motivation is clearly recognised in this thesis,\(^{69}\) but that does not oblige the historian to arrive at that same conclusion and write the history of the Resistance as some sort of *hymne à la France*.

How, then, do we understand resistance as a concept broader than the Resistance? Rod Kedward proposed in 2015 a more widespread understanding of resistance across time and place:

The active struggle for freedom must surely be one criterion of resistance, across time and place. The voluntary commitment of civilians to the subterfuge, creativity, secrecy and subversion necessary to fight against

---

66 Famously used as target practice by *miliciens* in the film *Lacombe, Lucien* (dir. Louis Malle, 1974).  
67 Baldenweck, *De la Résistance*..., p.812.  
68 Laborie, *op.cit.*  
69 See chapter three.
overwhelming and unacceptable oppression must also be a constituent. And thirdly, I would want to add, the aim to restore or extend human rights.  

Kedward’s theory is more solidly founded, but in itself, provides possible problems here for the historian. For there were resisters who talked about the importance of order. Jean Thomas conceived his actions as purely a fight against the German enemy, and André Gosse had been in the *Croix de Feu* in the 1930s, and still talked about the importance of order in his testimony.  

Many conceptions of resistance have been advanced when it comes to France in 1940-1944. Henri Michel was one of the first to attempt a definition, which focused on patriotism and ideology, and was couched in terms of combat. This represented the *realpolitik* of *résistancialisme*—the conception of a military resistance, but which encompassed both Gaullism and Communism. François Bédarida defined it as a struggle for ‘the liberty of the nation and the dignity of the human being…against the domination and mostly occupation …by a Nazi regime or satellite’. Bédarida’s conception is not one this thesis wishes to adopt because it could easily lead to a debate as to whether or not Vichy was a National Socialist regime or satellite, which is not the subject of this thesis. Nor would this thesis want to look through the narrow prism of Henri Michel’s analysis, because that would neglect many of those whose resistance was conceived as non-violent.  

However, resistance was more than just theory; it was an action, it was practice. This was something at the heart of a paper by Henry Pickford at the University of Sussex in

---


72 Pierre Laborie, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Résistance ?’ in Marcot et al. (eds.), *op.cit.*, p.33.

73 Ibid, pp.33-34.
November 2015. His argument was that to conceive resistance as a *praxis*, there had to be a clear understanding of the differences between ‘resistance against’, ‘resistance towards’, and ‘resistance as’. *Resistance against* is about what resistance aims to oppose. It is about defining the action that causes the reaction. Yet to see resistance purely in those terms is to conceive of it as a totally reactionary behaviour, and if the reaction does repel and overwhelm the action, then for it not to be nihilistic, it has to have further aims. This is where ‘resistance towards’ becomes important - what is the aim of a resistance? What is its vision of the future? How resisters conceived the future was the subject of Alya Aglan’s *Le temps de la Résistance*. This conception, she argues, was central to how resisters performed their actions and rhetoric. Finally, how is resistance performed? What acts are carried out? How does resistance challenge oppression? This is where we have to consider ‘resistance as’, which characterises, and is characterised by, the practices of resistance. This then takes us towards an understanding of resistance in France between 1940 and 1944.

In fact, Pickford made another vital point, and one that again goes to the heart of how we frame, epistemologically, the Resistance. He pointed out that in philosophy and in sociology, a collective agent can come apart. A superior in a collective may have different motivations to those which someone lower down in that collective has. This we see time and again in the Resistance. Benjamin Remacle led the Communist *Front National* in Seine-Inférieure - but was himself a practicing Catholic and a Gaullist. Pierre Bérégovoy belonged to the youth wing of the Communist resistance, the *Front Unie de la Jeunesse Populaire*

---

74 Henry Pickford, ‘Resistance & Praxis’, paper given as part of *Conceptualising Resistance*, conference organised by the Centre of Resistance Studies, University of Sussex, November 18, 2015.
75 Pickford, *op.cit*.
76 Aglan, *Le temps...*, pp.43-60.
77 Pickford, *op.cit*.
78 Ibid.
79 Interview with Benjamin Remacle, ADSM AV09/022, 1985.
(FUJP), but was never a Communist, and later became Prime Minister of a Socialist centre-left government.\(^{80}\)

This is why it becomes more accurate perhaps to talk about “resistance in France” rather than necessarily “the French Resistance”. Resistance was a much broader, much less structured, much more heterogenous idea, as Marcot, and before that, Jacques Sémelin, have suggested.\(^{81}\) It was also something that was shaped by the resisters themselves. What resistance actually meant to resisters varied depending on their actions and their beliefs. Resistance was an imagined community because what bound these disparate resisters together was not the formal structures of networks, or *comités départementaux de libération* (CDL) or the *Conseil National de la Résistance* (CNR) or even the Free French and General de Gaulle.\(^{82}\) What bound them together was the idea of disobedience, of opposition, of subversion, and the reality of secrecy, of adopting a stance that often went against the hegemony of the day. The *esprit de la Résistance* was a communion whose celebrants felt as though they knew what it meant to them individually.

So what was resistance in Upper Normandy against? It was against, ostensibly, the German occupation. But actually, it ran deeper and wider than that. One resister was keen to stress that it was not the Germans that the resisters were fighting. Germany, like France, was a civilised European nation, capable of producing writers, thinkers, composers. What they were fighting was a corruption of German ideals in Nazism.\(^{83}\) This explains how a number of the early resisters were teachers or intellectuals, who saw the corrosiveness of Nazi ideas.

\(^{82}\) The idea of “imagined community” is adapted from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London, Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7. The use of this theory though is not intended to ground resistance as necessarily nationalistic, but to show that the idea of resistance was socially constructed.
\(^{83}\) Quotation from Marc Perrin, former resister, Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation, Forges-les-Eaux.
This would set the tone for much of the next four years- resistance was more often a war of hearts and minds than a battle of bullets and brawn.

But it was not just Nazism that was being fought, it was Vichy as well. The National Revolution was the name given to the cultural revolution that the Vichy regime embarked upon in the summer of 1940. It adopted as its values travail, famille, patrie (work, family, fatherland). The official name of the administration was changed from République française to the more ambiguous État français, or ‘French State’. Vichy and the ideology of maréchalisme, the personality cult of Pétain, held a form of cultural hegemony, comparable to the dominance of capitalism and fascism in Italy identified by Antonio Gramsci. Bernard Lawday recalled as a young boy at the main grammar school in Rouen, Lycée Pierre Corneille, being set as a homework task by his History master, a letter of gratitude in response to Pétain’s New Year address of 1942. Even in 1944, when Pétain visited Rouen, he was greeted by cheering masses. Pierre Laborie makes the important distinction between le maréchal and the régime du Vichy in terms of the adhesion of the French people towards Vichy, especially in the later stages of the war. So right from the beginning, resistance was an engagement in a counter-society, going against the grain that seemed so accepted by the generality of public opinion. It was a political act, a contestation of this new order of National Socialism and National Revolution. This was very much what the ‘resistance against’ was.

The ‘resistance towards’ was more varied. Some wanted to create a Communist France. Some wanted to rebuild the Popular Front. Some wanted to restore republican values,
and some wanted to rebuild France as a nation of order. Some were simply concerned with driving *les Boches* out of France, and their collaborators out of power as traitors. Some wanted to prove their adhesion to France. Finally, there were some who simply wanted to save the lives of Allied airmen, or resisters on the run, or Jewish children.90

Even more multiple were the various forms of action that made up ‘resistance as’. This was often shaped by the capacity to resist, as well as the aims of the resister themselves-the forms of resistance available were as multiple and as varied as a resister’s agency allowed it to be. This thesis will be focusing on ‘resistance towards’ and ‘resistance as’ and how it shaped the greatest the different strands of resistance in Upper Normandy during this period.

The understanding of resistance that we are therefore advancing in this thesis is that resistance in France between 1940 and 1944 was the contest and challenge, by thought, word and deed, of Nazism & Vichyism, and the policies and institutions involved in making these systems function, in order to create a new society. So the second research question for this thesis to answer is how does a study of ‘resistance’ differ from a study of ‘the Resistance’? To add to this, a third research question- how was resistance manifested, and how did the ‘capacity to resist’ influence and impact upon resistance action?

**For a political history of resistance in France**

At the outset, the aim of this thesis was to be a ‘history from below’ of the Resistance. Initially, this led to wanting to write a social history of resistance in Upper Normandy, a field that seemed neglected after perusing through an initial literature review. Certainly what was to be avoided was an analysis written through the prism of networks, relegating resisters to anonymity. The idea of writing it as a political history seemed like re-treading old ground-

---

90 See Mason Norton, ‘A la recherche de la toile d’araignée et de la cité clandestine : Résister en Seine-Inférieure, 1940-44’ in Feiertag (ed.), *op.cit.*
the interpretation and legacy of the Resistance that persists in collective memory is one divided between Gaullists and Communists, as Pierre Nora identified in his essay on the Resistance in *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, and indeed, the first scholarly works on the Resistance in the 1950s and 1960s concentrated upon its political aspects.\textsuperscript{91} Why then, is it that a political history of resistance offers a new reading today that still remains true to the original intention of ‘history from below’, whilst also avoiding a politicisation of resisters along the lines of either the Gaullist or Communist interpretations charted above?

Political history had been under attack in French academic circles for quite some time at the time that Henri Michel was producing his first scholarly works. The Annales school had rejected it for being \textit{événementielle}, or revolving around single events rather than processes.\textsuperscript{92} The deep divisions in resistance historiography, as mentioned above, convinced many historians by the 1980s that if the Resistance was to become relevant again, it had to go beyond political history, and so a variety of different approaches and genres were employed, as we have seen above.

Political history was not absent by any means. Jean-Marie Guillon’s *thèse d’État* on the Var was subtitled ‘\textit{essai d’histoire politique}’, but if it was a cultural history of the political, it still remained framed by a traditional conception of politics, revolving around parties and ideologies. Guillon’s work was influenced by the idea of the \textit{Var rouge},\textsuperscript{93} and Fabrice Grenard’s study of resistance leader Georges Guingouin in the Limousin rooted itself within a study of rural French Communism.\textsuperscript{94} This state of affairs was reflected in the 2006 *Dictionnaire historique de la Résistance*, which contained essays advocating cultural and

\textsuperscript{93} Guillon, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{94} Grenard, \textit{op.cit.}
social approaches, but very little advocating a political history. The nearest was an entry by Guillon himself entitled ‘Résistance et action politique’. 95

Yet political history in France underwent a revival in the late 1980s, in part owing to *Pour une histoire politique*, edited by René Rémond, in 1988. As well as offering a definition of *le politique* as opposed to *la politique*, as mentioned above, it also showed how political history could offer new understandings of other topics, such as culture, intellectualism, religion, linguistics or war. 96 The concept of *le politique*, or the political, was intended by Rémond to describe everything that governs or regulates everyday life and society more broadly. 97 It was also given an alternative meaning in 2011 by Vincent Peillon, in his work *Éloge du politique*. Peillon defined *le politique* as ‘the search for the common good’, whilst *la politique* was the complex of powers and opinions geared towards the exercise of power. For Peillon, political action is not designed to serve the vehicle of a party political movement, but action for the benefit of society and of everyday life. 98

But although many fields traditionally associated with new political history, such as gender, culture, or identity, or even, in the case of Alya Aglan’s *Le temps de la Résistance*, conceptual history, have made their way into the canon of resistance historiography over the course of the last decade, as we have seen above, new political history itself has not done so. This is surprising, because one of the more notable ways in which the legacy of the Resistance has manifested itself in recent years has been how the spirit of resistance has informed protest movements such as Occupy- demonstrated by the success of Stéphane Hessel’s bestseller *Indignez-Vous!* 99 This in many ways was another example of new political history- part of the book looked at the legacy of the Resistance, and analysed the

---

95 Guillon, ‘Résistance et action politique’ in Marcot et al., (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp. 567-574.
96 Rémond (ed.), *op.cit*.
spirit of resistance through the emotion of indignation, thereby inscribing resistance within the realm of the history of emotions.\textsuperscript{100}

It would seem, therefore, that within Resistance historiography as a whole, there is a gap to be filled. For if “The French Resistance” (\textit{la Résistance}) is inscribed and often linked to a structure sometimes qualified as \textit{politico-militaire}, and perhaps even \textit{la politique}, then “resistance in France” (\textit{la résistance}) is much more indicative of \textit{le politique}, or the political. The political history of the French Resistance has been much charted and much written about, but the political history of resistance in France remains to be explored. In a society where the usual democratic checks and balances had been suspended, and the expression of dissent against authority was repressed, sometimes savagely, resistance was effectively voting by other means.\textsuperscript{101} The fourth research question that this thesis aims to answer interrogates the relationship between resistance and politics- how was resistance a political act in a society where the usual political forums and channels had been suspended? What is political action?

Capturing the heat of the past: a conscious choice of methodology

To add to the epistemological element of this thesis, a careful reflection needs to be made upon the methodology and the sources that this thesis has used. To achieve this, the thesis has decided to rely primarily upon testimony in order to comprehend the individual perspectives of resisters and their trajectories and nuances.

The very nature of resistance meant that archives were not collated at the time. Most resistance groups did not compile archives until after the war when it came to obtaining

\textsuperscript{100} Hessel, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.3-5. Cécile Vast’s work on the MUR concludes that the main feature of resistance was intransigence, but this is a study of a network rather than a range of networks within an area or even an overview of the Resistance. See Vast, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.297-303.

\textsuperscript{101} This can be supported by the idea that the French verb \textit{voter} takes its etymology from the Latin noun \textit{votum}, meaning ‘wish’.
official recognition, a process known as homologation.\textsuperscript{102} Each group had someone who compiled a dossier of what the group and/or network had achieved. This person was known in the bureaucratic parlance as the liquidateur du groupe. Lists of actions carried out, resisters who belonged, resisters who were killed or deported, when the group was formed, when members joined and when, if applicable, the group was broken up and its members arrested, were compiled and then sent onto commissions who then decided whether or not to recognise or reject the demands.\textsuperscript{103} These archives were the basis for many of the works produced in the 1980s and 1990s.

As an archival source, these dossiers remain important to any historian wanting to understand the Resistance. They act as the backbone of what we know about organised resistance, the résistance-organisation. Some dossiers are little more than just nominative lists and formal legal attestations, but others give detailed descriptions of their members, motivations and achievements. Some, such as the Comité Clandestin de Nonancourt in the Eure, offer an intriguing insight into the early years of resistance, and how such groups and their structures worked in a small town.\textsuperscript{104}

The trouble, as Julien Blanc put it, is that if these archives are irreplaceable, they are also biased.\textsuperscript{105} For a start, the bureaucratic processes involved were considered complex. One of the peculiarities that this entailed was that a number of groups were given, and continue to be known by, names that they did not have at the time. So the famous group of the early Resistance in Paris, the Musée de l’Homme actually had no name whilst it existed, and was given that name because of where many of the resisters in the group worked and because the

\textsuperscript{103} Blanc, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.136-138.
\textsuperscript{104} ADE 88 W 53, ‘La Résistance à Nonancourt’.
\textsuperscript{105} Blanc, \textit{op.cit.}, p.135.
bureaucratic process after the war demanded that the group had an official name. Likewise the group in Upper Normandy known as the Maquis de Barneville was actually known to the maquisards themselves as ‘Le Lorrain’- the term ‘Maquis de Barneville’ was chosen because it stuck out more. This situation whereby baptism occurred at the same time as winding up and writing the group’s history is an ironic one, and in itself, shows the divide between the reality of resistance and the vulgarisation process that the bureaucratisation of the Resistance legacy thus entailed.

Moreover, the process was one that was prone to allegations of manipulating, and also privileged the networks over the individuals. Louis Jouvin, a resister from Grand-Quevilly, was arrested for having sabotaged telegraph wires, and then deported as a political prisoner (what the Nazis would term Nacht und Nebel), yet had his demand for recognition as a Combattant Volontaire de la Résistance (CVR) rejected. Elsewhere in France, Guy Môquet was presented by President Sarkozy in 2007 as an embodiment of resistance- arrested for belonging to the underground Communist Party, he was executed by firing squad at Châteaubriant near Nantes in reprisals for the Resistance assassinating the Feldkommandant of Nantes in October 1941. Yet Môquet was never part of an organised resistance network, and even had he not been executed, would not have been eligible for the CVR. Therefore, by the strictest legalistic definition, Guy Môquet could not have been considered a resister.

Another survivor of the camps as a resister who was deported, Jean Thomas, saw his group (and thereby himself) refused recognition as resisters because the group had only lasted 87 days- three days less than the minimum of 90. The group was eventually recognised in the

106 Blanc, op.cit., pp.139-140.
107 Michel Croguennec, ‘Le Maquis de Barneville entre mythes et réalités’, in Feiertag (ed.), Histoire et Mémoire de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure ...
108 Blanc, op.cit.
109 Correspondence between the author and Catherine Voranger, grand-daughter of Louis Jouvin, December 10, 2015.
1990s after the rules were changed to allow for a minimum of 80 days. 111 However, because he belonged to a resistance network in 1943-44, Maurice Papon was awarded the CVR-despite having worked for the Vichy authorities at the prefecture of the Gironde in Bordeaux until very late in the day. 112 A methodology that accepts Papon but rejects Môquet raises, at the very least, questions as to its reliability.

Furthermore, the CVR process privileged a military narrative that was overwhelmingly male and favoured the administrative prism of the state, and therefore became an instrument of, and an instrument for, ‘top-down history’. Equally, it favours quantitative history. It rarely looks at nuances, at motivations, at sentiments or at backgrounds. 113 This leads to what this thesis sees as the principal difference between ‘resistance in France’ and ‘the French Resistance’. The latter comes very much from the former, yet it has become a concept that serves very much a teleological purpose, designed to act as a support to a narrative that propagates a glorious national meta-narrative, known in French as le roman de la nation, even if that means forgetting the roles of others within that narrative who do not quite fit.

This is why the importance of testimony is critical for an understanding of resistance in France. Consequently, this thesis will be based largely upon testimony by resisters themselves, both oral and written. There is a large archive of oral testimony at the archives départementales in Rouen, including interviews with a wide range of resisters from those who helped to lead the CDL in Seine-Inférieure to those who simply hid Allied airmen. 114 Oral testimony for the Eure is not so plentiful, but there are some interviews that do exist, most notably one of Marcel Baudot that was recorded in the mid-1980s. 115 But there is also

111 Thomas, op.cit.
113 Gildea, op.cit., p.12.
114 ADSM AV09, interviews passim.
115 Interview with Baudot, AN 72J/216-222, 1986.
the importance of written testimony. Some of this was carried out for the purposes of either the works carried out by successive departmental correspondents of the CH2GM or for the
doixiers d’homologation, whilst others are memoirs & diaries. Whilst it has already been stated that many of these archives were focused purely on the details of actions, some testimonies in these archives are far more detailed, and offer us a rich insight into what life was like as a resister.\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, whereas the archives were compiled by resistance leaders, which I have identified in chapter two as being a certain kind of resister, oral histories look at both resistance leaders and those either lower down in the Resistance, or on its perimeters. This allows us to explore a wider range of motivations and resistances, as well as hear voices that resistance history has sometimes neglected, as Robert Gildea has recently showed in his 2015 work \textit{Fighters in the Shadows}.\textsuperscript{117}

Of course, such testimonies are by no means exclusively correct. There are, on occasions, errors, and oral testimony may well not possess the same attention to fine detail or exact chronology that more formal written archives might possess. But this in its turn is revealing and useful to the historian- it shows that these testimonies are just as liable to shaping as the archives mentioned above are. Indeed, oral historians such as Alessandro Portelli see oral testimonies as shaped narratives.\textsuperscript{118} In Portelli’s work \textit{The Death of Luigi Trastulli} for example, Portelli talks about how some witnesses have ‘displaced’ the murder of a worker from 1949 to 1953, to fit in with their narrative.\textsuperscript{119} Portelli also identifies how personal memories are organised around personal events, and so other events are negotiated around this. The problem shown is what happens when two measurements of ‘lived time’

\textsuperscript{116} Two files that are particularly useful in this sense are the written testimonies of Serge Duret, AN 72J/122, and Simone Sauteur (AKA ‘Puce’), ADE 88 W 56.
\textsuperscript{117} Gildea, \textit{op.cit.}
collide, and shows the limits sometimes encountered in trying to use oral history as a source to establish an objective chronology of events.\textsuperscript{120}

Portelli’s work initially appeared in the 1980s, but when the bulk of the interviews cited here were carried out, oral history methodology was not necessarily as widely-known in France as in the UK or in Italy. Thierry Lamiraud carried out much of his research using questionnaires in the style of Mona Ozouf, and oral history was sometimes seen as another way of carrying out quantitative history, which as late as the 1980s, was a dominant form in social history in France.\textsuperscript{121} Others were semi-structured, which in the interviews that I have carried out, is the same form that I have followed, allowing for the questioning to be tailored to each individual history.

However, even then mistakes occurred in recollection. In the testimony of Yvonne Dissoubray, for example, the interview had been going for about twenty-five minutes, during which time she had been using as a key event in her recollection of the early years of the war the \textit{exode} when her family had to flee, and her father returned to find that his property had been looted. It was only when she began to refer to direct action in 1940 that the interviewer noticed a discrepancy, and it emerged that she thought the \textit{exode} had occurred in September 1939, and not June 1940. This can be explained by a lapse in memory but also by colliding chronologies. Objectively, the war began in 1939; personally, for Yvonne Dissoubray, the war began in 1940 with the invasion of the Germans.\textsuperscript{122}

The biggest way in which the shaping of narratives affects oral testimonies in this study is turning points. Left-wing resisters cite the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{120} Gildea, \textit{op.cit.}, p.13. He quotes Daniel Cordier, who said that oral history could help to atmosphere and attitudes, but was not very good with specific details. This issue was pointed out in a book review of an edited volume based on oral history around the events of 1968 in Europe. See Daniel A. Gordon, Review of ‘Europe’s 1968: Voices of Revolt’, \textit{Modern & Contemporary France}, Vol. 22, No.3, August 2014, pp. 411-413.

\textsuperscript{121} Correspondence with the author, August 2012.

\textsuperscript{122} Interview with Yvonne Dissoubray, 1982, ADSM AV09/107.

\textsuperscript{123} Interview with Tony Larue, ADSM AV09/024, 1985; Interview with Christian Sénard, ADSM AV09/011, 1991.
whilst conservative ones focus on the introduction of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) in 1942-1943. This also explains, in some cases, differing entry points into the Resistance. Here, the question is emphasis. This can be lost in transcription, and underlines an important point- oral history interviews are meant to be listened, not read. Those who entered into resistance earliest focus upon pre-war upbringing in their accounts and thereby contextualise their experiences and their views. Hence, it took Tony Larue, in his 1985 interview, the best part of two hours before arriving at 1939 and the outbreak of war. Gustave Avisse takes a long time too to get to the start of the war, talking initially about his early working years, his tough background, and industrial relations in late 1930s Le Havre. Those who started later, such as Raoul Boulanger and André Gosse, prefer to talk about the war- Boulanger talks little about his early years, and Gosse tries to avoid his past in the Croix de Feu or his early support for le maréchal.

But all structure local events and patterns around particular events that had little to do with them, on the bigger scale of the war. Those in the FTP talk about ‘after Barbarossa’, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, or those in the countryside will talk about ‘after the STO’ in 1942-43. A number, on both sides of the divide, talk about the meeting between Pétain and Hitler at Montoire in late 1940, which appears to have taken upon an enormous significance in retrospect. Incidentally, it seems like it is younger resisters who are least concerned by the greater picture, and more influenced by things they actually saw, or could directly relate to. Georges Touroude was motivated by the death of Guy Môquet, who, like him, was born in 1924. Bernard Lawday was motivated by having to step aside for German soldiers in the street whilst on the way to school. ‘It seems petty, but it was a

124 Interview with André Gosse, op.cit.; Interview with Raoul Boulanger, ADSM AV09/004, 1982.
125 Interview with Larue, op.cit.
127 Interviews with Gosse & Boulanger, op.cit.
personal humiliation’ he said. Pierre Jouvin’s was the arrest of his parents, although as someone who became a party member at the earliest opportunity (and remains a member today), and who had grown up in the sectarian Communist counter-culture of the 1930s, it seems likely that he would have resisted anyway.

So even the chronological errors show us something about the nature of resisting and the forms of resistance, the standpoints of individual resisters. This also shows us that sometimes the accounts written retrospectively have been shaped for posterity. André Gosse, for example, wrote his memoir of resistance *Ceux de l’Ombre* in 1992. This came out nine years after his interview with the Seine-Maritime’s archivists, and just a year before his death. A world of tranquil agriculture in rural Normandy, interrupted by a stint of national service, and then by the arrival of the Germans, is described. Nowhere to be found is his *Croix de Feu* past nor his views on the Popular Front (which were revealed in 1983 to be scathing), and the Anglophobia he admitted to in an oral interview, situated firmly in the context of Mers-el-Kébir, is marginalised. There were hints of Gosse trying to distance himself from an embarrassing past in his oral history interview- he went out of his way to say that he did not try to overthrow the government in February 1934, whilst admitting to his membership of the *Croix de Feu*. ‘I can’t remember which demonstration I took part in when I was in Paris, but it wasn’t 6 février’ he said. His voice was also more halting when describing his activity prior to 1941, but considerably less so for his resistance years.

For aspects such as chronology, there are limitations to oral history, and it is clear that the narratives presented are shaped by those testifying. But the fact that oral histories are shaped should not result in them being overlooked- written, more formal, archival sources are

---

129 Interview with Bernard Lawday, *op.cit.*
130 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, March 26, 2013.
131 André Gosse, *Ceux de l’Ombre* (Luneray, Bertout, 1992)
132 Interview with Gosse, *op.cit.* For a further examination of the events of 6 février (a riot on the streets of Paris in 1934 when protestors tried to storm the Chamber of Deputies in the Palais Bourbon), see Chris Millington, *From Victory to Vichy* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2012), pp.52-82.
just as susceptible to shaping, either wittingly or unwittingly. What oral history does allow for, unlike the archives of the *homologation* process, is an exploration of the nature of both action & motivation, and is also revelatory as to the visions of resisters—aspects that *homologation* did not concern itself with. Used in conjunction with written archives, oral history allows us to arrive at an account of resistance that reveals potentially significant divergences from the traditional account of the Resistance, allowing for a greater range of actions and motivations.

Alistair Thomson, in his 1994 work *Anzac Memories*, looks at how individual accounts are constructed by negotiation between individual experience, personal identity, and collective memory. A similar process could be observed here, and actually furthers one of the aims of my research—a study that would put the resisters themselves back at the heart of the resistance narrative, and which would not just be a standard re-telling of what was evoked by Ruffin in the 1970s. This was what I tried to achieve in the interviews that I myself carried out, and also what I was interested in in the interviews that I listened to.

It became clear within the first year of formal doctoral study that the number of interviews that I would be able to carry out myself would be very few, and not necessarily enough to sustain a full PhD thesis. The discovery of a large corpus of oral history interviews carried out by the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM) was undoubtedly a huge help in this respect. Mostly they were carried out between 1981 and 1986, with a few exceptions such as the interview of Christian Sénard, in 1991, and a handful of interviews carried out between 2010 and 2013. These were carried out mostly by two historians on internships at ADSM, one of whom, Vincent Auber, had been the author of a *mémoire de*
The structure of these interviews was one of formality, with a certain empirical basis to the questioning for the most part. The interviews did cover a larger amount of ground than just their time in resistance - they also covered family backgrounds, and the years before the war. But much of the interviewing felt focused upon establishing facts, and it also felt as though the choice of interviewees did not really go much beyond the organisational structure of the Resistance. It was almost as though the interviewers were trying to shape the interview and the resulting narrative chronologically, whereas today, interviewing acknowledges that memory does not necessarily work chronologically, or even accurately in terms of chronology, as Portelli’s research shows.

An issue was therefore that the interviews were trying to do something that oral historians now recognise that oral history is not always well-designed to do. In the interviews that I carried out personally, I adopted a semi-structured style of interviewing. Whilst there were some loose parameters that I followed, and the interviews followed some common norms, I chose not to ask very much in the way of pre-prepared questions. I started the interviews with a standard question designed to establish the shaping of a witness’s memory, namely ‘what is your over-riding memory of the period 1940-44?’ From there, I would discuss briefly that period, before going back to the beginning, and establishing the person’s roots and origins, and then tailoring the questions to the experiences of the interviewee and what they had been through. There was a clear justification for this - influenced in part by Alistair Thomson’s arguments, I believe that the histories of individual people during the war require a certain amount of subjectivity insofar as each memory and each experience is negotiated. I believed that this could give the process of testimony more legitimacy within an

---

exploration of resistance than by analysing resistance through a prism of ‘comparative histories’, comparing and contrasting individual resisters in their turn. There were still some common ground between all of the interviews- each interview covered the same ground, such as politics, the exode, motivations for resistance, reactions to events such as the defeat of 1940, Barbarossa, the STO, or the purges (épuration), and views on the period both at the time and looking back across a gap of seventy years. This allowed for the gauging of different perspectives, and maintaining some kind of empirical perspective necessary for the collection of evidence in historical enquiry, yet also respecting the individuality (and subjectivity) of witnesses and their negotiations between selves, experiences, and the broader context of both the Resistance as an organisation and the memory of the Second World War.

In selecting both the testimonies used, and the quotations taken from these testimonies, I have made conscious decisions to construct an analysis rather than an account of resistance- that is to say, rather than write a detailed, definitive, even exhaustive history of resistance in Upper Normandy, I have chosen instead to chart its main evolutions and components. On occasion, the police archives have provided some of the testimonies- the police raid that broke up the CDL in Rouen in May 1944 confiscated the minutes of a previous meeting, which allows us a rare glimpse into the inner workings of a highly secretive committee and their discussions.\textsuperscript{137} But for the most part, these have come from the corpus of interviews collected in the 1980s. On their own, these testimonies would have led to a sometimes contradictory, or even uncertain, history- looking at resistance only through the eyes of testimony and nothing else would be indicative of the dangers of over-relying on a single source. But without these testimonies, as Laurent Douzou wrote, ‘the history of clandestinity is not possible’.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{137} Investigations of Inspector Louis Alie, counter-terrorist police, Seine-Inférieure, into the CDL of the Seine-Inférieure, May 1944, ADSM 54 W 276/8011.
\textsuperscript{138} Laurent Douzou, \textit{La Désobéissance} (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1995), p.18.
The choice of testimonies used is intended to represent both breadth and depth. Breadth in that I did not want to focus too heavily on one group of resisters, such as Communists, or members of the SFIO, or Gaullists. I have tried to use oral testimonies from Communists, those aiding airmen, those who defined themselves as Gaullists, and those who saw themselves as apolitical, to name but a few categories. The choice also represents depth because of the detail involved in many of the recollections. Not all of the interviews go into great depth, and some are only half an hour or so long. The interviews that have been shorter I have tended to quote less often. But many of the interviews do go into depth, and discuss a range of activities but also views on the events of the time. These tend to reveal insights less into the actual history of resistance, but more into the experience of resistance. To some extent, I have used the so-called ‘recovery theory’ of oral history in order to find out about individual experiences, whilst acknowledging the subjectivity of these experiences, and then using wider secondary reading and theoretical interpretations as part of my broader analysis of these sources as a whole.139

The passages above highlight both the benefits and pitfalls of oral history. The biggest difficulties are that the passage of time makes it very difficult now to write an oral history carried out primarily by the historian themselves- realistically, such histories of the period written from now onwards will rely heavily upon archives of oral testimony. This puts the shaping of the testimony, in many ways, out of the hands of the historian. These sources also need, on occasion, to be corroborated, either with other oral sources or with more formal written archives. They can also be more subjective than written sources, and in some ways

139 In her 2010 work, Lynn Abrams makes a distinction between two theoretical approaches to oral history. Firstly, there is ‘recovery theory’, which is where oral history is used to provide evidence not available from other ‘conventional’ historical sources, and secondly, a more cultural history-based approach whereby theoretical readings of interviews are carried out in order to arrive at new understandings of the past, based on the idea that testimonies are constructs, and should be interpreted as much for their import as expressions and representations as much as any factual import. Abrams though points out that some historians, such as Daniel James, have methodologies that blend both of these approaches, See Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Abingdon, Routledge, 2010), pp.4-9.
are more partial and more incomplete than some written sources, particularly when these are resisters who were not amongst the leaders of resistance networks- the testimony of Pierre Jouvin is not a definitive account of resistance in Grand-Quevilly for example, and the testimony of Bernard Lawday does not give a definitive history of resistance in Rouen around Lycée Pierre Corneille.\textsuperscript{140}

Yet it is the subjectivity that offers a benefit by comparison to the formal written archives. These testimonies reveal a wider set of motivations and ideologies- as Pickford stated, the collective agent can come apart.\textsuperscript{141} Resistance was a subjective movement- it meant different things to different resisters, whom in turn, resisted in different ways in the pursuit of different goals. Oral testimony allows the historian to discover these subjectivities in a way that the archives of the CVR do not allow for, and interpret these different meanings, in the same way that Luisa Passerini identified that the pursuit of oral history was not simply a case of researching facts, but of comprehending the testimony as representation.\textsuperscript{142} Here in this thesis, the testimony is not just a case of filling in the gaps of history- although it does bring insights where written archives are lacunar, and that is also a benefit in itself- but indicative of an interpretation and a strand of resistance. A final research question for this thesis to consider therefore is what testimony tells us about the nature and experience of resisting, and how it was conceived and regarded.

**The aims and structure of this thesis**

The aims of this thesis are to answer the research questions that arise from the survey of the historiographical, epistemological and methodological aspects of resistance history cited above. Firstly, what was the nature of resistance in Upper Normandy? How did it function

\textsuperscript{140} Author’s Interviews with Pierre Jouvin, March 26, 2013, and Bernard Lawday, March 25, 2010.
\textsuperscript{141} Pickford, *op.cit.*
within the specific locality of Upper Normandy, not necessarily favourable topographically to guerilla-style action, yet nonetheless a ‘lived space’ representing a microcosm of what France was like at that time? How can it be considered through the prism of historicisation, that is to say analysis through a historical context, rather than historisation, the simple chronology and collection of facts and data?

Secondly, how does a study of ‘resistance’ differ from a study of ‘the Resistance’? That is to say, resistance as a behaviour of defiance, a social engagement rather than necessarily a military or a patriotic one, an engagement grounded as much within the idea of Aristotle and the polis as the idea of an engagement for a state or nation. How did the ‘movement’, as Marcot put it, differ from the organisation?

Thirdly, how was resistance manifested and represented? How did the ‘capacity to resist’ influence resistance action? What can an intersectionality of different factors, such as gender, generation, identity, politics, culture and class tell us about resistance?

Fourthly, how was resistance a political act in a society where the usual political forums and channels of peacetime had been suspended? In what ways was it inherently political? How, and in what ways, was resistance a manifestation of the political?

Finally, what does resistance testimony convey to us about the nature of resisting and the experience of resisting? How was resistance conceived and regarded, both at the time and with reflection? All of this leads to the central research question of the thesis, which is how can we better appreciate the nature and character of resistance in the under-researched region of Upper Normandy without recourse to the conventional approaches of political history or military history?

The idea of resistance as being political and an engagement for the polis and la cité, is the idea around which the main body of this thesis will be structured. The first two chapters will be grounded within the idea of instrumental politics, resistance designed principally to
fundamentally alter society. Chapter one looks at Communist resistance, which conceived resistance as a continuation of the French Revolution of 1789. Influenced by Marxist thinking, the view of many Communists was that the Revolution and the Republic had been subverted, and that resistance action was a chance to complete the process of historical materialism - an acceleration towards the promised land of the Communist mode of production. In essence, this was resistance towards the ‘grand soir’, with the intention of revolutionising the polis, and imposing a set vision of it. This chapter will also identify why these resisters were more prone to carrying out violent forms of resistance, arguing that an intersectionality of factors needs to be considered between politics and capital in the Bourdieusian sense of the word, and looks at whether these resisters could be considered the subalterns of resistance.

Chapter two looks at resisters that preferred to fight the war, initially, by ways of propaganda and hearts and minds. Unlike the Communists, these resisters were not aiming towards a ‘grand soir’ - politically, their allegiances were closer to the Socialists of the SFIO, and the political centre. Their inspiration was less the Revolution of 1789, and more the Popular Front of 1936, and where the Communists were revolutionary, the resisters in this chapter could be seen as being gradualist. As such, they saw the need to carefully prepare for what would come after the Liberation, and began to turn their attention towards this as the war progressed. This represents the higher echelon of resistance in Upper Normandy, who were determined to shape not just the alternative to Vichy, but the succession to Vichy. As such, intersectionality will again be used, this time to identify the possible existence of an ‘aristocracy of resistance’, suggesting that their main aim was to gradually forge the polis.

The final two chapters will look at expression politics, or resistance action designed principally to express a refusal of both Nazism and Vichy. Chapter three looks at the idea that resistance was part of a patriotic struggle—serving the *polis*. This thesis does not aim to deny that many resisters engaged in resistance purely as a patriotic duty. What this chapter does do is examine the nature of that patriotism, and how it was constructed and how it manifested itself. In this chapter, we will identify the existence of multiple patriotisms. This will distinguish between those who resisted for the Republic, those who resisted for the Nation as *Patrie*, and those resisting for France as an adopted country. The gendered nature of both patriotism and resistance will also be considered here, and the nature of resistance as a manifestation of masculinity and identity, proposing that we understand patriotic resistance as part of a process of ‘remasculation’, or a restoration of masculine self-worth to a collective mentality, and proof of belonging and service to the *polis* as part of a process of social integration.

In order to understand the phenomenon of resistance in French society at that time beyond the Resistance, chapter four looks at resistance which did not directly engage with the enemy, but which was nonetheless a form of resistance to both Vichyite collaborationism and Nazi occupation because it challenged and/or defied their ideologies and regimes by helping other resisters, or by aiding the Allies, or by sheltering those who were at risk of persecution—a concept this thesis terms as ‘auxiliary resistance’. Their being on the edges means that these resisters are sometimes more neglected in resistance history, but this chapter will show that these resisters were in fact critical to the functioning of organised resistance, and will show that resistance can also be understood not just within the political and the military but also the everyday. It will also use an intersectionality of gender, location and age to show that the capacity to resist and resistance action was governed as much by environment and opportunity as what it was by politics and ideology. This will show that resistance was not
necessarily about direct confrontation, but instead could help those in direct confrontation, and also undermine collaboration and occupation more indirectly—thereby, this was resistance action as aiding the *polis*.

Finally, the conclusion will answer the research questions outlined in this introduction, arguing that resistance should be redefined and understood as a manifestation of the political. This is based in personal and everyday life, framed firmly within the context of Aglan & Frank’s *Guerre-monde*, which affected everyone in wartime France.\(^\text{144}\) It needs to be understood via an intersectionality of factors, situating it within what Bourdieu termed ‘the social world’.\(^\text{145}\) Patriotism was a part of what resistance was about, and it would be wrong to ignore it, but resistance should not be seen solely through that prism. Patriotism was not the sum of resistance. Michel Baldenweck stated in 2015 that ‘the Resistance was not about disobedience, it was about patriotism’.\(^\text{146}\) But this is a generalisation that is not wholly supported by the evidence of resisters testimony, only partly. Jean Basille resisted in Rouen in the early years of the Occupation, and stated that for him, entering into resistance was not about defending France, but about defeating Germany and fascism.\(^\text{147}\) Other resisters have given motivations that conflict with and contradict with Baldenweck’s ideal-type of an *enfant de la Patrie* that informs his conception of resistance.\(^\text{148}\)

This thesis argues that if there was a common denominator to resistance, it was that resisters resisted because they believed that they were acting for the good of their country as they conceived it, their immediate environment, their *cité*. This involved two forms of the political, the politicised political, designed towards the eventual exercise of power, and the personalised political, action for oneself and for the common good. Resistance as a whole

\(^\text{144}\) Aglan & Frank, *op.cit.*
\(^\text{146}\) Seminar ‘Résistances dans l’axe Seine’, Université de Rouen, March 25, 2015.
\(^\text{147}\) Testimony of Jean Basille, ADSM AV09/165, 1983. See also testimonies of Fainstein, *op.cit.*, and Lawday, *op.cit.*
\(^\text{148}\) Baldenweck, *La Résistance*, *op.cit.*, p.5.
was not always politicised, yet it was by its inherent nature political, action for, and the search for, the common good within *la Guerre-monde*.
Chapter One

Towards le grand soir: Communism and Resistance

Upper Normandy does not tend to feature highly in histories of the French Resistance on a national scale. But where it does feature is at the beginning, in June 1940.\textsuperscript{149} Etienne Achavanne was an agricultural labourer from the Eure-et-Loir. After the exode, he found himself in Upper Normandy. Working as a group of labourers charged with the upkeep of the Boos airfield just outside of Rouen, on June 20, he cut the phone lines to the airfield, which though a civilian base prior to the war (and after it too), was then being used by the Luftwaffe. The next day, there was an Allied air raid on Rouen. The kommandantur in Rouen attempted to warn the Boos airbase, and to scramble the planes, but was unable to do so. Twenty German servicemen were killed, a number of aircraft destroyed on the ground, the airfield put out of action for some time. It would not play any part in the Battle of Britain.\textsuperscript{150}

Achavanne, according to Alain Alexandre, was denounced by a work colleague, arrested, and on June 28, sentenced to death by a German military tribunal sitting in Rouen. He was executed by firing squad at Bonsecours, at 5am, on July 4, his death being announced by the Kommandantur two days later. He was the first resister in France to be executed.\textsuperscript{151}

Despite the best efforts of historians and chroniclers, Achavanne remains an elusive figure. He had only just arrived in the Rouen area, so knew virtually no-one-itinerant workers tended to keep themselves to themselves. Research in his home village uncovered slightly more, but also seemed to reveal more questions than answers. The youngest son of an instituteur-sécretaire de mairie, he worked as a farm labourer, having fought in the trenches.

\textsuperscript{149} Olivier Wieviorka, Histoire de la Résistance..., p.13.
\textsuperscript{150} Alain Alexandre, Résistance et Libération à Rouen (Presses de l’Agglomération de Rouen, 2004), p.8.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
of the First World War.\textsuperscript{152} But his death certificate recorded a man who had never married, never had children, and was normally domiciled in the same village where he had born.\textsuperscript{153} His trial was conducted in German, and as a military tribunal, would not have permitted much time for liberty of expression, which would not have exactly been willing to hear anti-German, pro-French sentiments. It is not known whether he made a final patriotic gesture in front of the firing squad, such as singing \textit{la Marseillaise} or crying out ‘\textit{vive la France}!’.\textsuperscript{154} Equally, there is no certain knowledge of what his motivations were. Speculation has hinted that Achavanne might have been incited to do it by a British officer, or was working for the British himself. Another version, cited by Raymond Ruffin, states that Achavanne had set himself up as a one-man Maquis- he was arrested for trying to resist a German soldier trying to confiscate a weapon.\textsuperscript{155}

Achavanne’s action was isolated- the angry gesture of a loner. It shows that resistance was not necessarily born of the leadership of grand figures such as de Gaulle or Jean Moulin, figures for whom documentary evidence and contemporaneous accounts exist in abundance, but came, as much as anything, from the ignored of history. Yet it also shows the limitations of early resistance- the need for coherence and co-ordination. To write an account of resistance in Upper Normandy, it is important to understand the thoughts, actions, visions and reflections of individual resisters, both amongst its leaders and amongst some of its humbler participants, showing resistance amongst both the remembered and the ignored.

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{152} Gilles Perrault, \textit{Dictionnaire Amoureuse de la Résistance} (Paris, Fayard, 2014), p.13. Perrault cites that this research was carried out by Alain Guérin, a journalist and historian working for the Communist newspaper \textit{L’Humanité}.
\item\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, p.12.
\item\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, p.12.
\end{enumerate}
The long resistance: Communism in France

The incident at Boos in June 1940 shows a clash of something much deeper than Nazi Germany against ‘free’ French. It reveals a social antagonism, a conflict between exploiter and exploited. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Achavanne was a Communist, the struggle between exploiter and exploited was one in which the French Communist Party (PC) would have recognised themselves.

The PC had been founded in 1921, after a split with the Socialists at the Tours Congress of the SFIO in December 1920. It allied itself firmly with the Third International, and over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, became increasingly Stalinist. It adopted the tactic of classe contre classe, and unlike other political parties, defined itself by its lack of capital, hailing the ‘people’ over the ‘elites’. What this translated as was that the PC was not so much a political movement as a social one. It was a working-class movement that sought not merely to capture the institutions of power, but to transform society. To that end, the PC at this time was an anti-system movement, and deliberately presented itself as such.

In the view of Philippe Robrieux, this would involve a revolution, to be achieved by violent means - the opposition of proletarian violence against capitalist violence. The aim would be to construct a ‘new Man’ and an ideal society. This was to be achieved via one direction (the Soviet Union) and one means (the PC). Bernard Pudal saw that the roots of this were not politically ideological, but drawing upon social stigmatisation and ostracisation; a development, particularly in the 1930s, of ouvriérisme, or ‘workerism’, which strongly attached itself to a working-class identity; and the vision of an alternative state and alternative

---

157 Prior to November 1943, the French Communist Party was known as *Parti Communiste* (PC); after this date, it was known as the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF). In this thesis, the party will be referred to as the PC for events up to and including that date, and the PCF for all events afterwards.
The words of Gustave Avisse, from a strongly non-conformist and left-wing background, who had left school at the age of eleven without qualifications, and went to work on the docks in Le Havre at the age of sixteen, convey this sense of ‘otherness’, and of viewing the Soviet system of a contemporary Eden. “For us, the USSR was above all a country of hope, a country that had succeeded in slaying its bourgeoisie.”

There was also a sense of longer-term injustice. Ronald Tiersky and Jean Touchard have both identified historical antecedents to the PC - Touchard, the revolutionary syndicalism of the Belle Époque, whilst Tiersky, writing in the 1970s, saw that the Tours congress, and the increasing hostility of the 1920s between Communists and non-Communists, ‘has successfully continued the schism in the polity that broke open in 1789, and which has been renewed repeatedly over the next 130 years in different forms’. The PC was therefore an alternative Left, intended to be revolutionary as opposed to the gradualism of the Radicals and Socialists.

Robrieux makes reference to the First World War in Communist mindsets, the memory of which was still alive and acute in the minds of those who had served in the trenches - but also points out the impact of both the Spanish Civil War and the events and strikes that brought the Popular Front to power between 1934 and 1936. This was reflected in the testimonies of former Communist resisters in the Upper Normandy region. Louis Eudier, a trade unionist and activist from Le Havre entitled his memoirs *Notre Combat de Classe et de Patriotes, 1934-45*. Oral testimonies by Christian Sénard, Gustave Avisse and Pierre Jouvin also talk about the 1930s, both in terms of the social struggles of industrial action and poverty, and also the political struggles in terms of the clashes of the 1930s and
the conflict in Spain. The presentation of their resistance was therefore one of something deeper than a straightforward Franco-German struggle - it was a deeper and longer struggle. Both Sénard and another resister, Jean Basille, talk about the importance of the Communist idyll in their vision and their action, and prolonging or continuing previous struggle. This shaping of the narrative could be seen as refuting the accusation of the Communists only resisting after Barbarossa, and the compromising of the Communist position by the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939, but is also indicative of the Communist conception of their own engagement - their activities were presented as resistance before the Resistance.

A final element was praxis, the putting into practice of theory. To this extent, resistance was the perfect means to realise this veneration of the Soviet Union and Marxist idealism, with the aim being the idea of *le grand soir*, the idea, dating from the era of the Commune, of the moment of profound transformation. Resistance by Communists would therefore be about praxis, and applying the theories that the party’s pedagogic approach in the 1930s had expanded upon. This chapter will analyse the evolutions of this praxis in resistance over the course of 1940–44, and explain the approach of individual communists, as opposed to the Communists as a bloc, to resistance during this period, and how their beliefs and backgrounds impacted and shaped their trajectories within resistance.

**Accelerating Rhetoric - Communist Resisters, 1940-1941**

Le Havre had already established a reputation in the inter-war years and before for being one of France’s most strike-prone cities, a regular scene of industrial unrest, and the source for the unrest that occurred in 1936, when a strike in the Bréguet factories rapidly spread to

---

167 Interview with Christian Sénard, 1991, ADSM AV09/011; Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, March 26, 2013.
168 Interview with Sénard, *op.cit.*; Interview with Jean Basille, 1983, ADSM AV09/165.
rest of the country. Within four weeks, France had come to a halt. Le Havre was also the setting for much social deprivation, with an alarmingly high rate of alcoholism, and living conditions that were cramped owing in part to the city’s geography, trapped between the sea, the Seine estuary, and a steep range of hills to the east, and in part to the tight city boundaries, as well as an influx of workers looking to earn a living from the port. In addition to the notable implantation of Communist-supporting workers, the city’s politics still witnessed tensions from the era of the Popular Front- workers had come out strongly in favour, yet the city’s Mayor and Deputy, Léon Meyer, had not stood on a Popular Front ticket, and in July 1940, during the emergency joint session of the two chambers of parliament at the Opera House in Vichy, had voted in favour of suspending the constitution of the Third Republic, and granting full powers to Marshal Pétain.

Trade unionism in Le Havre had evolved differently to the rest of Upper Normandy, if not France. For whilst Le Havre had a tradition of revolt, trade unionism in the city, ever since the wave of strikes that hit the port in 1922, favoured anarcho-syndicalisme over the PC. The outbreak of the war accelerated this tendency. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, took French Communists, and many others besides, by surprise. The party’s leadership in Paris vacillated for three days as to what line to take, only halted by Daladier banning the party.

For André Duroméa, a young activist working as a metalworker, the pact came as a total surprise. ‘There was no warning’ he recalled ‘no sign that this was coming. We did not understand this pact at all. It didn’t make any sense to us.’ The PC had, in its own peculiar

---

174 Interview with André Duroméa, ADSM AV09/004, 1982.
way, supported the Popular Front just three years earlier, formed to combat the dangers of fascism and national socialism. Now, the Communists were being asked to be friendly with a country in Germany that was avowedly National Socialist. This was a shift too many for many Communists in Le Havre. Members began to tear up their membership cards, and when Daladier banned the party, many more were only too eager to sever their ties with the party. Then, as France entered the war, and industrial activity began to centre on the war effort, the *anarcho-syndicalistes* shunned the PC, seeing it as the enemy within.\(^{175}\) Whilst Duroméa claimed to have no understanding of the pact, many more thought they did. Consequently, the underground PC in Le Havre, come the end of 1940, had as few as fifty members, falling from several hundred before the pact.\(^{176}\) Those who were once Communist now adopted the colours of the *anarcho-syndicalistes*, purely to keep their jobs and stay out of prison. Even Duroméa, who joined the party in 1936, and owed much of his education to it, admitted that he had remained a member at this time, but was virtually inactive, having little or no contact until the end of 1940.\(^{177}\)

For Avisse, the role of the PC, and with it, the unions, had always been to defeat fascism- he recalled the simultaneous strikes against the far-Right leagues in February 1934, and in support of the Popular Front.\(^{178}\) To this end, though he supported the pacifist stance of the PC in 1939, he still answered the call-up papers, and fought in the French army until its defeat in 1940. Avisse admitted that the reception of the Pact was a very poor one, and that even most of those who remained disagreed with it. The leadership of the party’s rump in Le Havre instead focused upon the local nature of politics, and what the PC and the Conféderation Générale du Travail (CGT) had achieved in the city, and tended to espouse local causes rather than national ones. Though an illegal organisation, with Vichy

---

\(^{175}\) Dhaille-Hervieu, *op.cit.*, pp.127-128.

\(^{176}\) Ibid, p.127.

\(^{177}\) Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*

\(^{178}\) Ibid.
unsurprisingly choosing to uphold Daladier’s decree of August 26, 1939, the now-clandestine
PC, together with the still legitimate CGT, pursued both legal and illegal activities. The legal
activities were publicly led, albeit without the word ‘Communist’ being anywhere to be seen,
by Louis Eudier, an activist before the war who worked in the docks, and had gone on strike
in May 1936. These activities consisted of peaceful demonstrations, usually outside the sous-
préfecture, over social conditions, such as benefits for the unemployed, which Vichy had cut,
and support for the homeless. There were also disputes over working conditions in the
factories, against the perceived assault upon the rights won under the Popular Front. 179 This
eyearly resistance was a continuation of the class struggle for Eudier. The demonstrations were
small-scale, and the target of this early resistance was Vichy rather than the Nazi
occupiers. 180 Nonetheless, the illegal activities were targeted at both. 181 Underground
newspapers, such as L’Avenir Normand, began to appear at the end of 1940, capitalising on
the first wave of disappointment with the regime- the notorious Montoire meeting between
Pétain and Hitler, with the now-famous photograph of the two men shaking hands. 182

The underground press was how André Duroméa became involved in resistance. ‘My
role initially was the sorting and the distribution of the tracts. We made a master copy, and
then turned out the copies through a roneograph.’ 183 Working as a metal-turner, operating the
roneograph at the necessary speed was not a problem for him. Nor, perhaps surprisingly
given that in terms of manpower and numbers, this was the PC’s nadir in the city, was
distributing the papers a major problem. He cited as the biggest challenge at that time
something altogether more basic. ‘Paper was in very short supply. For each edition, we
needed 20,000 sheets.’ 184 This explains why the profession that gave the Francs-Tireurs the

182 Interview with Marie-Thérèse Fainstein, ADSM AV09/102, 1982.
183 Interview with André Duroméa, op.cit.
184 Ibid.
most help during this stage of the Occupation, and who were the network’s most useful members in Duroméa’s view was lorry drivers- ‘they supplied us with a lot of material, not just in terms of weapons but mostly in providing the necessary paper for the tracts’. There was, however, no question of even sabotage at this time. Louis Eudier recalled ‘our resources were just too limited. It was difficult enough with the protests, the propaganda, the running of the party… to have effectively organised sabotage would have been giving me too much to do’.186

Communist resistance in Le Havre was thus firmly entrenched in the tradition of trade unionism. This was also the case in parts of the Rouen area- Henri Levillain recalled being asked by Paul Lemarchand to reconstruct the Communist base in Rouen firstly in the dockyards of the Chantiers de Normandie, and then within the suburb of Grand-Quevilly.187 In this instance, the clandestine PC was almost indistinguishable from the still legal Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). Their activities and personnel overlapped, but there were important nuances- the CGT rooted their activities within le social, the PC within la politique. Yet this distinction was one of complimentarity rather than diametrical difference- they were two sides of the same coin, motivated by the same desire, as early Communist resistance shuttled between the legal and the clandestine.188

However, Communist resistance elsewhere had a wider set of roots. Philippe Robrieux showed that if French Communism at this time had a solid anchoring within the labour movements, it also had roots that were more intellectual, within the liberal professions.189 Though ouvriérisme was in the ascendency within Communist circles and the structure of the PC, there was also an intellectual strand, distinctly apart from the working-

185 Interview with André Duroméa, op.cit.
186 Interview with Louis Eudier, ADSM AV09/007, 1982.
187 Interview with Henri Levillain, ADSM AV09/130, 1983.
188 Ibid.
class blue-collar ranks of the PC. Though still admiring of the USSR, it was based largely on readings of Marx and Engels, and in turn, influenced by the concept of the social sciences—what Isabelle Gouarné has called *la philosoviétisme*, and the development of a French interpretation of Marxism.\(^{190}\) This was reflected in Rouen and Dieppe, whereas a counterbalance to the working-class wing typified by Eudier, Duroméa and Lemarchand, the liberal profession wing of Communist resistance revolved around two schoolteachers— in Rouen, André Pican, and in Dieppe, Valentin Feldman.

Pican was a primary teacher in Le Houlme, whose involvement with the PC pre-dated the Occupation, and for whom Communist ideology represented the best critique of the state that France was in.\(^{191}\) However, for Pican, it was an approach that addressed the everyday as much as the elevated. The roots of Pican’s resistance were through what the French might term *éducation populaire*. He gave classes firstly at the Rue des Tranchées in Rouen (which according to Jean Basille, were ironically known as ‘catechism classes’),\(^{192}\) then, after the PC went into illegality in 1939, in private homes in Sotteville.

Whereas many Communist-organised classes were about explaining the party line to a wider audience, Pican’s were about political awareness more generally.\(^{193}\) His approach was that in the wake of the summer of 1940, a national consensus had sprung up around the Pétainist myth, reinforced by Vichy’s propaganda, the state-controlled press, right from the *Journal de Rouen* to *Radio-Paris*, and the values of the National Revolution, a doctrine linking back to the triptych of ‘Work, Fatherland, Family’, and which was to be disseminated via a number of different channels, including education and the media. If Vichy, and with it

---


\(^{191}\) Interview of Germaine Pican by Thierry Lamiraud, 1984, Private Archive. See also Vimont, *op.cit.*

\(^{192}\) Interview with Jean Basille, *op.cit.*

\(^{193}\) Ibid.
Nazism and Fascism, were to be defeated, then it would have to be done by firstly deconstructing, and then breaking, the cultural hegemony that it had established over the summer of 1940. Only then could the Communists begin to construct their vision of the future.194

From then on, the Revolution could begin. It is telling that for Pican, the Communist uprising was envisaged in the terms and language of 1789- he made reference in his diaries to an ‘assault upon the Bastilles [sic]’.195 His diaries take a form that reflect uncannily his resistance- a passage from cultural critique to action. The action was to free Communist prisoners. As Pican wrote “COMMUNISTS IN PRISON, FRANCE IN CHAINS!”196 In Pican’s eyes, the fate of France was irrevocably intertwined with the fate of Communism- because, using Marxist ideology, the Communist mode of production was the final destination, to progress towards when the old regime collapsed.197 Perhaps the most remarkable thing reading Pican’s account, written in 1941, is that in scope, it seems remarkably similar to Marc Bloch’s *L’étrange défaite*, with both works trying to find and offer explanations for the disastrous defeat of 1940. Yet neither had knowledge of the other, and Pican’s Communism, which begins by announcing ‘a struggle for peace and liberty’,198 was incompatible with Bloch’s analysis, which was far less strident in terms of ideology, and relied more on an evidence-based method of ‘example and fact’.199 Pican saw the ideological anti-Communism of the authorities, and their supposed opposition to the ’people’, as being to blame, whereas Bloch looked at the weaknesses of French military leaders. The first part of

---

194 Interview with Germaine Pican. See also ‘Journal d’André Pican’ in Vimont (ed.) *op.cit.*, pp. 169-196.
Pican’s work analyses what took place in 1939-1940, the second part looks at the present time (1941), and then the conclusion envisages the day of the uprising.200

Education was therefore the first step in accelerating towards this vision of the future. The second step was propaganda. Feldman, a secondary teacher of philosophy who had been at one time the youngest agrégé de philosophie in France, along with a young schoolmistress at Avremesnil called Marie-Thérèse Lefevre, started a resistance paper whose title indicated the horizons of the Communists- L'Avenir Normand.201 Literally meaning ‘The Norman Future’, it strove to widen the messages put across in the classes of Pican and Madeleine Dissoubray (the sister of Yvonne), but also strove to offer an alternative commentary on the war and on current affairs, which would not be found either in the Vichy-controlled press, or in the Free French broadcasts on the BBC, offering a critique of both Vichy and the Nazis.202 Even before Barbarossa, it was clear that the Communists were striving to create a school of thought that rejected both Pétainism and Gaullism, after, of course, having rejected and overthrown Nazism.

The testimony of Pierre Jouvin is telling in this regard- children of PC members belonged not only to the Jeunesses Communistes, but also to another youth organisation for pre-teens, les pionniers, which was meant to be an alternative to the Christian-based Scouts.203 The testimony of Albert Castelli shows that Communists met in their own social locations, such as his father Hilaire’s bar-tabac in Petit-Couronne.204 Jean Basille recalled that at the école normale, there were marked differences and disputes between those who supported the socialist SFIO and those who were communists as early as 1936.205 For many of these in the latter category, such as Basille, involved in the PC since 1937, resistance was

201 Interview with Marie-Thérèse Fainstein (née Lefevre), op.cit.
203 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
204 Interview with Albert Castelli, ADSM AV09/242, 1985.
205 Interview with Jean Basille, op.cit.
less about patriotism, and more about ideological cause and defence: ‘If we entered into the Resistance, it was not to defend France; it was to defeat Germany, and to defeat fascism’. Right from the early days of the Occupation, the Communists were a breed apart from the rest of the French society, outsiders determined to convert others with zeal. This, along with the problems and constraints posed by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, explains why the doxa for 1940-1941 was ‘politics, not weapons’, though Basille claims that the national Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) gave out an order for individual resisters to start collecting weapons before Germany’s attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941. This claim is reinforced by Duroméa, who stated that Organisation Sécrète (OS) was formed in Le Havre in early 1941. Initially, the arms collected were very small scale- ‘Nothing very much- just a few pistols’- but down on the waterfronts and in the factories, an illicit arms trade was starting to take shape. Over the course of 1941, this trade was only to accelerate, and lead to armed resistance.

Resistance at this time was therefore not engaged in violent action, but nor were the Communists blindly following the orders of their superiors in the hierarchy. Robrieux view is that Communists entered resistance before the PC as an organisation did, using the example of the miners’ strike of May 1941 in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where there were clashes between striking miners and German soldiers sent to break the picket lines at the pit heads. Though there was no violent confrontation between Communist resisters as a mass and the occupying forces, even in Le Havre, the amount of activity up to this point indicates that rank-and-file people within the clandestine PC were not passive within this first year of Occupation, and that there were Communist resistance activities in Upper Normandy before June 1941. Resistance activity though at this time, if not violent, could be described as Gramscian- namely the shunning of violent action in favour of a critique and combat of the

---

206 Interview with Jean Basille, *op.cit.*
207 Ibid.
208 Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*
socio-cultural hegemony upon which both the Vichy regime and Nazism was constructed. This could be seen as laying the groundwork for the idea of *le grand soir*, and provided the foundations for the future development of Communist resistance in the following years.

**Towards Action, 1941-1942**

The invasion of Soviet Russia was greeted as a turning point by many Communists, but not always a positive one. On the one hand, it opened up the second front, both in the wider context of the war, and in the narrower, localised context of the Resistance in Upper Normandy. The battle between fascism and communism was now starker and more apparent, and the Communists could come more openly into the Resistance as an organised group. However, for some, the news was a catastrophe, as it meant firstly that the repression would be increased, and secondly, for most of 1941, the news from the Eastern Front was not good. The Communists also met with increased repression in 1941, with the arrests of resisters such as Eudier, and the first executions of Communist resisters for sabotage in Le Havre, Joseph-Louis Madec and Léon-Albert Lioust. Whilst Alya Aglan has shown that historical precedent was a tool much-employed by the Communists at this time, and the parallels that they drew between Barbarossa and Napoleon’s invasion of 1812 were not favourable—Napoleon reached Moscow in October, Hitler had yet to do so— the testimony of Yvonne Dissoubray indicates that this propaganda did not always convince even resisters and militants themselves.

The intensification of the war meant that a more violent, revolutionary attitude could be pursued, with actions such as sabotage, attacks, and robberies. André Pican, though still committed to a propaganda war via the mediums of education and culture, established a

---

section of the Front National before the end of June.212 An example of sabotage at this time included Quevilly, where a number of communication lines were cut. One of the linemen for the Poste, Télégraphes et Télécommunications (PTT) was Louis Jouvin, a leading member of the pre-war PC in Grand-Quevilly, who had served as an infantryman during the debacle of 1940, and had been evacuated from Berck-Plage, eventually being repatriated by way of Bournemouth and Bordeaux.213 Rather than stay in England, he chose, along with the rest of his unit, to return to France to continue the struggle, and after the armistice, he made his way back to Grand-Quevilly, where his family lived, and where he, his wife, and several other former comrades revived the pre-war Communist rayon, and began to organise resistance not just along the lines of propaganda (an initiative organised mainly by the pre-war party branch) but also cutting cables- organised via his postal work.214 The phrase ‘chacun bricole dans son coin’ springs to mind, for linemen were highly mobile, and it was an easy way to identify which lines were of most importance to communications and infrastructure, whilst simultaneously providing an easy excuse for the resisters to cover their tracks.215 This form of action enjoyed a certain amount of success in the early years of the Occupation, but from 1941-1942 onwards, the Nazis required French communities to guard installations that were within the boundaries of their communes, which made opportunities for sabotage harder to come by for PTT employees. In the case of Louis Jouvin, whose political sympathies were not exactly a mystery, and likely as not under some kind of surveillance, he was caught, arrested, then sent to Compiègne.216

212 Thierry Lamiraud, Les instituteurs et l’Ecole Primaire Publique de Seine-Inférieure de 1939 à la Libération (Luneray, Bertout, 1986), p.157. The Front National should be understood as a movement backed by the Communists which made overtures to resisters outside of Communist milieux; it bore no link to the Front National of modern times, a far-Right political party founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen.
213 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
214 Ibid.
215 The phrase is also used by Vincent Auber to refer to the nature of action across the whole of the Resistance in Seine-Inférieure more generally. See Vincent Auber, Aspects de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure (unpublished Mémoire de Maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1981), p.8.
216 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit; ADSM 51 W 405.
At the same time, the Front National were beginning to make their military presence felt. In October 1941, they sabotaged the train tracks at Pavilly on the Rouen-Le Havre train line, causing a derailment, and putting the line out of action for some months.\footnote{Lamiraud, op.cit., p.158.} Then, in December, they carried out the first instance of armed action that was intended to directly damage life and limb, by attacking a German bookshop in Rouen city centre.\footnote{Ibid.} By bringing resistance onto the streets of Rouen, the Front National were very publicly undermining both the nature of occupation, via one of its means of cultural diffusion, and also Vichy’s status as a bulwark and guarantor, of public security.

Such a challenge drew a stinging response. Within a week, nine activists had been arrested in raids across the Rouen area, including one of Pican’s closest associates, and leading member of the Communist-affiliated \textit{Union des Femmes Françaises} (UFF), a schoolteacher called Lucie Guérin.\footnote{Lists of Communist resisters arrested in the department as drawn up by the prefecture, ADSM 51 W 427. The roles of female resisters will be looked at in more detail in chapter four. For more information on the UFF nationally, see Sandra Fayolle, \textit{l’Union des Femmes Françaises: une organisation feminine de masse du Parti Communiste Français (1945-1965)}, (unpublished PhD thesis, université de Paris-1-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2005).} Whilst many of those arrested between 1940 and 1941 for Communist activity were sentenced to just a year or two in prison, or were even acquitted, Lucie Guérin was found guilty, sentenced to eight years, and transferred to Rennes to serve her sentence.\footnote{ADSM 51 W 427, op.cit.} The arrests forced Pican and his wife Germaine to go into hiding in Paris, and the front page of the \textit{Journal de Rouen} on December 22, 1941, showed his photograph, along with a description, and that of Paul Lemarchand, underlining the threat that they were perceived to be to the regime and their idea of public order.\footnote{\textit{Journal de Rouen}, 22 December 1941.} It was the end of Pican’s activities in Rouen. In February 1942, he was arrested, along with his wife, in Paris. Mme Pican was sentenced to detention for having aided terrorism, and from there, she was
deported to Germany. André Pican was found guilty of terrorist activity, and executed by firing squad on May 19, 1942, at Mont Valérien.

There was also an intensification of the situation in Le Havre. The arms trade of 1941 that Duroméa evoked was successful enough for the first armed attack to be carried out in December 1941, followed by a more daring attack on February 23, 1942, when two Communist resisters opened fire on a Kriegsmarine parade. The Nazi response was not long in coming- two days later, they arrived en masse at the Pont de la Barre, near to the port, and went round the working-class district of the city, one of the poorest, dependant economically and socially on the port, rounding up anyone who got in their way, arresting known troublemakers and raiding houses and properties believed to be housing equipment and those wanted by the counter-terrorist brigades. A large number of arrests were made, out of whom thirty-two were deported to detention camps within France, and later, the concentration camps. They were nearly all sailors, dockers, or factory workers. If anyone had doubted that this was linked to the class struggle and the socio-economic disputes of the previous twenty years in the city, then these doubts were dispelled- leaving the Communists with a ready-made audience for their language and rhetoric of class struggle and workers’ solidarity. The rhetoric of a final struggle, of exploiters against exploited now had a tailored audience.

This resulted in the formation of a Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) unit in the city, in April 1942. From then on, also emboldened by news of German retreat on the Eastern Front, they turned its attention in Le Havre towards violent action, as well as sabotage. The notorious speech by Pierre Laval on June 20, 1942, where he stated that he hoped for German

---

222 Interview with Germaine Pican, *op.cit.*
225 Ibid, pp. 139-142.
226 Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*
victory ‘because without it, Bolshevism will be everywhere in Europe’, further strengthened their resolve, and meant that Vichyist symbols and public buildings were now legitimate targets for violent action. Thus, there were two attacks on German soldiers in April 1942 alone, but there was also an attack on a garage owned by a branch secretary of Jacques Doriot’s *Parti Populaire Français* (PPF) in October of that year, and on December 3, the employment office for the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (STO) on the Boulevard de Strasbourg had a brick thrown through its window, with a hammer and sickle drawn onto the brick.\(^{229}\)

All of these actions were carried out by the FTP, and all had common features: brevity, symbolism, violence, and a desire to cause fear amongst the enemy. This becomes clear in the oral testimony of Duroméa: ‘The strategy for our networks was clear- we struck, then we fled. It was practical- we did not have the means for long guerrilla warfare because we simply weren’t strong enough to resist for very long.’\(^{230}\) By strength, he meant not just physical, or even numerical, but financial too. Later on in 1942, he became the leader of the FTP in Le Havre, after his predecessor, Fernand Chatel, was called to Rouen following the arrest and execution of André Pican. He found the biggest problem faced by all resistance groups was resources, and in particular, money:

> Obtaining money was always a problem. We had no resources because we were declared illegal in 1939, and it was a tight era. Eventually, we had some 106 members of the clandestine party who were willing and able to give financial support. The only problem then was that we couldn’t keep


\(^{230}\) Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*
lists of these members and supporters, as we were illegal, and it was a breach of internal security. As leader, I was responsible for collecting, organising and then distributing the money. I had to have a good memory to remember all the faces and addresses of our backers!231

1941-42 saw a shift in the emphasis from Gramscian-style critique (in part because of the execution or arrest of most of those who had led the critique in the first year of the Occupation) to occasional actions which were more violent and more visible. There was, however, a more symbolic value to these forms of resistance rather than a military-style planning in the choice of targets- resistance at this stage was more about expressing the deeply-felt anger felt by Communist resisters than about leading a guerrilla-style war against Nazi occupation with the intention of defeating and overthrowing the enemy, even if that was still the long-term aim, along with realising le grand soir. As such, this period can be regarded as a transitional phase in the history of Communist resistance in Upper Normandy.

**Maquis or not Maquis? Guerilla warfare and insurrection, 1942-1944**

In parallel to the FTP in Rouen itself, a separate cell of Jeunesses Communistes (JC) started in October 1940 in Petit-Couronne, where the aim of defeating the Germans was almost, according to one of its members, Albert Castelli, a secondary aim. ‘Our first aim was to revive the Communist machine, and then we felt that we could defeat the Germans.’232 To this end, the JC in both Petit-Couronne and in Quevilly concerned themselves with tracts and propaganda between 1940 and 1942.233

---

231 Interview with André Duroméra, *op.cit.*
232 Interview with Albert Castelli, *op.cit.*
233 Ibid; Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, *op.cit.*
It would be a combination of factors that would lead this approach to be jettisoned in favour of a very different approach. Firstly, the older generation of Communists, who, given the nature of Communist social relations and structures that we have already looked at, were often the parents, or sponsors, of the younger resisters passing by the JC, had largely been arrested. Both Pierre Jouvin and Albert Castelli’s fathers had been arrested and deported, whilst their mothers were either on the run, or under close surveillance. André Duroméa’s father had also been deported, never to return. Secondly, the course of the war had turned again by the spring of 1943. Though the Allies’ attempt at a landing at Dieppe had been unsuccessful in May 1942, the Wehrmacht had suffered defeats in North Africa, and most notably of all, Stalingrad. Thirdly, the STO relève specifically targeted their generation. By now having to provide much-needed wages for families increasingly feeling the economic hardship of the Occupation, they had become breadwinners. That bread was now threatened by a conscription to aid an enemy that many of them had spent much of the last two years in some cases resisting, and who they had been brought up to consider, in ideological terms, the personification of a diametrically opposed ideology and thought system.

This coincided with the agreed need for an FTP unit in and around the Rouen area, to facilitate their operations in the Seine Valley. Henri Levillain recalled at the end of 1942 being contacted by Paul Lemarchand to discuss the creation of an ‘action unit’ in the Seine Valley, the geographical feature which, as we have seen in the introduction, is key to the functioning of Upper Normandy as a territory. Added to this was the fact that some of the members of the JC were now coming of age, and into the party proper, meaning that these resisters needed a new role. The JC had primarily been responsible for propaganda, but in Grand-Quevilly, had begun to turn to direct action thanks to the resourcefulness of their

---

234 Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*
235 Interview with Henri Levillain, *op.cit.*
leader, Albert Lacour. From a family that had belonged to the pre-war rayon in the commune, and a metal worker in the docks, Lacour had been in resistance since the summer of 1940, was considered to be faithful and able by the local party hierarchy, and had been carrying out, where possible, sabotage missions in local factories. His attitude impressed Chatel, and the latter felt that it was time for Lacour to take on board new missions, and lead a group responsible for carrying out sabotage of installations and infrastructure in both the area around Rouen, and the Seine Valley, which in parts served as the boundary between the two departments of Seine-Inférieure and the Eure, and held a strategic importance for both the local economy and the Nazi war effort. The Seine axis was vital to infrastructure, with the number of small ferries, or bacs, key to transport, and contained Le Havre & Rouen, two of France’s biggest ports.

Whilst this thesis wishes to avoid any geographical determinism, it should nonetheless be stated that it was very difficult to constitute a Maquis unit in Upper Normandy, and in particular the Seine-Inférieure. Whilst the Eure, and in particular the west of the Eure, with its landscape and sparse population, could lend itself towards a Maquis struggle, the Seine-Inférieure had several disadvantages. Naturally, it is comparatively flat, with a lack of mountains, or anything approaching a mountain. There are some woods and forests, but nothing on the scale of the Landes or the Ardennes. Demographically, there are a large number of small villages, two major cities (Rouen & Le Havre), and a third medium-sized city in Dieppe. Finally, the department had a heavy German military presence, especially in coastal areas, but also further inland as a consequence of the V1 sites. All of these were cited as good reasons by Benjamin Remacle, the leader of the Front National in the department in

1944, as to why a Maquis was both difficult and pointless.\textsuperscript{239} An extra reason, not cited by Remacle, might have been that rural Normandy had not been pre-disposed kindly towards Communism in the Inter-War years.\textsuperscript{240} Even within the FTP, it seems that there were doubts. André Duroméa recalls the organisation’s leadership in the region tried to discourage resisters, in particular young ones, from setting up a Maquis unit, because of the risks involved.\textsuperscript{241}

Barneville-sur-Seine is a small commune in the Eure. Though near to the river Seine, it is not on a main road to anywhere significant. To get to the caves in the hillside above the village, which overlook the river, there is only one road, which peters out into a track, and then a path into a wood.\textsuperscript{242} Its choice seems to come down to a simple fact- Lacour’s sister had married and was living on a farm near to the caves.\textsuperscript{243} Even the caves themselves were scarcely viable for the purposes of running a Maquis- Christian Senard recalls re-visiting Barneville many years later, and being amazed that the caves could accommodate as many \textit{maquisards}, and as much ammunition, as they did.\textsuperscript{244}

Lacour firstly constituted a group, consisting of eleven young men, including himself, mostly from the \textit{rive gauche} of Rouen, in particular Petit-Quevilly.\textsuperscript{245} Most had been members of the JC, so were already known to him, even to the point of having grown up with them- virtually all were fleeing the \textit{relève}, as only one of them was over the age of 22.\textsuperscript{246} They had also tried to form a maquis in the area around the Bois de la Garenne in Sotteville, which was short-lived.\textsuperscript{247} Three more had been FTP in Picardy or in the north-east of the

\textsuperscript{239} Interview with Benjamin Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{240} Paul Mansire, ‘L’évolution politique de la Seine-Inférieure sous la 3e République’ in \textit{Annales de Normandie} (Vol. 6, No. 3-4, 1956, pp. 307-319).
\textsuperscript{241} Interview with André Duroméa, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{242} Interview with Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{243} Chatel, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{244} Interview with Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{245} Although not exclusively, as Croguennec has pointed out, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{246} Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{247} Interview with Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
Seine-Inférieure, and were also fleeing the draft.\textsuperscript{248} The youngest out of the fourteen was just 18.\textsuperscript{249} Having constituted a group, and checked that Barneville was a suitable location, in late April 1943, Albert Lacour led them out of Rouen, and into the Eure, and into a tunnel of caves just above Barneville. Such was the relative remoteness of the location that the villagers never saw them. They left exclusively under cover of darkness, except to go to Lacour’s sister’s farm to pick up rations.\textsuperscript{250}

The following month, they recruited possibly their most unlikely member- Rudolf Pfandhauser, an anti-Nazi Austrian deserter from the \textit{Wehrmacht}. Though the exact circumstances of how he came to find out the group’s existence are a mystery, he joined them in May 1943, convincing them of his genuine anti-Nazi sentiment, bringing his army uniform with him, ammunition, and \textit{Wehrmacht} intelligence.\textsuperscript{251} Pfandhauser practically became one of the leading resisters, after Lacour himself, and was a considerable advantage to the group. Not only was he able to inform them as to what installations were of particular importance to the occupiers, he was also able to act as a decoy. He would apparently dress up in his uniform, and walk behind the other resisters, who would be walking hands above their heads, making it seem as though he had taken them prisoner.\textsuperscript{252} Another way was for him to enter a police station, and requisition bikes- on more than one occasion, when it was seen that the bicycles were going to people who were neither German nor soldiers, police officers who had the temerity to intervene found themselves pistol-whipped.\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{248} Croguennec, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{250} Chatel, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{251} Christian Senard states that Pfandhauser, who they only ever knew as Hugues, told them that he had served in Normandy, then been sent to the Eastern Front, from where he had deserted. Quite apart from the improbability of anyone being able to travel from Austria directly to Normandy, and even more so travelling from the front line (which in 1943, was still deeply implanted in Soviet territory), Senard adds that Pfandhauser’s French was limited- they did manage to understand one another, but conversations were not detailed or especially frequent, and usually consisted of gesticulation and broken French. A misunderstanding between the two parties, or possibly a desire to show commitment on Pfandhauser’s part, cannot be ruled out, though Senard did assert that he was markedly anti-Nazi. Interview with Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{252} Interview with Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{253} Chatel, \textit{op.cit.}
The motivations were common - opposition to Nazism, opposition to Vichy and both what it symbolised and those who symbolised it, a loyalty to their friends and communities, and the desire to defeat Nazism as quickly as possible. Those who had had pre-war links to the PC were also motivated by the idea that they were taking part in the realisation and building of a Communist France. However, whilst it may well be concluded that Pfandhauser was a pacifist and an anti-Nazi, and therefore in all likelihood opposed to the Anschluss, it is not known whether his outlook was as fundamentally Communist as that of Lacour’s for example.

It would seem likely that one way or another, Pfandhauser provided the information that led to the biggest single attack by the Resistance on the Wehrmacht in Upper Normandy prior to D-Day. On June 18, 1943, the Barneville maquis successfully derailed in the Eure a German train full of soldiers and sailors travelling from Cherbourg and Caen on leave back to Germany. The train left the rails, four carriages crashed into one another, and a fire broke out. 24 German soldiers were killed, many more injured.

Actually determining what actions they carried out is complicated. The Vichy authorities and the Nazis put out a list in September 1943 in the Journal de Rouen claiming a long list of actions, stretching back to the autumn of 1942. Raymond Ruffin, in his 1977 book La Résistance normande face à la Gestapo took this list at face value, claiming that it showed the enormous success of the group, and that given the attitude towards censorship in the Vichy-controlled press at the time, that this was probably a list that was ‘far from exhaustive’. The trouble with this source is that it was provided by the enemy, at a time when the war was not going well, and when Resistance activity was becoming more commonplace. The authorities needed a success to triumphantly proclaim, and appear to have

254 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
255 Chatel, op.cit.
256 Journal de Rouen, 24 September 1943.
257 Ruffin, La Résistance normande..., p.131.
added other crimes in the area where they were operating to the charge sheet. This was seen as a way of demonstrating that they had crushed the Resistance in Upper Normandy.\textsuperscript{258} However, it was both counter-productive and inaccurate. Firstly, because the Barneville Maquis, though highly active, was no more than the tip of the Resistance in Upper Normandy; secondly, this inspired other FTP networks, especially in 1944,\textsuperscript{259} and thirdly, because, as Fernand Chatel points out, the group was not fully formed until May 1943.\textsuperscript{260} Whilst some of the acts prior to those dates may well have been committed by resisters who went on to join the Barneville Maquis (some small, local FTP cells had been helping the groups of Duroméa & Leroy in the autumn of 1942),\textsuperscript{261} they cannot be credited to the Maquis de Barneville as a group, because they did not exist. Were the list cited in Ruffin’s book to be correct, a comparison over the same time frame would have made the FTP of Barneville both busier and more successful than the Maquis FTP brigades of Georges Guingouin in the Limousin. This was despite the Limousin providing an environment that was, geographically, ideologically and culturally, far more favourable than the Eure, notwithstanding the fact that Guingouin’s Maquis, even in 1943, numbered far more than Albert Lacour’s group in Upper Normandy.\textsuperscript{262}

However, in the much shorter timescale identified by Chatel, who was in theory their commanding officer (even though Duroméa says that virtually all contact was lost after the spring of 1943),\textsuperscript{263} the Barneville Maquis were, according to him, responsible for approximately 50 actions, including arson, theft, sabotage, derailments, attacks on German forces (\textit{Wehrmacht & Feldgendarmerie}) and on the Vichy police.\textsuperscript{264} Whether or not this is an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Roulier, \textit{op.cit.} p.19.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Interview with Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Chatel, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Interview with André Duroméa, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{264} Chatel, \textit{op.cit.} This is corroborated by Christian Senard, \textit{op.cit.}, and by Croguennec, \textit{op.cit.}
\end{itemize}
exaggeration, the Barneville Maquis’ credentials as an active Maquis were certainly well-established come the summer of 1943.

This could explain the reaction of the authorities in the summer of 1943. One of the *maquisards* was arrested in Rouen, having been recognised as being part of a hold-up two days previously. Having been tortured in the Gestapo headquarters on the rue du Donjon in Rouen, he divulged the location of the group. The testimonies of those who were arrested earlier in the Occupation, such as Jean Basille, Yvonne Dissoubrey or Marie-Thérèse Lefevre, indicate that arrests were usually carried out by the counter-terrorist brigades of the Vichy police, led by Louis Alie, or by the Milice. Rarely were the Gestapo or the SS heavily involved until much later on in the Occupation, unless there had been a direct attack on the occupiers. However, on August 24, 1943, the effort to flush out the Barneville Maquis was a co-ordinated one, and one that caught them by surprise. Though Alie was there, and nominally in charge, the presence of a deserter, as well as the damage caused by the group, meant that whilst there were 100 *miliciens et policiers* under Alie’s command, they were outnumbered and outarmed by the 200 Germans present.

A shoot-out followed, which lasted several hours, punctuated by a number of explosions. Albert Lacour & Rudolf Pfandhauser were killed outright. The rest, after running out of ammunition, with two of their number wounded, and nowhere to flee to, surrendered. All thirteen of those arrested were taken firstly to Bonne-Nouvelle prison in Rouen. After the trials, seven were executed by firing squad, whilst the others were sent to Buchenwald, except for Christian Senard. Another former member of the JC, he said that he would have been executed as part of the Nazi reprisals against attacks by the Resistance, had

---

265 Croguennec, *op.cit.*  
266 *Interviews passim.*  
267 Interview with Christian Senard, *op.cit.*  
268 Ibid.  
269 Chatel, *op.cit.*
he not staged an escape from the prison in November 1943, and rejoined the FTP. The escape, as he put it, was not planned, but pure circumstance- he saw a chance to break out using the chair in his cell and removing the bars, and duly took it.\(^{270}\) He returned to resistance, describing the morning after his escape, and his first moments of regained liberty (albeit in clandestinity), as a rediscovery of purpose and of the meaning of existence. His resolve strengthened, he duly took part in the Liberation of Rouen in August 1944.\(^{271}\)

The fate of the Barneville Maquis shows the problems linked to *maquisard* action. Though effective, it was difficult to sustain for a prolonged period of time, for the circumstances of the day in Upper Normandy made it difficult to be both an active resister and in hiding. André Duroméa, though critical of their approach, tempered this by adding ‘but one cannot question their bravery and courage’.\(^{272}\) Chatel, writing in *L’Humanité* in 1968, also paid tribute to their bravery, and to their ‘intrepid youthfulness’.\(^{273}\) Even Benjamin Remacle, critical of the counter-productiveness of prolonged direct action, recognised the success of their short existence.\(^{274}\) Yet as Croguennec has pointed out, although the Barneville Maquis were far removed from the *maquisards* of the Vercors, and cannot really be compared to them, they do show a certain resourcefulness amongst resisters in the Rouen area, and the presence of armed combat, even if it was ultimately limited and doomed to being defeated in a battle with the enemy’s forces.\(^{275}\)

The decision to pursue violence as a means to combat Vichy and the Nazis inevitably led to a heavy toll in Le Havre as well. There, the FTP killed their first German officer in November 1942; predictably a wave of intense repression followed that winter. Jean Hascoet, a working-class leader from the docks, was arrested on suspicion of terrorism. He was found

\(^{270}\) Interview with Christian Senard, *op.cit.*

\(^{271}\) Testimony of Christian Ŝenard to the CH2GM, 1957, AN 72J/191.

\(^{272}\) Interview with André Duroméa, *op.cit.*

\(^{273}\) Chatel, *op.cit.*

\(^{274}\) Interview with Benjamin Remacle, *op.cit.*

\(^{275}\) Croguennec, *op.cit.*
guilty and executed by firing squad in 1943. Duroméa, and fellow leaders Gustave Avisse and Charles Tinel were forced to go into hiding.\footnote{Interview with André Duroméa, \textit{op.cit.}} The new generation of leaders were all workers, and all favoured violent action, and even more violent rhetoric. The press, typified by publications such as \textit{Le Franc-Tireur}, now made ever more dramatic references to the uprising of 1789 and the Commune of 1871.\footnote{Couture, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.23-25.} That both historical events, as anyone with a basic knowledge of French history from the elementary syllabus of the day knew, involved a Germanic power invading France to put down and quell the people (slightly erroneous in the case of the Commune it should be said, but not something to trouble the \textit{francs-tireurs}),\footnote{Pierre Milza, \textit{L’année terrible- La Commune} (Paris, Perrin, 2009), p.386.} was no coincidence. In the fevered climate of 1943-1944 for the Communists, Pétain came to represent the ghosts of both Louis XVI and Adolphe Thiers; the Nazis representing the Habsburgs’ and Bismarck’s armies. Ultimately, this would be counter-productive for the FTP. By May 1944, their desire for revenge and bloodshed would not only lead to their leaders being either executed and deported (Duroméa being wounded and captured in a shoot-out in early 1944, Jouet arrested in 1943 and then executed as a hostage in August 1944), but to the local Comité Départemental de Libération (CDL) reining them in.\footnote{Minutes of CDL meeting, April 8, 1944, ADSM 54 W 256/8011.} This partly explains the very small role played by the FTP in the liberation of Le Havre in September 1944, which consisted of liberating just a handful of minor infrastructure and installations, mostly in the suburbs rather than the city centre.\footnote{Dhaille-Hervieu, \textit{op.cit.}, p.156.}

By contrast, the reaction of the Communists in Rouen after 1943 leaned more towards prudence. Though sabotage was still very much an activity, and as Benjamin Remacle testified, occasional attacks on collaborators,\footnote{Interview with Benjamin Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}} the organisation was to have smaller units, operating more infrequently, and not living together permanently as was the case with a
Maquis. Resisters instead dispersed after their actions, which were in any event more co-ordinated from this point onwards, with the FTP and Front National in Rouen coming increasingly under the orbit of the CDL- even more so after the capture and arrest of Duroméa in January 1944.\textsuperscript{282} Only with the combat for the Liberation in August 1944 would Communist resistance in the Rouen area begin to take a semblance of semi-permanence comparable to the Maquis de Barneville.

When Georges Guingouin liberated Limoges in August 1944, he was told by someone that his peace was well-earned. He replied that his peace would not come until the day of the \textit{grand soir}.\textsuperscript{283} The shift towards ouverture, caused in part by the fact that many Communists were now in captivity, reveals something similar in Upper Normandy. If liberation was achievable, the \textit{grand soir} was still distant, and violent combat against Vichy and Nazi Germany would not deliver it. Whilst violent overthrow had a certain rhetorical appeal, the period 1943-44 shows in reality its limitations. The Communists who were left in 1944 would either work in small groups, or in co-operation with non-Communist resisters.\textsuperscript{284}

The Countercommunity

The identities that come through in testimonies are that the Communists were separate from the norms of French society, and Norman society, at that time. Their backgrounds were either non-religious from the outset, or they rejected religion early on, and were strongly left-wing. For those with a Communist background, resistance was too important to be regarded as juvenilia. It was associated with ties of kinship and community- except that it was really a community within a community. The testimonies of Pierre Jouvin and Jean Basille indicate this- his father did not have high opinions of other resisters from Quevilly who were not

\textsuperscript{282} Interview with Henri Levillain, \textit{op.cit.}; Interview with André Duroméa, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{283} Grenard, \textit{op.cit.}, p.274.
\textsuperscript{284} Interview with Benjamin Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}; Author’s Interview with Bernard Lawday, \textit{op.cit.}; Dhaille-Hervieu, \textit{op.cit.}, p.156.
Resistance amongst Communist sympathisers was also more likely to be grounded not just within communities based upon *communes*, but also upon much smaller micro-structures, such as circles of friends, or workshops within factories or dockyards, as the testimonies of Henri Levillain and Louis Eudier show, as do the studies currently being undertaken by Rebecca Shtasel and Michel Croguennec.

The difference between these testimonies and others is even further marked in terms of reference points. Whereas many resisters, especially outside of the Communist ranks, conceived their action as acting for France, Jean Basille stated that ‘we did not fight to free France; we fought to defeat fascism and Nazi Germany’. Many of them were inspired by the call of July 1940, carried in the clandestine press, from Maurice Thorez, the Communist leader in exile, and not the *appel du 18 juin* of de Gaulle. The Gaullists were even distrusted - Benjamin Remacle can recall being told to keep well away from the Gaullists, and their determination to press on with direct action, even after de Gaulle had called for a halt to it in 1941, shows how little they thought of de Gaulle. If he was accepted in 1944, it was with resignation, and following the party line, which now embraced some sort of co-operation with other resisters.

Whereas for many other resisters, the real turning points came elsewhere in the Occupation, such as disgust at the reprisals of the German occupiers, or the introduction of the STO, for most of these resisters, their motivation came from the earliest moments of the Occupation, and even before- there was an emphasis on what could be called ‘resistance before the Resistance’. There was a concern with both events within France, and the

---

285 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, *op.cit.*
288 Interview with Jean Basille, *op.cit.*
289 Interview with Christian Sénard, *op.cit.*
290 Interview with Benjamin Remacle, *op.cit.*
inspiration of continuing, even finishing, the French Revolution, and also the war in Russia, the success or failure of the much-admired Soviet model. The balance of home and abroad, and the interaction between these two wars and conflicts (the conflict between Nazism & Communism and the conflict between Vichy and the Resistance) is vital in understanding these resisters and what Reinhart Koselleck termed Erwartungshorizont, or ‘horizons of expectation’ - the sum of visions of the future based upon the twin domains of hope and memory. The Communist horizon of expectation was the grand soir, but one that mixed both the Bolshevik model and the conclusion that 1789 was a bourgeois revolution, thereby inscribing resistance and Communism, as François Furet saw it, within a longer tradition of Jacobinism.

All of this shows that amongst these acts were the strongest manifestations and sentiments of what could be called la mentalité résistante. Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie said many years later that he had always felt like a mal ajusté. Within the context of what was both a conservative society, and subject to the cultural hegemony of the Vichy regime, this sentiment of inability to adjust, to fit in, to conform, characterise both the accounts and the identities of these resisters. This in its turn led them to carry out actions that marked them out most firmly as resisters and as non-conformists, which resulted in an emphasis on more violent action.

This leads to a reflection upon the role of these resisters within the social fabric of Upper Normandy. They either had outsider status because of controversial political views, such as in the case of Pican and Feldman, or were at the bottom of the social scale because of a lack of either economic, cultural or social capital. This lack of capital also reduced their

291 Interviews with Basille and Senard, op.cit.
294 In Le Chagrin et la Pitié (dir. Marcel Ophuls, 1971).
agency, and their capacity of expression, almost bordering upon ‘subaltern status’. An essay by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak poses the question ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ This is based on the fact that women who committed suicide in colonial-era India by throwing themselves upon their husbands’ funeral pyres (a practice known as sati) exist as historical sources only via the sources of the British colonialists. They do not exist independently as historical sources, agents who can speak for themselves.\(^{295}\) For the likes of Jean Hascoet and Albert Lacour, and Rudolf Pfandhauser, violence was the only way that they could speak, the only way in a society where democratic rights had been suppressed that they could perform the political.

The irony of this, which would not be lost on readers of Spivak, or of James C. Scott’s *Weapons of the Weak*, is that their existence is thus largely known because of their short-term failure- i.e. the fact that they failed to survive the war.\(^{296}\) So ultimately, in histories of resistance, which were often dependent on written sources by resistance leaders such as Duroméa and Fernand Chatel (whose survival of the war and slightly greater cultural and social capital, having benefited from the party’s political education classes and held more senior positions within the PCF, gave them a greater agency and greater capacity of expression), the subaltern, the most oppressed of the classes, does not speak, or at any rate, not for themselves. The question that this begs is that when an agent loses the agency to write their own history, do they also lose their voice? Can the *franc-tireur* truly speak? The response, ultimately, is that they do not speak directly. They become characters in the interpretations and versions of others. They become a sort of *arlèsienne*- oft-mentioned, but never appearing. Only the survivors truly speak and truly appear. In the writing of history, as in this period itself, their role is defined, shaped, and limited by their lack of agency.


\(^{296}\) For a further exploration of Scott’s theories of resistance, see *Weapons of the Weak* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1985).
Writing in the 1970s, Ronald Tiersky defined the French Communists as a ‘countercommunity’.\textsuperscript{297} He argued that the ‘countercommunity’ did not truly come into existence until 1947, but that the 1930s and the experience of resistance marked a foreshadowing of it.\textsuperscript{298} Whilst Communism was not as well-implanted within France as it would be in the post-war period, the experience of Communist resisters in Upper Normandy at this time indicates that Communist resistance was a form of ‘countercommunity’, with its own set of goals, its own set of visions, its own set of structures and social codes, existing and functioning at one remove from the remainder of French society.

Indeed, resistance, and the sacrifices that accompanied it, became one of the symbols, one of the defining factors, of this ‘countercommunity’, both during and after the war. Pierre Jouvin lost eight of his comrades either at Barneville, or in Buchenwald.\textsuperscript{299} Their sacrifice did inspire other resisters, as can be seen by the frequent references made by other resisters to them in testimony, and there is today a street named in the group’s honour in Petit-Quevilly.\textsuperscript{300} Another example of this is the fate of Valentin Feldman. After having resisted peacefully for the first year, wrestling between restrained and constraining personal circumstances, and trying to make sense of the situation around him,\textsuperscript{301} he too passed towards direct action in 1941, as part of the \textit{Organisation Sécrète} (OS) in Dieppe. In February 1942, he was arrested after a sabotage on a metal factory in Déville-lès-Rouen. Prior to that, his resistance activity had caused the death of a German soldier in Dieppe. Consequently, he was tried by a German military tribunal, and sentenced to death. He was executed by firing squad at Mont Valérien on July 27, 1942. His last words before the \textit{peloton} opened fire were an appeal to his executioners. \textit{“Imbéciles, c’est pour vous que je meurs!”}\textsuperscript{302} The giving of life in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[297] Tiersky, op.cit., pp.310-311.
\item[298] Ibid, pp.319-320.
\item[299] Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
\item[300] Called Rue du Maquis de Barneville. Cited in Croguennec, op.cit.
\item[301] Valentin Feldman, \textit{Journal de guerre} (Tours, Farrago, 2006).
\end{footnotes}
attempting to construct a better society was an idea that entered the mythology of French Communism, and showed that the ‘countercommunity’ had its own martyrs, in a narrative that hailed le peuple over le pays.\textsuperscript{303}

The belief of Communists in resistance as revolution, as a step towards the forging of ‘new Man’, shows that there was a political engagement that went well beyond the narrow conception of la politique, and politics in the sense of polis. Communist resisters, in their critiques, actions and expectations went well beyond simple liberation and the exercise of power, and towards a profound transformation of society. This vision of the polis was, as Alya Aglan has indicated, fixed and definite.\textsuperscript{304} So what distinguishes Communist resistance apart from non-Communist resistance is this very existence of ‘countercommunity’, and aiming to impose a set vision of the polis, a goal that went much further than simple liberation and defeat of Nazi Germany. In essence, for Communist resisters themselves, resistance was not simply about liberation; it was about revolution, and going towards it.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has shown the origins and developments of resistance amongst Communists in Upper Normandy. The origins of resistance, and much of the violence perpetrated by resisters during this period, lay in social ostracism and their lack of social capital. Violence, both rhetorical and actual, was the only way by which these resisters, whom in relation to the paradigm of résistance-organisation could have been seen as ‘the subalterns of resistance’, were able to manifest their anger, the only way, realistically, that they could deploy what Henry Pickford calls ‘the capacity to resist’.\textsuperscript{305} This meant that Communism had a ready

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{304} Aglan, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.115-153.
\item \textsuperscript{305} Henry Pickford, ‘Resistance & Praxis’, paper given as part of \textit{Conceptualising Resistance}, conference organised by the Centre of Resistance Studies, University of Sussex, November 18, 2015.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
audience for its vision of a war pitting ‘exploiters’ against ‘exploited’. Communists saw resistance as part of a much bigger struggle than France against Germany, a war of causes rather than a war of states. This would also explain why, both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of testimony, they tended to draw upon historical events in both the distant and more recent past. Resistance was simply a continuation of a longer struggle.

This ‘long’ resistance, or ‘resistance before the Resistance’, also shows why to understand the involvement of Communists in resistance, it is perhaps more accurate to talk about ‘Communist resisters’ than ‘the Communist Resistance’. Individual Communists entered into resistance well before the PC as a national force and apparatus entered the Resistance. As such, this chapter has shown that Communist resistance (i.e. resistance carried out by those with Communist beliefs) began well before the Nazi attack upon the USSR in June 1941. It is true that it was not as active or as visible in the first year of the Occupation as what it was to be later on, but as we shall see in subsequent chapters, this is a characteristic hardly unique to Communists.

Developing from a pre-existing critique of society before the Occupation, Communist resisters engaged in a cultural and political critique in 1940-41, before moving more towards violent action after Barbarossa, with the FTP becoming a paramilitary wing of the Communist countercommunity, until eventually in 1943, the FTP attempted, with the Barneville Maquis, to mount a guerilla war against Vichy and the Occupier. The dismantling of the Barneville Maquis, and anti-Communist repression elsewhere (in particular Le Havre),\(^{306}\) showed the limits of such an active insurrection, and explains the relatively marginalised role of the FTP at the Liberation.

Robert Paxton wrote of resistance that ‘there lay the division between those who wanted only to chase the Germans out and those who wanted also to change French society root and branch.’ At the outset, Communists found themselves at the far end of the latter. They were, until events in 1944 made them, as far as Upper Normandy was concerned, too weak to function alone, and at times even marginalised within the larger make-up of the FFI in the Liberation, a ‘countercommunity’ that was committed to revolutionising the polis and imposing a set idea of *la cité*. In the same way that in the 20th century more widely, Communism represented the revolutionary element of French politics, we can see that in 1940-44, Communist resisters were the revolutionaries of resistance.

---


308 Touchard, *op.cit.*
Chapter Two

An aristocracy of resistance? Gradualism and Resisting

We have seen in the previous chapter the nature of resistance amongst Communists, which was guided by both a firm vision and conception of resistance. This, though, was not universally true either of the Resistance, or even of left-wing resisters. Violent resistance action was likely to provoke equally violent reprisals, as we have seen not just in chapter one, but also in looking at the Occupation in other parts of France, such as Nantes and the reprisals after the assassination of the Kommandant, Otto Hotz. But there was also a critique of the position of Communists. As the clandestine newspaper Libération phrased it in January 1941:

Friends have asked us to make clear our position in relation to communism.

It is simple. For us, there is no communism. On the one hand, a Head of State, Stalin, and his people, who are pursuing an essentially Russian policy, for the moment Germanophile. On the other hand, in France, several thousand imbeciles who call this policy ‘Universal Socialism’, and expect from Stalin bread, peace, liberty, and much else besides. For the French, no problem. If they are enamoured by social progress, they are not expecting a socialism imported from Russia; if enamoured by liberty, they do not expect from Stalin their liberation. In both cases, they are counting above all on themselves.
The critique of the PC as being dominated by Russia was a powerful one in the early part of the Occupation, but also, as Ronald Tiersky has shown, a successor to the schism in left-wing polity perpetuated since 1789.\textsuperscript{311} As such, rather than divide left-wing resistance into ‘Socialists’ and ‘Communists’, this thesis prefers to view the division as being between ‘gradualists’ and ‘revolutionaries’. This follows a similar pattern to that of Alya Aglan, and the divide between planificateurs and accélerateurs- the former believing that resistance was something that had to be carefully planned along with a slow forging of the future, whilst accélerateurs believed in more violent action in order to advance towards a set vision of the future.\textsuperscript{312} How gradualists approached resistance in Upper Normandy is what this chapter will explore.

\textbf{Defining gradualism}

In his 1996 work \textit{La France à l’heure allemande}, Philippe Burrin put forward the concept of ‘accommodation’ to describe the reaction of the French population to the German occupation. It was used to describe an attitude of neither collaboration nor resistance, merely continuing daily existence with the occupiers.\textsuperscript{313}

Shortly after the defeat of 1940, it became clear that the liberation of France was not likely to arrive any time soon- something recognised by Tony Larue when he said in 1985 “We knew that Britain would not be liberating us soon, and neither would America. It was for that reason we distrusted de Gaulle.”\textsuperscript{314} The resulting dilemma was neatly summed up by Larue, who stated that the now clandestine SFIO took the decision not to show any dissent openly towards the German occupiers, as there were such a huge number of Frenchmen being

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{312} Aglan, \textit{Le temps de la Résistance} (Paris, Actes du Sud, 2009).
\textsuperscript{313} Burrin, \textit{op.cit}, p.191.
\textsuperscript{314} Interview with Tony Larue, ADSM AV09/024-023-020, 1985.
\end{flushright}
held prisoner in Germany.\textsuperscript{315} For Larue, France in 1940 was a divided society, coloured by a generation clash between those who had survived the war of 1914-1918, and those who were younger, and did not remember the previous conflict.\textsuperscript{316} Furthermore, those who might have seemed obvious candidates to lead resistance were being closely watched. Larue believed that both the \textit{mairie} in Grand-Quevilly and his own home were under surveillance. When pressed in 1985 as to whether or not his attitude, and that of the population at large, was one of indifference in the early years of the Occupation, he responded that “The political situation [of that time]- as well as the cultural and social situation- was one of the utmost prudence…not indifference”.\textsuperscript{317}

This prudence also seems to have informed Marcel Baudot in the Eure. Baudot was one of the department’s most outstanding civil servants. He had been sent to Evreux in 1925 to oversee the running of the \textit{archives départementales} as chief archivist, after graduating from the \textit{Ecole Nationale des Chartes} in Paris.\textsuperscript{318} His influence had already extended to re-organising the archives, and overseeing its move into a new purpose-built building, chosen specially by Baudot, in 1937.\textsuperscript{319} He had regular contact with politicians and officials at the departmental level. His post did not have regular contact with the German occupiers, but he was a relatively well-known figure within Evreux, and his absence would have been noticed. Therefore, he remained in his post, and as a civil servant, took the oath of obedience to Pétain in late 1940.\textsuperscript{320} Simultaneously though, he appears to have begun planning ways of dissent against the Vichy regime, to plan the undermining of the new order from within. For example, from the autumn of 1940 onwards, Baudot, with the help of one or two others, began to identify and collate documents with the local administration of the Eure that might

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[(315)] Interview with Larue, \textit{op.cit}.
\item[(316)] Ibid.
\item[(317)] Ibid.
\item[(318)] Interview with Marcel Baudot, \textit{op.cit}.
\item[(319)] Ibid.
\item[(320)] Papp, \textit{op.cit}, p.13.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
be useful to the German occupiers from a military perspective. These documents were then separated from other documentation, both before and during the archiving stage, and hidden away from the normal administrative repositories where such documents might be expected to be found.

Remaining in post, seemingly supportive of the Vichy regime, and accommodating, if not supportive, of the Occupation, is not an uncommon aspect of some resisters. Michel Corroy, of Darnétal, remained a police inspector, coming into contact through his work with Louis Alie, a fellow inspector, who quickly became responsible for the ‘counter-terrorist’ brigade in the Seine-Inférieure. Corroy pledged allegiance to the maréchal, in his capacity as a civil servant. So too did Jean Capdeville and Georges Brutelle, both instituteurs. The latter pledged his oath after he had begun his resistance activity, by collecting ammunition left behind in the Allied retreat earlier that year. Realistically, given the amount of surveillance that the teaching profession was under (police, school inspectors, colleagues, parents), overt resistance at this stage would, as Larue hinted, have been counter-productive in the long term. The testimony of Paul Le Goupil shows that though the teaching profession had a merited reputation for supporting the Left, there were plenty of Vichyites and pétainistes inside it during the Occupation to make prudence the best course of action. This was particularly true in Le Goupil’s case, who was a young trainee, and then a probationary teacher, dependant on the favourable opinions of inspectors and directeurs d’école to secure a teaching post, and the social status and guaranteed pension that came with it.

None of the resisters wanted Nazism and a German occupation of France, and very few wanted Pétain. In Larue’s opinion “he was never a republican, but a soldier, who

321 Interview with Baudot, op.cit.
322 Papp, op.cit, p.15.
favoured order before all else”, and Larue’s conviction from the outset was that Pétain was partly to blame for the bloodshed of Verdun in 1916 and that with him receiving *pleins pouvoirs* in 1940, “a second Verdun”, of whatever kind, seemed “certain”. There was thus this twin rejection of Nazism and Vichy’s National Revolution, and yet it was impossible to deny its existence. This situation meant that there was little that could be done to defeat it immediately, in the short-term. The only way that it could be beaten, in their view, was in the long-term, and that meant adopting long-term tactics, such as undermining, limiting and sabotaging the *État français* and its initiatives, and likewise the Nazi war effort.

For both Tony Larue and Raoul Leprettre, there was also a twin rejection of both Catholicism and Communism. Tony Larue described Communism as being ‘too rigid’, but also considered himself a *révolté*, appalled by social injustice in Quevilly, and the lack of ability on the part of the Church to address this. For Leprettre, there was a rejection of Communism for its inability to comprehend the market economy, but also a recognition that the economy needed to be fairer, and needed a greater degree of central planning, and less *laissez-faire* liberalism. This was shaped in part by his travels in 1930s Scandinavia, where the Nordic model of social democracy that would dominate the 20th century history of those countries was beginning to take shape. In Leprettre’s case, a lack of strong political beliefs seem to have been added- though a member of the SFIO, he said that he was only ever active at election time, and although a freemason since 1937, and belonging to the same lodge as a number of city councillors (including the future mayor under the Vichy regime, Maurice Poissant), he disapproved of the mixture between freemasonry and politics as undemocratic and “not [fitting] my conception of freemasonry”.328

325 Interview with Larue, *op.cit.*
326 Ibid.
327 Interview with Raoul Leprettre, ADSM AV09/135-134, 1983.
328 Ibid.
Though they may have seemed the embodiment of the status quo, tending to be in privileged positions (Larue was elected Mayor of Grand-Quiveilly in 1935, and was a qualified chartered accountant, Leprettre a manager within a printing firm), this appearance concealed a critique of those in powerful positions. If there was an event which reinforced this perception, it was the experience of 1936, and the twin events of the Popular Front and the Spanish Civil War. For Tony Larue, there was a clear link between the two:

Of course the *bourgeoisie* supported Franco and the fascists… It supported their interests… They were opposed to the Popular Front in France, as they were in Spain… Francoism was the forerunner to Nazism, to Vichy.\(^{329}\)

Another person who went on to play a considerable role within the Resistance in Upper Normandy who was appalled by the events in Spain was the Head of the Ecole Supérieure de Commerce in Rouen, Césaire Levillain. Levillain organised collections for Spanish refugees, and aid for those fighting for the defence of the Second Spanish Republic. In the view of Raoul Leprettre, Levillain was a humanist, who was sympathetic to the Soviets and, in principle, the PC (or at any rate, more so than either Larue or Leprettre), but whose humanism was grounded in the Declaration of the Rights of Man rather than Marx and Engels, the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as opposed to Communism and the Russian Revolution.\(^{330}\) Like Larue, he seems to have viewed the events of Spain as a harbinger of what might come to France.

Consequently, we can see that gradualist resisters positioned themselves as a sort of ‘third force’. The ‘resistance against’ of these resisters identified two enemies—firstly

---

\(^{329}\) Interview with Larue, *op.cit.,*  
\(^{330}\) Interview with Leprettre, *op.cit.,*
Nazism, which posed a threat to French values and French sovereignty, then the moral and social conservatism of Vichy. But it also saw a further danger - that of Communism, which they viewed as a threat to France firstly by its alliance to Nazism, and also by its ideological rigidity, and also judged that their tactics were too violent to achieve a peaceful transformation of society (seeing the contradiction in the avowed aim of ‘violence to end violence’) but also the conservatism of de Gaulle. Gradualism was built therefore on a triple refusal- of Nazism, of conservatism, and of Communism. Though of course this did not translate into actual ‘resistance against Communism’, their very existence and resistance against both occupation and collaboration would establish them as a clear alternative to the Communists. This ‘triple refusal’ was at the heart of the aims of gradualist action, which believed that the defeat of both occupier and collaborator could only be achieved over a passage of time.

Starting resistance: 1940-41

But although Tony Larue may not have entered into resistance until later on, others were beginning their trajectories in 1940. Marcel Baudot has already been cited (though his actions in 1940 could be seen as being less about resisting and more about not collaborating), but there were other examples too. On a sunny Sunday in July 1940, ten friends gathered in an apartment on the rue Léon Malétra in Petit-Quevilly. Ostensibly, had a police officer passed by and enquired as to the nature of the meeting, the reply would have been that a group of friends were celebrating the forthcoming end of the school year, or enjoying Sunday lunch. This concealed, however, an earnest discussion about what had befallen France, and what could be done. The apartment was rented by Georges Brutelle. From Picardy originally, and working-class in origin, Brutelle gained his certificat d’études in 1935, aged thirteen.

331 Interview with Brutelle by Thierry Lamiraud, 1981, Private Archive.
From there, he went on to the école normale in Rouen in 1935, and joined the SFIO. He helped with the 1936 election campaign, and was an activist within the normale right through until 1940. Just too young to be called up, he had only experienced the defeat from a civilian perspective.332

Brutelle’s aim was to bring together all those that he knew within the SFIO cell at that time, as well as others who might be sympathetic, and discuss firstly how France had been defeated.333 The causes of the defeat as diagnosed by Brutelle and his friends lacked the perspective that Marc Bloch had (who was engaged in precisely the same exercise at around the same time, with the writing of L’étrange défaite), as none of them had been on the front line, but the idea of a country that had failed to modernise was one that they were broadly in agreement with. From this, there was an agreement that Vichy, and the reactionary Marshal Pétain, was not the direction that France should be taking.

These consensuses were easy enough to reach. De Gaulle himself in London held both views. But Brutelle states that he and his friends were not at this time Gaullists. Where was the difference? The difference was post-Vichy, and what should follow once Pétain had been removed from power. Brutelle and his friends were for a ‘New Popular Front’. “We desired the attachment to ideals, to the great figures of socialism”.334 For Brutelle, who had cut his political teeth in 1936, the Popular Front was unfinished business. This was shared by his fellow friends, eight of whom were normaliens like him. The only exception was Brebion, who was also from Grand-Quevilly, but who was a docker, and had been a fellow member of the SFIO.335

The next question was by far the most difficult to answer. What could be done? Léon Blum was under arrest, accused of being one of those responsible for the defeat. The one

332 Interview with Brutelle, op.cit.
333 Ibid.
334 Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre. Cited Lancestre, op.cit, p.5.
335 Lancestre, op.cit., p.3.
SFIO deputy for the Seine-Inférieure, René Lebret, had voted in favour of Pétain in the extraordinary session at Vichy earlier that month.\textsuperscript{336} Even the one parliamentarian for the department who had voted against pleins pouvoirs, Octave Crutel, was a Radical who was actually a Pétainist- he simply opposed the dissolution of the legislature, and presumably the accompanying loss of a part of his salary.\textsuperscript{337} Pierre Mendès-France had fled to North Africa. Tony Larue was still an inexperienced politician at this stage, and as we have already seen, unwilling to do anything that might provoke a chain reaction. The culte maréchaliste was at its apogee. In the face of this, Brutelle and his friends could not even agree on a name for their group.\textsuperscript{338} The only thing that could be agreed upon was that there should be no direct action for the time being, as that would be counter-productive, and unnecessarily endanger themselves. But neither was doing nothing, the course of action that Larue and others seemed to be favouring, an option. The only option that seemed open was propaganda. So the meeting broke up, with a loose agreement to resist in some way, to do something, but no-one was terribly sure what, how, or really who for.\textsuperscript{339}

The meeting could be seen as the roots for what one might call the Socialist resistance in Seine-Inférieure- if it were not for the fact that the SFIO was actually moribund at this time, and that considering the fact that the SFIO had largely voted for pleins pouvoirs in July 1940, ‘socialist resistance’ may seem like something of an oxymoron-\textsuperscript{340} but the truth is that little tangible came from this meeting. What the meeting tells us is that in the first weeks and months of Vichy and the Occupation, the desire and decision to resist posed more questions than answers for all but the most dogmatic of resisters. Much resistance action focused around individual acts at this time for those not belonging to Communist networks. Brutelle,

\textsuperscript{338} Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre, \textit{op.cit}.
\textsuperscript{339} Interview with Brutelle by Lamiraud, \textit{op.cit}.
\textsuperscript{340} For further detail as to the varying reactions of Socialists in France during the war, see Marc Sadoun, \textit{Les Socialistes sous l’Occupation: Résistance et Collaboration} (Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1982).
it seems, had started to collect leftover weapons in the autumn of 1940, yet he himself stated that it was not done with any great purpose or intention until 1942- and then only to carry out sabotage.  

The slightly hesitant, not terribly co-ordinated approach to resisting is a characteristic of much of the résistance nébuleuse at this time.\footnote{Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre, \textit{op.cit.}} In Nonancourt, a small town at the very southern tip of both the Eure and Upper Normandy, an account written by the town’s leading resister, Dr Raoul Dauphin, describes resistance as “early, active, and solidly organised”.\footnote{Dr Raoul Dauphin, ‘La Résistance à Nonancourt’, ADE 88 W 53.}

The events described in the account that follows show that whilst all three of those descriptions were to some extent true, they were not necessarily simultaneously true at the same time.

In late 1940, a small group of men, who could have been qualified as notables within the community of Nonancourt, began to meet in private to discuss the political and military situation, both locally and nationally. These conversations, after a few months, began to turn towards the need to do something about the Occupation, whilst naturally recognising that there was little that Nonancourt itself could do, and that there was no real alternative that they could propose for the time being. “The only combat to pursue was the battle of ideas” was how it was justified retrospectively in 1947.\footnote{Dauphin, ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.}} Consequently, the group, though still without a name, produced propaganda that discouraged efforts in favour of helping the German war effort.\footnote{Ibid.} The propaganda appears to have had some success in undermining morale and encouraging disenchantment with both the Nazi war effort and the Vichy regime.\footnote{For further information about public opinion in the Eure during this period, Marcel Baudot’s \textit{L’opinion publique sous l’Occupation: l’exemple d’un département français entre 1939-1945} (Paris, PUF, 1960) gives an indication as to the broad lines of its forms and changes. At a more national level, Pierre Laborie’s \textit{L’opinion}}
But for two years their resistance virtually never went beyond that, and there was no organised collection of weapons until 1942, and in any event, there was never enough to arm everyone in the group, even when the numbers were only in single figures.\textsuperscript{347} For virtually all of the Occupation, violent confrontation was something gradualists considered to be a suicidal option, one guaranteed to result, sooner or later, in bloodshed, unless highly planned, and well-calculated.

An example of this attitude towards violence comes from the only instance in Nonancourt of an action deliberately designed to harm German forces rather than irritate or hinder them. Dr Dauphin stressed that it had nothing to do with this early group collectively, but was planned and carried out solely by one member, a local engineer called André Pone. It occurred in July 1941, at a \textit{Luftwaffe} base at St-André. Pone sabotaged the switch box so that it failed- before coming back on again, and then, a few minutes later, failing again. It would have seemed as though the box was tripping out, but would not have seemed like an obvious sabotage to the ground crew. During one of these power cuts, three German bombers came in to land. The third one failed to stop in the darkness, crashed into the other two, and caused a huge explosion and ensuing fireball that also damaged other aircraft on the ground. Thirteen airmen were killed, several auxiliary ground crew suffered smoke inhalation and/or burns.\textsuperscript{348}

It seems that the \textit{Luftwaffe} did not suspect deliberate sabotage. There is no record of reprisals in the area at the time, or in Evreux.\textsuperscript{349} However, at no other point during the group’s existence was any equivalent activity undertaken, even after D-Day. The group’s later structure meant that even countenancing such action was not considered seriously.\textsuperscript{350} As

\textit{française sous Vichy} (Paris, Seuil, 1990, \textit{2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.} 2001) is also informative. The reaction to Montoire was indicated in the interviews with the author of Bernard Lawday (March 25, 2011) and Norbert Dufour (March 26, 2011).

\textsuperscript{347} ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{348} Dauphin, ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{349} Baudot, \textit{op.cit.;} Papp, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{350} ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.}
action widened, it became more planned, and the more planning meant the greater the danger to a larger group of people. Ultimately, this instance was an exception that proved the rule with regards to the approach of gradualists towards violent combat at this time.

The gradualists and resistance at this time was usually much about refusal- from its genesis and even before, one can detect a ‘triple refusal’- but less in the way of concrete action. The opportunities for action from a gradualist perspective were few and far between, because although they knew what they were resisting against, their visions of a post-occupation society were unclear, in part due to the absence of any convenable major figures, either nationally or even locally, and in part because of the nature of the war and the ‘sur-occupation’ in Upper Normandy. Although ‘resistance against’ was clear at this stage, ‘resistance towards’ was less certain, and there was little ability to manifest resistance into a coherent ‘resistance as’ at this stage. The lack of full development of the full range of what Henry Pickford has called ‘criteria of resistance’ meant that for the gradualists, the early resistance of 1940-41 was restricted and frustrated by both the force of the enemy and by their own shortcomings.


1941 saw two developments- the entries of both the Soviet Union and the USA into the war. For Tony Larue, the situation had begun to seem desperate. A Nazi defeat of Soviet Russia would have closed down the second front- seen as the only way to defeat Germany. Larue admitted that as Germany penetrated deeper and deeper into Russian territory, he began to make contingency plans:

---

351 Pickford, op.cit.
The news from Russia was getting worse every day… From some of my contacts, I began to enquire about going to Argentina. When I was at school, I had learnt some Spanish, and could speak the language a little. My wife could not- I did Spanish, she took English, but I can hardly speak any… Well, we discussed it, and I looked into the possibility… and it would be possible, eventually, to work in my field… Not straight away, I would have taken any work I could to start with on arriving, but we knew people who had settled in Buenos Aires, and we would have gone there first of all, and from there…352

Larue had privately been critical about de Gaulle fleeing to England in 1940, yet approximately eighteen months later, he was considering uprooting himself and his step-family to the southern hemisphere.353 The idea seems far-fetched, and how Larue thought that he could have maintained the cause of resistance in Buenos Aires is not something he explains- nor was it something he was asked by the interviewers carrying out his interview in 1985. Larue used the story, he said, to illustrate just how low morale amongst resisters had become.354 By now, he no longer had public service to worry about- the decree of 1941 had resulted in the prefect sacking Larue as mayor of Grand-Quevilly, and replacing him with someone more obedient. Larue continued to work as a chartered accountant, which became his front, with resistance firmly remaining a clandestine activity. Though no longer burdened by electoral obligations, full-time clandestinity within France was still not an option that appealed to him.

352 Interview with Larue, op.cit.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
The effects of Barbarossa were particularly traumatic on those who had belonged, prior to 1940, to the SFIO. Though many cited here had been Socialists, or of a socialist leaning, there was never a ‘socialist resistance’ as such. When the PC was outlawed in 1939, the SFIO did not pick up any disaffected ex-Communists.\footnote{Interview with Larue, \textit{op.cit.}} When Marshal Pétain convened an extraordinary joint session of parliament in July 1940, most of the SFIO parliamentarians who took part voted in favour of \textit{pleins pouvoirs}.\footnote{Robert Paxton, \textit{Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order} (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972), p.41.} Barbarossa saw ‘bolshevism’ become the enemy- and some of the individuals who belonged to the SFIO prior to 1940 decided that the old maxim of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ counted here. Whilst Larue was sacked in Grand-Quevilly, his former fellow SFIO mayor, René Lebret, in Elbeuf, remained in post, and supported the Vichy regime.\footnote{Lecouturier, \textit{op.cit.}, p.219.} According to Larue, many former Socialists followed him.\footnote{Interview with Larue, \textit{op.cit.}; Interview with Georges Templier, ADSM AV09/084, 1981.} It was an added difficulty for resisters to contend with.

Another difficulty was material conditions. The small group of resisters who met at Georges Brutelle’s flat in Grand-Quevilly became more organised, and began to identify more strongly with a national network called Libération-Nord, a network of socialist-leaning resisters. Drawing upon the regular discussions of politics that took place in private, they began to produce a newspaper called \textit{Jaurès}, which appeared for the first time in February 1941.\footnote{Georges Touroude, \textit{Les Braconniers de l’espérance} (Royan, Editions de la Langrotte, 1995), pp.48-49.}

The editorial line of \textit{Jaurès} was not one that reflected the majority of French opinion in 1941. Those who contributed were almost exclusively \textit{instituteurs} or training to join the teaching ranks.\footnote{Letter from Georges Brutelle to Claude-Paul Couture, August 3, 1987. Cited in Couture, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 11.} In some ways, its outlook was quite parochial. After the closure of the \textit{école normale} in 1940 by Vichy, there remained the problem- what to do with those training
to be teachers? Vichy’s solution was to integrate them into the lycée system. Ironically, this was a solution in line with some of the more radical elements of the Third Republic (the Popular Front Education minister Jean Zay had envisaged the baccalauréat as compulsory for all instituteurs), but at the time, it created tensions. The normaliens were incorporated into Lycée Corneille, where they were ‘tolerated’. The school was already overcrowded, and suffering from material shortages, and the welcoming of teenagers from mostly working-class backgrounds was not a popular proposal. The memoir of Georges Touroude and the oral testimony of Bernard Lawday indicate an environment of political tension, divided between those hostile to Vichy, and those who fervently supported it. Consequently, the paper spent most of its space attacking not the Occupation, or even Nazism, but the Vichy regime and the révolution nationale.

To understand the Vichy regime and its internal workings and how it managed to govern with the consent, or perhaps the indifference, of the population, and to understand the difficulties faced, the concept of ‘hegemony’, as defined by the Italian anti-fascist thinker Antonio Gramsci, needs to be understood. Gramsci used this concept to explain a position of dominance by an elite (which in 1920s Italy, tacitly meant the fascist regime of Mussolini) not just from a political perspective, but also considering cultural, economic and social factors. Vichy never created a single governing party in the way that other fascist and totalitarian regimes did. Instead, the regime rested entirely upon le culte du maréchal. This personality cult saw Pétain everywhere - street names, currency, stamps, busts, sports trophies, to name but a few. The de facto national anthem was called ‘Maréchal, nous

362 Touroude, op.cit, p.32.
363 Ibid, p.33.
364 Interview with Bernard Lawday by the author, op.cit.
365 Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre, op.cit.,
voilà!’. Pétain appointed not just all ministers, and had the right to name his successor, but also all civil servants, who pledged allegiance to him. Children read comics about him, bottles of Burgundy wine and roses were named after him.\textsuperscript{368} The regime had a degree of cultural hegemony that was almost unprecedented in living memory. It controlled all of the radio, local and national newspapers, the cinema, publishing, education and of course, the state propaganda machine. Resistance, already a difficult cause, was not helped by directly taking on what seemed to be the regime’s main trump card- Pétain himself. \textit{Le culte du maréchal} was the myth upon which Vichy built its political, social, cultural and moral legitimacy.\textsuperscript{369} Though some were scornful of Pétain, the vast majority of the French population were not. His personal popularity long outlasted that of the Vichy regime- even in 1944, he was greeted by cheering crowds upon his visit to Rouen.\textsuperscript{370}

But from the outset, the language of \textit{Jaurès} was not only disrespectful, but violent.\textsuperscript{371} The virulence of these attacks though would have likely shocked many readers who did not belong to the social circles in which many of these resisters moved, and it is difficult not to conclude that much of the paper’s content was a mixture of crude rhetoric, meant deliberately to shock and preaching to the already converted. But there was also a defence of the values of the Popular Front in the face of the ‘National Revolution’, and it is interesting to note the outlining, even in 1941, of a \textit{‘nouveau front populaire’}, to be engaged in the common struggle against Nazism.\textsuperscript{372} It would be another two years before Jean Moulin would achieve something along these lines at the national level, with the foundation of the \textit{Conseil National de la Résistance} (CNR). Even in resistance circles though, this call for unity fell on deaf ears, and in the end, even Brutelle found limits. From late 1941 onwards, he opposed unifying with

\textsuperscript{368} Miller, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{370} Paxton, \textit{op.cit.}, p.326. Author’s Interview with Lawday, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{371} Couture, \textit{op.cit.}, p.14.
\textsuperscript{372} Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre, \textit{op.cit.}
the Communists because of their use of physical violence - which he considered ‘unjustified
and unbeneﬁcial’, as opposed to the verbal violence of the clandestine press.\footnote{Cited in Lancestre, \textit{op.cit}, p.7.}

Engaged in the battle of ideas, it seems that Brutelle was ﬁghting much of the same
terrain as André Pican and his political education classes. But the developments of the war
around them meant that the early hopes for unity were dashed. More and more \textit{normaliens}
and \textit{lycées} were attracted by the more strident rhetoric of Communist-leaning networks, and
\textit{Jaurès} found itself isolated - too virulent for the mainstream, and too hollow for many in the
Resistance underground counter-culture.\footnote{Touroude, \textit{op.cit}, p.50.} Numbers and ﬁnance became a problem, and the
inevitable problem of paper also bit. With less people being willing to draft and print the
paper, and material scarcity increasing, the regularity of publication became erratic, and
eventually, the paper ceased publication after less than a year of existence. The group around
Brutelle, who was now in a teaching post, concentrated on tracts and posters instead.\footnote{Interview with Brutelle by Lamiraud, \textit{op.cit}; Couture, \textit{op.cit.}, p.14.}

Though Barbarossa was, as we have seen in chapter one, a turning point for resisters
on the revolutionary Left, it would appear that it was less so for gradualist resisters. This was
in part because of the distance that they kept from Communist resisters, but also because of
their ongoing difﬁculties in ﬁnding an effective means of resistance. Although in 1941-42,
they had begun to ﬁnd and establish a common purpose around the idea of a ‘new Popular
Front’, they were still ﬁnding it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a form of expression - in essence, though they
now had a ‘resistance towards’ to accompany ‘resistance against’, their ‘resistance as’ was
still unclear. An examination therefore of gradualist resistance in the period 1940-42 reveals
the difﬁculties in establishing an effective ‘third force’ both in resistance and amongst the
French political spectrum as a whole. It may also help to explain why when referring to this
period in his speech at the Panthéon in December 1964, André Malraux called it the ‘pre-
history’ of the Resistance- a period when many resisters may have felt the will to resist, but had not yet found the necessary means. Whilst the gradualists at this time did not collaborate, their stance during the period of 1940 to 1942 seems to have oscillated between an ‘accommodation’ of sorts and covert displays of resistance.

Towards a co-ordination of resistance: 1942

These first two years show the roots of a left-wing, non-Communist resistance in Upper Normandy. They also show the difficulties that they encountered, quite apart from the repression of both Vichy and the Nazis, in being effective. Finding a message and finding an audience receptive to that message were matters that were far from straightforward. In order to achieve either (and both), it became clear that two characteristics were needed above all- organisation and co-ordination.

So in 1942, throughout Upper Normandy, the planification of resistance in Upper Normandy began. The two figures essential to this were Césaire Levillain in the Seine-Inférieure, and Marcel Baudot in the Eure. Levillain had been Principal of the Ecole Supérieure de Commerce in Rouen. However, in 1941, he had been revoked from his post for his political leanings. To Tony Larue, this was not a surprise: “Levillain’s colleagues wanted him out ever since 1940- they had been bought by the Germans in 1936, and they were all pro-Nazi, pro-Vichy, Francoist”. 376 Levillain earned a living giving private lessons in English after his dismissal, but his dismissal did allow for more time to resist. Described as a ‘humanist republican’, his contacts made him an excellent choice to set up a resistance network. He had trained as, and been, an instituteur, so had contacts within the teaching profession, but also had contacts within the local business community and industry as a

376 Interview with Larue, op.cit.
consequence of his work, and also on account of his freemasonry.\footnote{Interview with Leprettre, \emph{op.cit.}} He also had an international perspective- the school had links outside of France, and he had seen at first-hand the consequences of the Spanish Civil War. He therefore appreciated that liberation was not going to be achieved in France alone, and believed that resistance would require working with the Allies.

At the end of 1942, he founded not one, but two resistance networks.\footnote{Interview with Larue, \emph{op.cit.}} Libération-Nord consisted of propaganda and sabotage. The sabotage element was led by Brutelle, and also involved Jean Capdeville, who had engaged two mechanics with a view to carrying out sabotage in 1941- though actual sabotage did not begin until later the following year, the targets being principally vehicles that were used by the occupiers and by the Vichy regime. Cohors-Asturie was officially separate- it was charged with evasion and intelligence, and had the most contact with England. This was led by Levillain himself (who was also in charge of Libération-Nord) and by Raoul Leprettre.\footnote{Interview with Leprettre, \emph{op.cit.}} However, as Leprettre noted, the two did not have much separating them, and as well as sharing a leader, they also shared members- most of the members in one were also in the other, and Brutelle was a member of Cohors-Asturie, but as opposed to Libération-Nord, he did not hold a leadership position.\footnote{Ibid.}

In 1941, Marcel Baudot had founded a network of Libération-Nord in Evreux, along with a headteacher called Auguste Azémia and an engineer called Leon Larouge.\footnote{Papp, \emph{op.cit.}, p.62; Interview with Baudot, \emph{op.cit.}} But until 1942, it was highly localised, and varied from one part of the Eure to the next. Evreux resisters were likely to be from the liberal professions, but in the east, around Rugles and Gisors, Libération-Nord was led by local \textit{notables}, firmly linked to the Third Republic (Albert Forcinal in Gisors had been a deputy) and mostly consisted of working-class men. In
the south and west of the Eure, around Nonancourt, Pacy-sur-Eure and Pont-Audemer, resisters were likely to be artisans and skilled tradesmen.\textsuperscript{382}

The east and the south of the Eure and Evreux both appear to have been comparatively favourable to the idea of building a new Popular Front, to the extent that even the local Communists, and \textit{Le Patriote de l’Eure}, favoured a more conciliatory, \textit{rassembleur}, approach.\textsuperscript{383} It would be using this consensus that Baudot created a departmental apparatus for Libération-Nord in 1942, concentrating, as it had done previously, on intelligence and propaganda, although the purpose of the departmental apparatus appears mainly to have been to co-ordinate and support the local committees on the ground, which were small, unarmed, but well-organised.\textsuperscript{384}

\textbf{La Résistance des Notables? The Comité Clandestin de Résistance de Nonancourt}

Many committees did not leave behind a huge legacy, other than a short document summing up their actions after the war.\textsuperscript{385} However, one of the exceptions to this was the \textit{Comité Clandestin de Résistance de Nonancourt} (CCRN), which was formed in March 1943, where their leader, Dr Raoul Dauphin, wrote a detailed account of the group’s activities in a testament submitted to the CH2GM in 1947.\textsuperscript{386} The formal organisation of resistance in Nonancourt was in reaction to circumstances, both local and national. In late 1942, some individuals who had been meeting as part of the group of friends cited earlier began to make contact with emerging cells, and in particular, Marcel Baudot in Evreux.\textsuperscript{387} One or two were also making contact with the FTP. The presence of two contrasting networks, with contradicting means of action, and contradicting aims in what was a small town, had the

\textsuperscript{382} Documents providing a statistical overview of resisters in the Eure, ADE 88 W 26.
\textsuperscript{383} Copies of \textit{Le Patriote de l’Eure}, ADE 101 J 3.
\textsuperscript{384} Papp, \textit{op.cit.}, p.62
\textsuperscript{385} ADE 88 W 53 \textit{passim}.
\textsuperscript{386} Dauphin, ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{387} ADE 88 W 53, \textit{op.cit.} ; Interview with Baudot, \textit{op.cit.}. 106
potential to create tension. On the larger scale of the war nationally (and internationally) momentum was shifting towards the Allies, and as 1943 progressed, the German military presence increased. The context was also becoming more urgent - the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) began to impact upon daily life and society, the front line closer to home with the increase in Allied bombing.\(^{388}\)

At a meeting at Dr Dauphin’s house in Nonancourt, fourteen men formed the CCRN, drawing upon tradesmen, liberal professions, and the white-collar managerial class.\(^{389}\) The aim to co-ordinate the different networks in the Nonancourt area, and to ensure that the Resistance worked together. Intelligence was shared, as were resources - in the first few months, the greatest call upon their services was to aid those fleeing the STO.\(^{390}\) In the course of 1943, several dozen réfractaires were helped to escape by the CCRN, or provided with false papers that enabled them to avoid being drafted. This, incidentally, resulted in the only other piece of direct action that the CCRN condoned prior to D-Day - three raids on mairies in neighbouring villages.\(^{391}\) Even then, the raids were planned for the night time, so as to avoid anyone getting hurt.

All action was calculated, planned, designed to harm the Nazi war effort, but not the local populace. Likewise, all of the intelligence was collected with one destination in mind - France Libre in London. Equally, the sabotage that was carried out was not meant to annoy the population, but the occupier. For the most part, sabotage was intended to be an irritant, as outright destruction carried the risk of reprisals, though this changed in the last months of the Occupation. But it was a source of satisfaction for Dr Dauphin that in the period of 1943-

\(^{389}\) Papp, *op.cit.*, p.201.
\(^{390}\) ADE 88 W 53, *op.cit.*
\(^{391}\) Papp, *op.cit.*, p. 201.
1944, not one munitions train that left Nonancourt, having been manufactured at the town’s weapons factory, left intact.392

Even the storage of weapons was designed to cause the maximum amount of difficulty to the Gestapo and the Vichy anti-terrorist brigades, but the minimum for the civil population. Though weapons were scarce, after the spring of 1943, individual resisters had to keep their weapons in one place, with one member of the CCRN acting as the committee’s quartermaster. This quartermaster was also the manager of the town gasworks. To retrieve the weapons, a delicate procedure had to be followed correctly involving the regulation of the air pressure and the volume of gas being treated. Failure to do so would have resulted in the immediate asphyxiation of everyone in the chamber. Orders existed that should the Gestapo raid the gasworks, that this procedure be sabotaged—though the Resistance in Nonancourt would have been crushed, the local Gestapo brigade would also have suffered a large number of fatalities.393

The CCRN can be judged as having more success where Jaurès, in the Rouen area, and at an earlier stage, had failed. The approach was more co-ordinated, better organised, better directed towards an avowed aim— the defeat of Nazi Germany— and better aimed at the local audience. Its political rhetoric, though strongly orientated towards a new Republic, and supportive of the Popular Front, and opposed to Vichy, was less dogmatic. The CCRN were emblematic of the reconciliation of idealism and pragmatism in resistance action, and demonstrate how, at a local level, gradualist resisters began to eventually find a sustainable ‘resistance as’ in 1943, one that gave voice and action to their aims and reflections. In this period of 1942-43, they were finally able to become an effective resistance. Gradualism was now able to both clearly identify not just whom they were resisting against, and what they

392 ADE 88 W 53, op.cit.
393 ADE 88 W 53, op.cit.
were resisting for, but also able to identify a way of manifesting their resistance, by drawing upon the skills of individual resisters, who as we have seen, often had privileged positions within local society, which enabled them to carry out actions such as propaganda, sabotage, and collating intelligence. As a consequence of being able to function across these three criteria of resistance, the gradualists were beginning to be able to forge a third force within both resistance and politics as an alternative to both the Communists and Vichy, and disprove Pierre Laval’s claim that the war was a straight choice between collaboration and ‘Bolshevism’, and a different pathway and vision to the above two.

Towards l’après-Vichy: 1943-44

Resistance networks began to recruit within the civil service from 1941, and increasingly in 1942-1943. Two factors were vital for this- the resurrection of the Communists, and the discrediting of Vichy. The first threatened to bring a revolution that would radically transform French society; the second was now showing signs of being chronically unable to govern France. Yet if both Vichy and the Communist grand soir were unacceptable, then there was no question of simply returning to the Third Republic and the Popular Front. So it became necessary to create (bricoler) a third way, between Nazism & Vichyism on the one hand and Communism on the other.

This was essential to the planning for the future, which we shall look at shortly, and which involved civil servants. But this potential liberation posed opportunities and challenges. The opportunities were obvious- the chance to re-shape France and liberate the nation from Nazi occupation. But there were also challenges to be faced, and these had to be addressed at the same time, if not before turning attention to the future. Although some civil

394 Interview with Leprettre, op.cit.
servants had resisted, and the Resistance had been able to undermine the Vichy regime from within, these civil servants were never anything approaching a majority.\textsuperscript{396}

Thus, it was clear that revolution was in itself not sufficient - it needed to be followed swiftly by reconstruction and even rehabilitation. The civil service would need to be rid of the most violent collaborators; the local and national press would need to begin from scratch. The political infrastructure (i.e. the mayors) would need to be trusted by both the population and the Resistance, and above all suspicion of Nazi sympathies.\textsuperscript{397} This would be particularly acute if the battle of liberation turned out to be a protracted one.

So what happened after the Liberation required careful planning. The \textit{exode} of 1940 had shown the potential for chaos if ever there was a power vacuum.\textsuperscript{398} Add to that the rancour that a decade of political turbulence, starting with the riots of February 1934, had brought, and it was clear that there was enormous potential for bloody anarchy. With the intention of preventing this, came firstly, at a national level, the formation of the CNR in May 1943, and then in late 1943 and early 1944, the \textit{Comités Départementaux de la Libération} (CDL).

1943 had been a turbulent year for Libération-Nord in the Seine-Inférieure. A \textit{réfractaire}, provided with false papers in Darnétal in the May of that year, was arrested in Dax in the south-west of France during a police check. Under torture, he divulged the names of Suzanne Savale, who had produced the papers, and Césaire Levillain, who had led the network.\textsuperscript{399} They were both arrested, and Michel Corroy and Henri Savale followed not long after. Cohors-Asturie was practically dismantled, as was the \textit{centre de Darnétal}. Libération-Nord was suspended for a time, as although the groups under Brutelle’s direction were still active, they had no real contact with either the national direction of Libération-Nord or the

\textsuperscript{396} Michel Baldenweck, \textit{De la Résistance ...}, pp. 282-325.
\textsuperscript{397} Interview with Leprettet, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{398} See Eric Wauters (ed.), \textit{Témoignages des Haut-Normands} (Rouen, Editions des Falaises, 2010).
\textsuperscript{399} Interview with Larue, \textit{op.cit.}
CNR. Raoul Leprettre and Tony Larue were both keeping a low profile, and Larue left Normandy after a warrant was issued for Larue’s arrest, for what might translate into English as ‘seditious assembly’. He was taken ill with an “arranged” stomach ulcer, operated upon, and then “kidnapped” from the hospital.

However, in late 1943, Henri Ribière made contact with Raoul Leprettre, who had returned to Rouen to take over the Wolf printing firm. According to Leprettre, Ribière was astonished to learn that the network was practically moribund, and his report to the national direction reflects the view that Libération-Nord in Seine-Inférieure was far behind their counterparts and homologues in most other French departments.

A reduced activity was embarked upon, principally intelligence, but also working with other groups. Libération-Nord, according to Leprettre, had talked about the importance of renewing France after the Liberation, and now was the time to make these plans more concrete, and to follow the example set by Moulin, as well as de Gaulle’s call for working in unity to defeat the Nazis. Consequently, contact was made with the leaders of other networks, and at the end of 1943, the CDL for Seine-Inférieure was formed.

Though resistance in Seine-Inférieure encountered many difficulties, there appears to have existed in 1943 a relative desire for many of the different strands of resistance to cooperate with each other. Normally, Libération-Nord might have expected to encounter difficulties in working with Communist-leaning networks or the Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM), a network perceived to have a more conservative leaning outlook. But the leaders of both the FN and the OCM in the department were atypical.

---

400 Interview with Leprettre, op.cit.
401 Interview with Larue, op.cit. Larue indicates that this medical diagnosis was in fact a cover to help him to escape.
402 Interview with Leprettre, op.cit.; Aglan, La Résistance sacrifiée, p.150.
403 Interview with Leprettre, op.cit.
The FN was led by Benjamin Remacle. Born in 1914 in Le Havre, his family had moved to Rouen when he was five. He trained as an engineer, graduating in 1936. He had sympathised with the SFIO, but never actually joined. He received a religious upbringing - as a Protestant. Later on, he would convert to Catholicism, but was never an atheist. In fact, he said later on that he was not opposed to Daladier’s decree outlawing the PC in 1939. He began resisting individually in 1940, helping prisoners of war to escape, but in 1941, made contact with the organised resistance, and the FN via a Communist friend in April 1942. Strangely, he found his initial resistance work to be menial:

I turned to sabotaging vehicles that the Germans were using in 1941… it was in carrying out sabotage that I was finally able to do something, to fully apply my creative mind, and start finding ways to sabotage different installations.

Remacle was in favour of direct action, but also against the idea of favouring a maquis. In his view, the Diables Noirs at Ry were ‘a farce… there was hardly a village in the department that didn’t have any Germans’. Furthermore, he did not subscribe to a Soviet-style future, but ‘France first- the liberation of the territory’. Everything had to be planned around this, and to that end, he was willing to co-operate with other resisters.

So too was François Fagot. Leader of the OCM in the Seine-Inférieure, although it was acknowledged that most of his fellow members were conservative, Fagot himself was a former member of the SFIO, and still held to be a ‘fervent socialist’. His wife Simone

---

404 Interview with Benjamin Remacle, *op.cit.*
406 Interview with Remacle, *op.cit.*
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Files of the *brigade anti-terroriste*, Rouen, 1944, ADSM 51 W 445.
recalled him as being left-leaning, without actually being gauchiste as such, and a firm believer in the ideals of the Republic and republicanism, such as the separation of Church and State, or la laïcité.\textsuperscript{410} The finer nuances of his politics were, in any event, largely considered to be irrelevant- many of the members of the OCM in the area around Rouen were civil servants, and were prepared to put politics to one side for a greater good.\textsuperscript{411} Fagot had been sent from Paris after the previous leader, Candelier, had been forced to go into hiding, so was there to enforce a national line. From this perspective, it was scarcely surprising that he should favour working with other groups.\textsuperscript{412} So in all, the conditions for Libération-Nord to co-operate with other groups were more favourable than what they had been previously under the Occupation.

In parallel to the other groups adopting some of the ideas of Libération-Nord, Libération-Nord adopted some of the tactics of the other groups. They had increased their efforts of sabotage in 1943, but became more favourable to armed action in 1944. In Grand-Quevilly, on January 3, 1944, this resulted in the death of a German soldier- what appears to be the only instance of them carrying out such an attack in four years.\textsuperscript{413} Leprettre says that armed action was only as part of the planned nature- building towards sabotaging Nazi installations and hardware ahead of the D-Day landings. The nature of the armed groups though was limited, as Brutelle was arrested after being denounced in December 1943- responsibility went to Christian Desjardins from this point onwards, and after June 1944, the \textit{Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur} (FFI).\textsuperscript{414}

\textsuperscript{410} Interview with Simone Fagot, ADSM AV09/167, 1984.
\textsuperscript{411} Files of the \textit{brigade anti-terroriste}, Rouen, 1944, ADSM 51 W 445.
\textsuperscript{412} Interview with Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{413} Lancestre, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.31-33.
\textsuperscript{414} Interview with Leprettre, \textit{op.cit}. For further details as to the organisation of the FFI in Seine-Inférieure in the summer of 1944, and the local authorities in the era of the Provisional Government, see Baldenweck, \textit{De la Résistance…}, especially from p.303 onwards.
The minutes of one CDL meeting, on April 8, 1944, survive. Most of the subjects discussed are linked to resistance activity in the department- but not all. The FTP, for example, proposed a motion calling for the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, in recognition of the bravery of the young fighters in the Resistance. No vote is recorded in the minutes, and it was simply a motion that would have called upon the CNR to lower the voting age at the Liberation. Leprettre also said that other meetings touched on not just who would take over as mayors of the communes, but how the local economy would be structured, how rationing would work, public transport (the testimonies of Bernard Lawday and Tony Larue indicate that links between the centre of Rouen and the rive gauche were far from satisfactory, and after the heavy bombardment of April 1944, the two rives were practically separate communities in all but name), reconstruction, and how local media would work. All of these would be important things in the immediate post-war landscape.

Hand in glove with this was the Noyautage des Administrations Publiques (NAP). Its role was never meant to be one that was open, as its name suggests. Leprettre appears to have been linked, and this would seem to have been the intelligence arm of Libération-Nord during his time in charge. They gathered intelligence purely within the local administration, with two aims in mind- preparing the Liberation, and gathering data on how the local administration worked. This second mission had a dual purpose- the apprenticeship of power, and also the elimination of the more zealous collaborators. All along, the NAP was

---

415 Minutes of CDL meeting, April 8, 1944, ADSM 54 W 276/10811.
416 ADSM 54 W 276/10811, op.cit. As a note, the voting age was not lowered to 18 until 1975, under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
417 Interviews with Lawday & Larue, op.cit.; Leprettre’s papers and testimony to CH2GM, AN 72 J/191.
418 Interview with Leprettre, op.cit.
419 The main newspaper in the region, Journal de Rouen, was banned at the Liberation for having been guilty of collaboration. It was replaced first with a paper entitled Normandie parle français, which then, in 1945, after the return of Wolf and Leprettre from deportation, turned into Paris-Normandie, a newspaper that still appears today. For a further discussion of the importance of the Resistance in shaping the post-war regional press in Upper Normandy, see Cécile-Anne Sibout, Paris-Normandie à l’époque de Pierre-René Wolf, un grand patron de la presse régionale (1945-1972) (unpublished PhD thesis, Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, 1999) and Les hommes de presse de l’agglomération rouennaise (Rouen, Agglomération de Rouen, 2002).
420 Baldenweck, De la Résistance..., p.215.
intended to smooth the transition from Vichy to Provisional Government, and in the shadows of what was commonly called ‘the army of the shadows’.

However, quite how hand in glove this was is unknown. There appears to be some debate as who was actually in charge of the NAP. The *archives nationales* would suggest that it was a M. Schweitzer from the Eure, from the *Ceux de la Résistance* network, who was a close friend and associate of Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, the man who would go on and take charge of the FFI in Upper Normandy after D-Day. 421 Oral testimony from Leprettre and Larue cites Edmond Dauzet, head of financial affairs at the prefecture in Rouen, as the leader. 422 The historian André Combes names Jean Capdeville, yet Capdeville makes no mention of being a member of the NAP in his own testimony. 423 Furthermore, the oral testimonies of both Remacle and Leprettre claim responsibility for leading the CDL. 424 The minutes that survive, perhaps diplomatically, as well as from a security perspective, omit who was chairing the meeting. 425 All of this is perhaps indicative of the slightly murky and secretive nature of the NAP and their activities.

The formation of the CDL in the Eure was slightly easier, although their history tied in closer to that of the FFI. Marcel Baudot chaired the CDL in the department, formed the NAP unit that worked in Evreux, and then became head of the FFI within the Eure. 426 The last position had both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage was that it enabled him to finally bring the west of the Eure into the mainstream Resistance orbit, in particular the Maquis Surcouf but also the FTP. 427 The Resistance (now FFI) would play a critical role in the battle for Normandy. However, this required a military discipline, and Baudot was

421 Papers of Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, AN 516/AP1.
422 Interviews with Leprettre & Larue, *op.cit*.
423 Baldenweck, *De la Résistance*...., pp.259-264; Testimony of Jean Capdeville to the CH2GM, 1958, AN72J/191.
424 Interviews with Remacle & Leprettre, *op.cit*.
425 ADSM 54 W 276/10811, *op.cit*.
426 Interview with Baudot, *op.cit*.
427 Papp, *op.cit.*, p.244.
forced to desert his civil service post and go into hiding on June 6, 1944, when the Allies landed on the beaches of Calvados and the Cotentin peninsula on D-Day. From here until the Liberation, Baudot’s role was much closer to that of a guerrilla leader, directing the FFI from hiding.

Whilst this day had been the subject of extensive preparation for some time by resisters who chose to carefully plan and co-ordinate their action, and in the case of the Eure, most resistance networks experienced substantial growth (roughly half of all members of organised resistance in the Eure who were active at the time of D-Day had joined in the six months prior to D-Day), the results of this planning and co-ordination were mixed. In the case of the Seine-Inférieure, organised resistance was severely affected by the arrest and break-up of the CDL in Grand-Quevilly on May 8, 1944. This decapitated the main resistance networks, including Libération-Nord. The Allied landings just four weeks later meant that there was little time to build up a replacement-organised resistance in the department passed officially onto Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, who had been named as the Free French commissaire de la République, who operated out of clandestinity for much of the Battle of Normandy, and a base in the vicinity of Louviers in the east of the Eure. Libération-Nord nominally passed into the departmental control of Capdeville, although it would seem that in practice, each of the local areas of Libération-Nord did their own thing.

In the Eure, Marcel Baudot managed to avoid capture, and along with Bourdeau de Fontenay, managed to ensure a reasonable orderly transition of power. However, many networks that had embraced preparation over direct action over the course of the previous

---

428 Interview with Baudot, *op.cit.*
429 Statistical breakdown of CVR dossiers for the department of the Eure, ADE 88 W 26.
431 Papers of Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, AN 516/AP1.
432 Interview with Raphael Mallard, *op.cit.*; Jean Andréani, *Rapport d’homologation*, SHD, *armée de terre*, 13 P 131. These two sources give accounts of activity for Libération-Nord in the areas around Dieppe and Le Havre respectively; they seem to have had little close contact with their superiors in Rouen in 1944.
433 Interview with Baudot, *op.cit.*
four years showed themselves to struggle with the demands of battle. In the case of the CCRN in Nonancourt, despite copious security measures, such as changing the location of their radio, their signal was still traced, and that, along with the discovery of a resister with false papers, was the source of their dismantling by the Gestapo in July 1944. They did not even have time to put into effect the sabotage procedures planned at the gasworks.  

In both the case of the CDL of Seine-Inférieure, and the CCRN in Nonancourt, the members were arrested. But whereas the members of the CDL were deported, only one member of the CCRN was deported, Joseph Le Ledan, who died in Mauthausen just before the liberation. The others managed to escape in the chaos of the Nazi retreat in August 1944, whilst awaiting transfer. It showed that for all the preparation necessary for effective resistance, luck, chance and opportunity were also important factors in its successful realisation.

The gradualist approach to resistance was able to bear more fruit in the period of 1942-44, because during that time, the three criteria of resistance that Pickford has talked about were more reconciled to one another than what they had been previously. Through growing dissatisfaction with Vichy, continuing enmity to Nazism, and the relative weakness of the Communists, whom, as we have seen in chapter one, bore the brunt of reprisals against the Resistance, as well as a lingering distrust of the apparatus of the PC, they were able to identify a moderate audience for their message of reformism rather than revolution. They were also able to elucidate their message via clear organisation, and by profiting from the general evolution of circumstances, namely the weakening position of the Axis Powers in the war at large. Their flexibility enabled them to organise the Resistance more generally. Indeed, the period of 1942-44 could be seen as the period where the gradualists built resistance into

434 Dr Dauphin, ADE 88 W 53.
435 Ibid.
the “Resistance”, eventually constructing a more unifying approach to resistance than the
more sectarian attitude of both Communist resistance, and indeed earlier resistance efforts of
their own. Whereas the Communists and those on the revolutionary Left had tried to impose
their own vision and conception of resistance, the gradualists forged and realised a broader
vision and organisation. There were, however, limitations to the success of their approach.
Despite all the planning of the CDL and the FFI, as well as the influx of numbers in the early
months of 1944,\textsuperscript{436} they were never able to convert their resources into that of a successful
mass army able to independently take on the \textit{Wehrmacht} in armed combat. Figures for the
Seine-Inférieure show that in 1944, the average length of time for a resistance leader was
three months between assuming command and either arrest or death.\textsuperscript{437} For all the care and
precaution taken by gradualists to avoid violently provoking the Occupier, they still
encountered, as they became more threatening to both the Nazi occupation and the Vichyite
hegemony, the full force of the enemy. Though able to ensue some sort of orderly transition
at the Liberation, from a military perspective, the gradualists were no more able to deliver
their own liberation without aid from the Allies than what the Communists had been.

\textbf{From exit to voice: An evolution of gradualism}

A philosophical device frequently credited to the German philosopher Leibniz is ‘to resist is
to act’.\textsuperscript{438} Yet that device could be challenged by referring to the work of Albert O.
Hirschman, and his theory of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’.\textsuperscript{439} Hirschman’s theory is originally meant to
be applied to a business environment, but can also be applied to political situations, as a
choice between withdrawing from civic or political participation (‘exit’) or actual protest

\textsuperscript{436} Statistical breakdown of CVR dossiers for the department of the Eure, ADE 88 W 26.
\textsuperscript{437} Fonds de l’Office National des Anciens Combattants (ONAC), Seine-Inférieure, ADSM 3848 W.
against the regime (‘voice’). In Hirschman, there is also a third option, ‘loyalty’, which would be used here to explain the attitude of collaboration, or even just passive support for Vichy. But by ‘exit’, is one really showing resistance? The truth is that it depends as much as anything on the context of the situation, and of course, the situation was highly dependent on location and on the individual. René Coty, the Radical deputy for Le Havre, who went on to become President under the Fourth Republic, for example, voted *pleins pouvoirs* in 1940, but never participated in political life until after the war, even refusing the mayoralty of Le Havre after Léon Meyer was stripped of public office. Nor did he engage with the Resistance, though he remained a keen observer of the situation around him.\(^{440}\) Coty could be seen as an example of ‘exit’, but he never claimed to have been a resister. Much of Tony Larue’s activity between 1941 and the end of 1942 easily falls under the category of ‘exit’, yet his engagement afterwards meant that he came to be considered as a resister, a status that was certainly helpful in his long post-war political career.\(^{441}\) Generally, one can say that ‘exit’ is a precursor to resistance, and the first step towards it, but only if followed by further actions - in essence, one can only see ‘exit’ as resistance if it is then followed or accompanied by ‘voice’.

To many of those who saw themselves as being on the non-Communist Left, ‘exit’ was the only strategy left open in 1940, because ‘loyalty’ would have meant adopting the antithesis of their values, and ‘voice’ was not an option- as Brutelle’s early attempts in 1940-1941 showed, ‘voice’ is only an option if you have something to say. After the so-called ‘strange defeat’ of the previous summer, even the most eloquent could be forgiven for being lost for words. But to facilitate that ‘exit’, the only arrangement that was realistically open is what Burrin called ‘accommodation’; recognising the Nazi occupation without ever really


\(^{441}\) Larue returned eventually to the mayoralty of Grand-Quevilly in 1947, defeating Louis Jouvin in that year’s municipal elections, and remained mayor until stepping down in June 1995. Larue became a deputy in 1956, then senator in 1977, until his death in July 1995.
accepting it.\textsuperscript{442} Thus, Larue did not resign in 1940,\textsuperscript{443} and Brutelle & Capdeville remained in post as \textit{instituteurs}- thereby taking an oath of loyalty to Marshal Pétain.

Yet in many ways, it was a false ‘exit’ that these resisters made. They were not disengaged with the political process- they were simply temporarily withdrawing from it in order to reinvent it. The meeting of the group on the rue Léon Malétra shows this- anyone who is seriously engaging with the questions of the defeat of 1940 and how to react is not truly in ‘exit’ mode. So we can argue not only was ‘accommodation’ a form of ‘exit’, but also that ‘exit’ was a form of ‘accommodation’. Either way, both were temporary states of being until the right time presented itself for ‘voice’.

Gradualism can therefore be seen as being about slowly forming and forging a form of action, as well as the creation of a viable ‘third force’ within resistance and within French politics. Initially, gradualist resisters did not resist overtly because although there was a will to resist, there was a lack of means. Neither willing to collaborate nor able to quite properly resist, they adopted a form of ‘accommodation’ and ‘exit’. Over the course of four years, this slowly evolved, first from accommodation to critique and ‘voice’, and then to outright resistance. This position of resistance though refrained from violent combat (with one or two rare exceptions) until the landings of June 6, 1944, at which point the waiting ended, and the war of liberation began. During this final year of resistance, the uncertainty and the waiting that characterised the action and thoughts of many of these resisters gave way to a clearer sense of purpose in preparing for the Liberation, both militarily and politically. This is not dissimilar to the process identified by Aglan when examining the \textit{planificateurs}.\textsuperscript{444} Similarly, just as Aglan concludes her chapter in the winter of 1943–44, so it can be seen that the climax of gradualism was D-Day. After that point, action for these resisters was not just about

\textsuperscript{442} Burrin, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{443} Interview with Larue, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{444} Aglan, \textit{Le temps…}, pp. 63-117.
resisting the enemy, it was about liberating the territory and assuming some sort of power, to be exercised in the immediate aftermath of Vichy’s end and reverse the politics of the National Revolution.

**Resistance aristocracy?**

In sociology, agency is the capacity to act of individuals as agents of their own destiny.\(^\text{445}\) To many of those from the lower strata of society, as we have seen in the previous chapter, direct action was the only form of action left open to them. But many of those resisters that we have examined in this chapter were from higher echelons of society - civil servants, business, industry, and the liberal professions. It seems as though, by virtue of having a greater form of cultural capital, in the Bourdieusian sense of the term,\(^\text{446}\) they were able to have greater choice of what forms of action they took. Perhaps this could be called ‘hyper-agency’, an enhanced capacity to act, the luxury of choosing what sorts of action one carried out, a choice of forms of resistance available. They did not merely choose to resist, but also chose when to resist- an important choice.

Eric Hobsbawm identified the importance of ‘the aristocracy of labour’ - a stratum of the working-class that benefited from being more skilled, better-salaried, and consequently a better status.\(^\text{447}\) One can adapt this concept in an analysis of resistance and resisters to identify that the resisters in this chapter were the ‘resistance aristocrats’. They provided, as often as not, the leadership of many local resistance networks, were amongst the earliest resisters, and played major roles in determining the shape and direction of local resistance networks and movements- what action was taken, what members were recruited, what causes to fight for and espouse.


\(^{446}\) Bourdieu, *op.cit.*, pp. 241-258. This was where Bourdieu distinguished more clearly the differences between cultural capital, economic capital and social capital.

The definition of ‘resistance aristocrats’ that is being advanced here is slightly different to the idea outlined by Hobsbawm, and rests upon a means that is neither exclusively political, nor exclusively capital. The definition of ‘labour aristocracy’ is of a well-paid, even salaried, working class, benefiting from exploited workers elsewhere in the world, and used as an instrument to appease revolutionary demands amongst the proletariat.\textsuperscript{448} Yet both the clandestine newspaper edited by Brutelle and the Communist organisation run by André Duroméa in Le Havre suffered with financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{449} Besides, the ‘resistance aristocracy’ was hardly being used as an instrument by the Vichy regime to undermine the Gaullist or Communist causes. Nor were they exclusively left-wing- Benjamin Remacle represented the FN, but was Catholic, and in later life, would support the Gaullist \textit{Rassemblement du Peuple Français} (RPF).\textsuperscript{450}

The advantage held by the ‘resistance aristocrats’ lies exclusively upon the Bourdieusian concepts of cultural capital and social capital. They had better cultural capital because of their secondary and tertiary education, and they had better social capital because they had more contacts, with other people of similar backgrounds to themselves, who could provide assistance to their resistance activities.\textsuperscript{451} Hence in Nonancourt, Dr Dauphin and the CCRN could call upon the local gasworks in which to hide their rudimentary arsenal.\textsuperscript{452} The problems faced in producing clandestine newspapers were solved, to some extent, by Raoul Leprettre taking over the running of a printing firm.\textsuperscript{453} This social capital also made the business of networking to find like-minded resisters easier. It also reflects the social standing

\textsuperscript{449} Interviews with Brutelle and Duroméa, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{450} Interview with Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{451} For a more detailed explanation of Bourdieu’s theories of the forms of capital, see Bourdieu, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{452} ADE 88 W 53.
\textsuperscript{453} Interview with Leprettre, \textit{op.cit.}
of those resisters who had been in, or linked to, the SFIO in the inter-war years; namely that they formed, in the words of Marc Sadoun, ‘une élite du savoir’.  

Consequently, it is they who have a more privileged voice in shaping resistance historiography. Tony Larue’s oral testimony is the longest and most detailed in the Seine-Maritime- it lasts for over eight hours. Marcel Baudot became the unofficial historian- and archivist- of the Resistance in the Eure. Paris-Normandie, the regional paper which started life initially as Normandie parle Français, and which provided many of the early impressions of resistance history, acting as a vehicle for the new post-war hegemony of résistancialisme, was ran by Pierre-René Wolf, Raoul Leprettre and Georges Brutelle between 1945 and 1982. These resisters had the greatest formal training- teachers, civil servants, accountants, engineers- and so were the most able resisters. This thereby gave them a certain superior standing within the networks that they ran. After the war, when the time came for testimony, it was they who were the most able to talk to historians or to take up the pen themselves, and so, for seventy years or so, it has been the ‘resistance aristocrats’ who have shaped our knowledge of the Resistance in Upper Normandy.

This concept of resistance aristocracy can also be used to explain further the differences in debates around resistance historiography and memory at the local level. Just as the ‘labour aristocrats’ are sometimes seen as agents of the ruling classes, some Communist-sympathising resisters see them as figures not just responsible for showing less resistance, but also as being responsible for carrying out an épuration that was not as

---

455 Interview with Larue, op.cit.
456 Baudot’s oral testimony is, at ten hours in length, the longest interview consulted for this thesis. See Interview with Baudot, op.cit. He was also responsible for compiling the extensive resistance and WW2 archive for the Eure (ADE série 88 W), and wrote the Hachette history of the Liberation in Normandy. See Baudot, La Libération en Normandie (Paris, Hachette, 1974).
457 Sibout, Paris-Normandie....
458 Interviews at ADSM AV09 passim; see also regional archives of the CH2GM, AN 72J/191 & AN 72J/122.
459 Cf. Lenin, op.cit.
thorough as it should have been.\footnote{Author’s interviews with Bernard Lawday & Pierre Jouvin, \textit{op.cit.}} This was particularly felt in Grand-Quevilly, whereby Louis Jouvin saw both Césaire Levillain and Tony Larue as having been ‘invisible’ during the era of resistance.\footnote{Author’s interview with Pierre Jouvin, \textit{op.cit.}} So the concept of ‘resistance aristocracy’ can be used both positively- for understanding the leadership and the co-ordination of resistance- and critically- for understanding the divisions that emerged amongst \textit{anciens résistants}.

The concept can also be used critically because arguably, as John Barzman has suggested recently, whereas Jean Basille had stated that Communist resisters were engaged in the defence of a cause,\footnote{See chapter one.} the ‘resistance aristocracy’ could be seen as having engaged in defending their own social privileges and status.\footnote{John Barzman, question to the author at \textit{Histoire et Mémoire de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale} study day at Université de Rouen, December 9, 2015.} The defence of the resistance legacy and ‘French values’ then becomes an appropriation, which both serves as a meta-narrative for their interpretation of resistance, and also marginalises both the Communists and the Gaullists in their representation of the resistance story.\footnote{Robert Gildea, \textit{Fighters in the Shadows} (London, Faber, 2015), p.12. Gildea notes that this ‘third way’ interpretation of the Resistance emerges more clearly within the historiography during the 1980s and 1990s, at a time when the Socialists held the presidency in France- and after the \textit{volte-face} of 1983, were eager to cast themselves as neither Communist nor Right.} Whilst it is impossible to prove definitively that self-interest was the sole motivation of the ‘resistance aristocracy’, we can see that they had a privileged role in the immediate post-war era, and had a privileged role in the shaping of the historiography of resistance.

The idea of ‘resistance aristocracy’ therefore allows us to understand the shaping of resistance not just at the time, but also in history and memory. A category of resisters possessing a greater than average amount of agency, shaped by reserves of political, cultural and social capital, emerged as the leadership of resistance inside France, as opposed to the militarised structure of \textit{France libre} that has come to sometimes be known as \textit{la résistance extérieure}. At a regional level within Upper Normandy, this shaped the direction and
organisation of resistance, the projects upon which they focused, thereby ensuring that organised resistance steered clear of aiming for some sort of ‘revolution’ that would not merely end the Occupation, but also radically alter society. Instead, the social projects of the Resistance would ultimately become more reformist than revolutionary. At a local level, these projects would be put into place thanks to the impetus of this ‘resistance aristocracy’. Likewise, it would be the ‘resistance aristocrats’ who would take the lead in the writing of resistance history, and whose voices would be felt the loudest across the post-war years— and the voices that some of those who felt disenfranchised by the politics of the Liberation would sometimes blame the keenest.\textsuperscript{465}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how a group of socially and culturally privileged resisters turned their greater share of capital within these domains to engage in resistance against both the Nazi occupation and the Vichy regime. It was founded upon a triple refusal of Nazism, conservatism and Communism, all of which were conceived as threats to their vision of France, and their idea of the *polis*. Yet unlike the resisters in chapter one, there was no pre-conceived or fixed vision of what the *polis* should look like. It was something that had to be slowly crafted, based pragmatically on the wider political situation both regionally and nationally. To this end, the gradualists, for the greatest part, did not engage in violent provocation, but instead in forms of resistance that undermined the enemy without exposing the populace to reprisals, and instead aimed to convince their fellow French citizens, by way of propaganda, that both Nazism and Vichy were fundamentally wrong in both creed and action.

\textsuperscript{465} See Eudier, *op.cit.*; Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, *op.cit.*; André Gosse, *Ceux de l’Ombre* (Luneray, Bertout, 1992) for three examples of resisters (in Gosse’s case, with radically different views to the former two) of resisters who felt that the resistance legacy had, to some extent, been misappropriated.
Nonetheless, it was not simply about waiting for the time to be right militarily; it was also about reforming society. To that end, the difference between the resisters analysed in chapter one and the resisters seen in this chapter is akin to the split in the polity identified by both Tiersky and Touchard—namely the difference between revolution and reformism.\textsuperscript{466} There was therefore a dual motivation for many of these resisters— they were motivated by both the desire to combat Nazism and restore French sovereignty (and with it, \textit{la République}), but also, perhaps more surreptitiously, a defence of their social privileges within the fabric of Upper Normandy against both the National Revolution and the hypothetical \textit{grand soir}.

This is why although both of these chapters cover the idea of the ‘politicised’ political, or what Moses Finley called ‘instrumental politics’,\textsuperscript{467} and both forms of resistance had, as an aim, the exercise of power, their intentions were different. Those who subscribed to the Leftist, Communist outlook believed in an uprising to result in a revolutionising of the \textit{polis}, but those who were Left-wing yet non-Communist and more gradualist in outlook wanted an organised, planned resistance that would defeat the enemy, but only reform the \textit{polis}, with both their conceptions of resistance and their conceptions of society being forged over a lengthy period of time.

Whilst in purely military terms, the impact of the ‘resistance aristocrats’ could easily be seen as negligible— their comparative lack of impact upon the wider military context of the Battle of Normandy has been shown both in this chapter, and perhaps even by Marcel Baudot himself—\textsuperscript{468} the role played by the ‘resistance aristocrats’ within the social context was anything but, as their plans played a key part in the restructuring of both the administration

\textsuperscript{466} Tiersky, \textit{op.cit.}, p.329; Touchard, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{467} Moses Finley, \textit{Politics in the Ancient World} (Cambridge, CUP, 1983).
\textsuperscript{468} Baudot, \textit{La Libération de la Normandie}.... Curiously, considering that he himself was a resistance leader, Baudot does not place a huge amount of emphasis upon the role of the Resistance in the events of June-September 1944.
and the cultural vectors of Upper Normandy in the immediate post-war period.\footnote{For a more detailed examination of the region in the era of the Provisional Government, see Baldenweck, \textit{De la Résistance...}, Vol.2, pp. 331-836.} In fact, the opposition between ‘resistance aristocrats’ and ‘resistance subalterns’ could be seen as indicating the different attitudes of resisters within the framework of organised resistance, or \textit{résistance-organisation}. The ‘subalterns’ saw themselves as a countercommunity of insurgents who wanted to rise up from their positions and overthrow the existing order, revolutionising the \textit{polis}, whilst the ‘aristocrats’ saw themselves as a social category whose positions were to be defended, and that from their privileged positions, they were the best-placed to reform and shape the \textit{polis}.

Finally, this has not only influenced the resistance actions that were carried out at the time, but also shaped the writing of resistance history and the memory of resistance. Just as Jean Touchard has suggested that some of the most critical divergences amongst those on the Left in France come about as a consequence of their varying interpretations of historical reference points such as the Enlightenment, or the Revolution, or the events of 1848,\footnote{Touchard, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 37-39.} so we can see that resistance to Nazism and Vichy has been interpreted differently by those on the Left who were gradual reformists, and those who saw their role as that of revolutionaries. Each strand has their own appropriation of the resistance legacy; each has their own \textit{Histoire de la Résistance}.

We have seen resistance through two strands so far- revolutionising the \textit{polis} and reforming the \textit{polis}. In the next two chapters, we will move towards a personalised sense of the political and the relationship between resisting and the \textit{polis}, closer to the idea of expressive politics, beginning in the next chapter with an examination of the link between resistance and patriotism.
Chapter Three
National Identities? Resistance and Patriotism

In 1883, the Minister for Education, Jules Ferry, wrote to the nation’s instituteurs. In his letter, he stressed that teachers were, to some extent, the substitute of the father.471 This example reinforced an aspect already visible from viewing the war memorials to the dead of the Franco-Prussian War or by listening to *La Marseillaise*- the citizens of France were also its children- *les enfants de la Patrie*.472

By 1940, this was already ingrained into the rhetoric of the Republic. Behind it was a centralising mentality, one that placed the state at the heart of national values, and one that made France and being French into an identity above all others. It was also a mentality that betrayed not merely a patriarchal system of society, but also a society that was hierarchised, structured, and encouraged family values. It was not just parental ties that bound the family-the nation itself was a family of sorts in terms of ties and structures.

The kinships bound up in this were confirmed by education, work, and for young men, military service. These acted, for many, as rites of initiation into adulthood.473 As such, French national identity and French masculinity were implicitly linked. Men had to play masculinised, gendered roles within society, and one of these was to act as defenders of the nation. Needless to say, these rhythms were upset by the defeat of 1940- Vichy discouraged *La Marseillaise*, and replaced *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* with *Travail, Famille, Patrie*. The Armistice agreement effectively emasculated the armed forces, thereby ending, by default, military service.474 It was a further sense of disorientation, of social disorder. Philippe Buton

472 First line of *La Marseillaise* (written by Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle, 1792).
has shown how the defeat of 1940 was not just the crisis of France as a nation, but also the crisis of French masculinity.475

Yet if this was France’s darkest hour, this also created an opportunity for those who wanted to serve France to do something. In the first two chapters, we have looked resistance informed by the politicised political, and instrumental politics, but this chapter will examine a shift away from this conception of the political, and towards resistance as a political action as first and foremost an expression of beliefs rather than a desire to exercise power, which could be seen as the personalised political, or expression politics. This chapter proposes to examine those resisters for whom the act of resistance was motivated principally by the idea of patriotism.

A Certain Idea of France?

‘Ever since my first days, I have always had a certain idea about France’. This statement opens the first volume of Charles de Gaulle’s Mémoires de Guerre.476 But what was that idea? What de Gaulle then goes on to say seems almost semi-mystical.477 Ultimately, there is nothing actually fixed- it is the sentiment of the statement that one is invited to agree with.

This conception of patriotism is critical to the understanding of resistance. It was not uncommon, across all shades of opinion in the clandestine press, to see fallen resisters referred to as patriotes.478 Yet if most claimed to be patriotic, the definition that lies behind the usage of these terms is not always the same. The resisters that we have seen in chapter one saw themselves as the true defenders of la patrie, and many saw their mission,
ultimately, as completing the Revolution of 1789. The resisters in chapter two would have seen themselves as *patriotes*, but theirs was a patriotism informed by a humanist tradition, and motivated by a desire to reform France and French society— which was also the case with some of the resisters in this chapter.

But many other resisters who we will analyse here had an idea of France that was guided, to varying extents, by nationalism. Their idea of France was a patriotism that was less closely tied to a firmly identifiable political ideology than resisters in either of the previous two chapters. It was formed by works such as Ernest Lavisse’s 1913 work on French history, and a belief in the mythical power of France. In many ways, it was not far removed from the same ideals that informed the resisters in chapter two, but the key difference was in terms of motivation. Beyond the certain idea of France, and the restoration of an uncompromised sovereignty, there was little that was concrete that united them. There were no grand projects for the future, though this was perhaps understandable— for most of the period 1940-1944, even removing France from Nazi occupation seemed a tall order.

Finally, there was a small minority of resisters who came from outside of France, but rather than necessarily have an internationalist outlook, conceived resistance action as evidence of integration within France. They conceived France as the country which welcomed them, and they conceived patriotism, and with it resistance, as part of a process of integration towards becoming French, not just legalistically, but also practically— proof that they were truly French, and that naturalisation was more than just a process of acquiring a passport.

Rather than talking about patriotism as a single concept, this chapter aims to show that in resistance, there co-existed multiple patriotisms. Maurizio Viroli has distinguished between patriotism and nationalism, with the first being closer to service for a common group

---

of people, and their cause of shared and mutual liberty, which he also terms as ‘republican patriotism’, whilst he traces nationalism’s emergence to the late 18th century, and the striving towards a chauvinistic kind of homogeneity of a people, based on cultural, linguistic and ethnic lines.\textsuperscript{480} The patriotism being examined here are firstly, republican patriotism, in the sense identified by Viroli, and applied to those defending the French republican legacy. Then, what we have chosen to call national patriotism, which though not necessarily nationalistic, does draw upon a narrative of France as a providential state,\textsuperscript{481} and not far removed from what Eric Hobsbawm called ‘state patriotism’.\textsuperscript{482} Finally, we will look at the patriotism of those immigrants using resistance to prove their Frenchness, which we will call integrational patriotism.

\textbf{Serving the Republic}

François Furet wrote that the commemorations in 1880 of the fall of the Bastille were proof of ‘The Republic sailing into port’.\textsuperscript{483} For Furet, this marked the climax of social acceptance of republicanism, the end of a process over the course of certainly the previous decade, whereby the Republic ceased to become a subject of contention, and accepted as the form of governance that divided France the least.

The keenest defenders of republican values were those who owed much to the \textit{école républicaine}. For those born after the First World War, a new possibility opened up—education in both the primary \& secondary systems. It should be noted that until the reforms of 1959, the two systems tended to run in parallel, rather than sequentially. The vast majority of French people were educated in the primary system, but a small minority entered \textit{collège} at six or seven years of age, then progressed onto \textit{lycée} upon getting the certificat d’études, or

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{482} Eric Hobsbawm, \textit{Nations and Nationalism since 1870} (Cambridge, CUP, 1992), p.78.
\end{thebibliography}
school certificate. This system then allowed, upon getting the *baccalauréat* (usually at the age of 18), entry to the liberal professions.  

_Lycées_ were fee-paying prior to 1930, but the fees were then abolished, breaking down the traditional barrier. In 1937, having passed his school certificate a year early, Bernard Lawday left his primary school in Sotteville, and enrolled at the age of twelve at Lycée Pierre Corneille, the city’s main secondary school for boys, which traced its history back to the 16th century, originally being run by Jesuits, but having long since converted to the state sector by this time. Lawday recalled being only the second boy of his generation from the less-favoured _rive gauche_ to go to the school, situated near to the city hall, on the _rive droite_. For him, crossing the river five days a week (the exceptions being Thursdays and Sundays) was almost like entering a different society, of different norms and culture. But prior to just a few years before, this universe would have been totally impossible for Lawday to accede to- he came from a working-class background, and the family had only just moved up from ‘lower’ Sotteville, the less-privileged areas of the _commune_ centred on the railway station. The chance to go to ‘Corneille’ allowed Lawday to move into new social circles-one that further developed his knowledge and offered a humanist alternative to the Catholic upbringing he had received. Despite being an altar boy until the age of 13, he said, in response to the question when he stopped believing in God “I don’t think that I ever really did believe [to begin with]”.

For Georges Touroude, the social tension was also present, but the Republic also provided him with the opportunity to go on and better himself. Born into a rural family in

---

484 Paxton, *op.cit.*, pp.133-137.
485 Author’s Interview with Bernard Lawday, *op.cit.*
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid. Lawday was from a family that had arrived in Sotteville in 1843, but his parents had to move to the Paris region for work after the First World War- he was born in Bobigny in 1925, but moved back to Sotteville (considered to be an upward move in terms of social mobility) in 1929. The move from ‘lower’ Sotteville came just before the war, and was considered a further upward move in terms of social mobility.
488 Author’s Interview with Lawday, *op.cit.*
1924, Touroude seemed to describe himself as being a schoolboy who was good at learning, but not always the most committed.\textsuperscript{489} It was not until 1940, aged 15, that he finally passed the entrance exam for the \textit{école normale}; no sooner had he gained admission to the school in Rouen than the \textit{écoles normales}, the training colleges for primary teachers (\textit{ instituteurs}), were abolished, and so, in 1941, Touroude and his fellow \textit{normaliens} were forced to go to the Lycée Corneille.\textsuperscript{490} For Touroude, who described no strong political sentiments with regard to his upbringing, going to Rouen represented a culture shock, both in terms of environment and in terms of the social \textit{milieu}.\textsuperscript{491} 1941, and the transfer to “Corneille”, represented a further shock still- for though the pupils were of the same age, the primary and secondary sectors were different socially.

Despite the reforms of the 1930s, few families from working-class backgrounds took advantage- at this time, only 3\% of French children acceded to secondary education.\textsuperscript{492} Their cultures were different- whilst the primary sector was designed to instill republican values first and foremost, as well as basic literacy and numeracy skills, the secondary system drew upon the classics, early modern French literature, mathematics that went well beyond the usual basics taught at primary level, and philosophy.\textsuperscript{493} Republican values were still at the heart of the system and its ethos, but it was a different set of codes and mores. For Touroude, there was another factor that amplified the sense of shock- the scale of Nazi occupation was more intense than in the countryside, and the girls \textit{lycée}, known as the Lycée Jeanne d’Arc, was being used as billeting. Such was the situation that Touroude was unable to lodge himself within the school, and he had to board with friends of his parents in Sotteville.\textsuperscript{494}

\textsuperscript{489} Georges Touroude, \textit{Les Braconniers de l’Espérance} (Royan, Editions de la Langrotte, 1995), pp. 3-11.
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid., pp.13-17.
\textsuperscript{491} Ibid, p.13.
\textsuperscript{492} Paxton, \textit{op.cit.}, p.133.
\textsuperscript{494} Touroude, \textit{op.cit.}, p.19.
education becoming one of the key areas of reform for Vichy’s National Revolution, and the curriculum becoming a vehicle for *le maréchalisme*. One of the examples of this at Lycée Corneille seems to have been the appointment of a new History/Geography teacher, referred to in Touroude’s account as ‘Lucien M.’ Upon arriving in his new post in January 1942, he announced to his classes that he was the representative of the *maréchal*, before proceeding to read aloud Pétain’s official New Year message, and then setting as homework the task that each student write a personal letter of thanks to Pétain, expressing their gratitude for ‘his unfailing service to France’. With many of the boys staying in accommodation where heating was scarce, where food was rationed, and with the Nazi occupation of France showing no signs of ending soon, one might understand why this was enough to make a number of them feel aggrieved.

The ‘outsider’ upbringing combined with a secondary education was something that inspired the early resistance of Benjamin Remacle, whom we have seen in the previous chapter. Remacle’s upbringing was particular to put it mildly. He was brought up as a Protestant, a minority often marginalised within French society, and only really numerous in the south of France in and around the Cévennes. His upbringing though was left-wing, and, as he saw it, ‘strongly influenced by the memory of the First World War’, which he pointed to as making him a pacifist, and anti-fascist. Yet unlike other resisters, he never

---

496 Touroude, *op.cit.*, pp.27-29. This part of Touroude’s work is slightly more controversial. The name of the teacher is given as no more than ‘Lucien M.’, but Touroude also mentions that he went on to lecture at the Sorbonne, and that he was an expert on the History of the Vikings. Lucien Musset was an expert on the history of the Vikings, but he taught not at the Sorbonne, but at Caen. However, Musset was born in 1922, so would only have been two years older than Touroude, and only three years older than Lawday. Also, Musset’s father was Dean of Humanities at Caen during the Occupation- and was deported for resistance activity. However, despite the clues being so obvious, Musset (who outlived Touroude by three years, dying in 2004) appears not to have sued for libel. Lawday too was adamant that Musset set this as a homework- he described him as a figure of fun amongst the boys, partly owing to a high-pitched voice. Based on interview with Bernard Lawday, *op.cit.* and Jean-Jacques Bertaux, ‘Hommage à Lucien Musset’ in *Annales de Normandie* (Vol.55, No.1-2, 2005), pp.2-4.
497 Interview with Benjamin Remacle, *op.cit.*
499 Interview with Remacle, *op.cit.*
quite made the step from political sympathising to political militancy. He said that he was
opposed to Léon Blum’s Spain policy in 1936, but did not support an intervention to help the
Spanish Republicans. He was sympathetic to the Popular Front, but never joined the SFIO,
and was not opposed to Daladier outlawing the Communists in 1939- yet still saw himself as
left-wing. Another contradiction was that he supported the Armistice, but was firmly
opposed to Pétain, and began resisting before the end of 1940. His background contained
another contradiction- despite being educated in the secondary system, he shunned the
pathways into the liberal professions and instead opted for a technical education, qualifying
as an engineer in 1936. Thus, prior to 1940, by which time Remacle was 26, his political
engagement was one of interest, but not involvement.

The principal difference between Remacle on the one hand and Lawday & Touroude
on the other was age. It was this difference in age that informed both the difference in entry
dates into resistance and differences in forms of action. Remacle’s action started quite early,
but in the same vein as his pre-war political engagement, there was initially no formal
adhesion. Firstly in the summer of 1940, he helped French POWs who had not yet been sent
to Germany to escape and then used his position as an engineer to sabotage work being
carried out for the Nazis at the Chantiers de Normandie based in Rouen. It was not until
March 1941 that he made formal contact with the organised Resistance, and not until April
1942 that he actually became a member of a network. As the war progressed, the nature of
his resistance action evolved, and began to engage him not necessarily politically, but
certainly intellectually. As he put it ‘It was in sabotaging vehicles that I was able to fully

500 Interview with Remacle, op.cit.
501 Ibid.
502 Ibid. Remacle’s quote is intriguing- ‘For me, Pétain died in 1919. I was relieved with the Armistice, but apart
from that…’. This echoes slightly de Gaulle’s quote, in Charles Williams’ biography De Gaulle: The Last Great
Frenchman (London, Abacus, 2002): ‘Marshal Pétain was a great man; he died in 1925’ (p.62). It is impossible
to know if Remacle knew of de Gaulle’s original quotation.
503 Remacle was born in 1914, Touroude in 1924, Lawday in 1925.
504 Interview with Remacle, op.cit.
505 Ibid.
apply my creative mind’. From simply producing shoddy work, he progressed in 1941 to sabotaging military vehicles, in a manner that did not actually harm any servicemen, but forced the vehicles to come in for servicing time and time again, and also helping resisters within the mairie at Petit-Quevilly to forge papers. Then, from 1942, some more violent action was undertaken, principally against Vichy and collaborators.

For Lawday & Touroude, their entries into resistance came later. Touroude said that the turning point for him came in October 1941, with the execution of Guy Môquet, a 17-year-old Communist resister interned at Châteaubriant near Nantes. It came on top of the social tension that existed already, and the thought that Môquet was the same age made some boys of Touroude’s social class realise the nature of the Nazi occupation, and of Vichy.

There had already been two resistance networks in Lycée Corneille in 1940-41, both of which had floundered after the leader of the Communist network had been expelled, and the Lessertisseur boys narrowly escape a prison sentence for gun-running. Action could neither be too radical nor even hint at violence- the authorities were instructed to counter any political activity within the corridors.

This would explain why a meeting of twelve boys, interested by the idea of setting up a resistance network within the school, met some distance away from the buildings, in the municipal gardens behind the city hall, after lessons on November 10, 1941. The discussions centred on the war, their views, and how to manifest them. Like the forerunners to Libération-Nord at Grand-Quevilly the previous year, whom we have discussed in the previous chapter, there was an agreement to do something, but uncertainty as to do what

---

506 Interview with Remacle, op.cit.
507 Ibid.
508 Touroude, op.cit., p.20.
509 Author’s Interview with Lawday, op.cit. For further discussion and information on Môquet, and his legacy in terms of the history and memory of the Resistance, see Pierre-Louis Basse, Guy Môquet: Une enfance fusillée (Paris, Stock, 2007) ; Jean-Marc Berlière & Franck Liaigre, L’affaire Guy Môquet : Enquête sur une mystification officielle (Paris, Larousse, 2009).
511 Touroude, op.cit., p.25.
exactly. Unlike the meeting at Grand-Quevilly though, there was an idea though of what action they might carry out in the meanwhile in order to give voice to their discontent.

The very next day was the anniversary of the armistice that ended the First World War in 1918. Commemorations were not totally outlawed, but they were certainly discouraged. Classes took place as usual, but during morning break, the same twelve boys gathered by the school’s war memorial, and left a wreath reading ‘Ceux qui n’ont pas oublié’.\textsuperscript{512} It was deliberately ambiguous- not outwardly political in a party politics sense, not directly opposed to the Vichy regime, or even the Nazi occupation, but equally, it showed a certain discontent with the present and a recognition of previous sacrifices in wars against Germany. It also achieved its aim of drawing attention to a cause- in the weeks that followed, despite the reluctance of those who had been involved in the Lessertisseur group, the small gathering of boys had found themselves a name- albeit the not terribly original \textit{Normale}- and by the spring of 1942, contained fifty schoolboys, whose initial activity centred upon the distribution and displaying of tracts- most of which were homemade, but others had been dropped by the RAF, and then collected and displayed by boys, aided by Maurice Reynaud, a teacher who was sympathetic to resisters, taught English, and was married to an Englishwoman.\textsuperscript{513}

It was shortly after this time that Bernard Lawday joined the group. Rather like Touroude, Lawday was also someone for whom the sense of social antagonism was acutely felt. His motive for resistance was partly out of patriotic sentiment, but also partly out of frustration against the Nazi occupiers. He described having to walk up the hill that led to the school, and crossing over the road because the \textit{Wehrmacht} were coming in the opposite direction, as French civilians were not supposed to share the pavement with German

\textsuperscript{512} Touroude, \textit{op.cit.}, p.26. Translates as ‘those who have not forgotten’.

\textsuperscript{513} Touroude, \textit{op.cit}, p.29; Author’s Interview with Lawday, \textit{op.cit}. 

137
Lawday said that the humiliation of having to cross the street to make way for a foreign invader in his home country was something that played on him mentally, and led to a sense of injustice that led him to want to do something. It was via contacts within the school that he joined Normale, although his resistance activities were initially limited to just propaganda.\(^{515}\)

1942 represented a turning point. Resistance action began to become broader, and now targeted not just the Nazi occupiers, but also Vichy and collaborationists. In part, this was a response to the change in attitude amongst the regime- Carcopino was replaced as Education Minister in April 1942 by Abel Bonnard, who though perhaps less inclined towards Pétainism, was certainly a partisan of collaboration.\(^{516}\) Whereas previously the attitude of the educational authorities had been one to keep schools free from politics, the attitudes after the summer of 1942 were ones that targeted actively Resistance activities, whilst leaving pro-Vichy, even collaborationist, activities unchecked. Bernard Lawday, along with four other boys, was expelled in early 1943 for “subversive political activities”.\(^{517}\) However, no charges were brought against him, and if anything, the expulsion brought him further into resistance. Officially, he enrolled at the Lycée annexe in Elbeuf, but owing to its distance from Sotteville (the only way to get there was by train), Lawday used this to spend more time carrying out resistance activities—only that by now, the resistance activities were less about propaganda, and more designed towards sabotaging installations.\(^{518}\)

For Benjamin Remacle, resistance became more organised. Despite not being a Communist himself,\(^{519}\) he joined the Front National in 1942.\(^{520}\) Action up until now had been

\(^{514}\) Author’s Interview with Lawday, op.cit.
\(^{515}\) Ibid.
\(^{516}\) Paxton, op.cit., p.142.
\(^{517}\) Author’s Interview with Lawday, op.cit.
\(^{518}\) Ibid.
\(^{519}\) Interview with Remacle, op.cit.
\(^{520}\) Ibid.
along the lines of propaganda, but now it turned towards the possibility of armed action, such as collecting arms. But at this time, there was no action against people, only property, although arson attacks were amongst the activities carried out.\footnote{Remacle also adds that not all of these attacks were on the orders of the FN’s command (i.e. Fernand Chatel), and that some were made independently.} Interestingly, from this point, actions were taken more against Vichyites and collaborationists than against the Nazis.\footnote{Interview with Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}} The term ‘Front National’ was meant to be a national, cross-party organisation, designed to unite France under a loosely Communist banner.\footnote{Daniel Virieux, ‘Front National’ in François Marcot et al. (eds.), \textit{Dictionnaire Historique de la Résistance} (Paris, Robert Laffont, 2006), pp.122-124.} Invoking again Revolutionary rhetoric (and in particular \textit{l’esprit du Valmy}), this meant waiting for the right moment to strike against the occupant, but to make sure that nothing undermined national unity when that came, the collaborationists had to be either eliminated or marginalised.

This action conceived the Republic as being an integral part of resistance activity, and considered there to be no difference between the values of republicanism and the values of France. But whilst this was also true of many frans-tireurs, the difference was that France was prioritised over any kind of partisan ideology. What is notable about all three cases- Benjamin Remacle, Bernard Lawday, Georges Touroude- is that all three belonged to what Jean Quellien terms ‘\textit{la Résistance d’obédience communiste}’.\footnote{Jean Quellien, ‘Normandie’ in Marcot et al. (eds.), \textit{op.cit.}, pp.300-301.} Yet all three rejected Communism as an ideology- Remacle stressed the nature of \textit{une et indivisible} in the Resistance,\footnote{Interview with Remacle, \textit{op.cit.}} Lawday said that he did not consider himself to be Communist, and later on joined the Parti Socialiste,\footnote{Author’s Interview with Lawday, \textit{op.cit.} Lawday also stated that he never wanted to feel compromised at all, explaining why, unlike many other Socialists such as Raoul Leprettre or Tony Larue, he never joined the freemasons. His political activity remained firmly at municipal level, and he was not even elected as a councillor until 1977- when he was 51.} whilst Touroude, though admitting to being sympathetic to the Communists in his memoir, always wanted to keep separate from other resistance networks partly for reasons of security (justified by the reprisals suffered by resistance networks in
1944 after the infiltration of the CDL), and partly because of wanting to keep politically independent, maintaining a stance that was neither Communist nor Gaullist, but which was definitely republican rather than being blindly patriotic. Fear of being compromised by other cause and other ideologies was paramount, and this explains both Touroude’s singular stance and the secretive nature of his group.

The other noticeable aspect was that even after the D-Day landings, attacks against the occupier was not something taken lightly. Whereas other networks, including those in chapter two, took June 6 1944 as their signal to enter into a more active fray, neither Touroude nor Lawday condoned direct attacks upon the Nazis- Bernard Lawday stressed, before saying anything else about his resistance activity ‘I never once fired on anyone’. His gun was meant purely for self-defence. This was based on the same view held by de Gaulle that such actions resulted in reprisals that could only harm and affect the local civilian population. With the motivation of France above the motivation of a political ideology, the safety of the French population was considered paramount, and not worth compromising. Although these resisters inscribed their action as the defence of values, these values were not held dogmatically above all other factors, and were also quite prepared to be satisfied with the Liberation of France. Lawday stated that his own role in the Liberation, and the one that he was proudest of, was that he delayed the retreat of the Nazis by several hours by continually changing the direction of the signposts at a series of different road junctions across Rouen and its suburbs on the rive gauche during an entire afternoon on August 30,

---

527 Touroude, op.cit, p.77.
528 Ibid, p.78. Infiltrations were much-feared amongst resisters, and resulted in their secretive nature, both during and after the war. When I interviewed Bernard Lawday in 2011, he used his wife’s sound-proof office, with the door remaining firmly shut. The interviews conducted by Vincent Auber & Isabelle Thierry in 1985 with Tony Larue were conducted in his office at the mairie in Grand-Quevilly (Interviews with Larue, op.cit.). Some considered isolation to be a strength- Touroude said that he felt as though the infiltration of the CDL vindicated his decision to keep his unit, though affiliated to the Forces Unies de la Jeunesse Patriotique (F.U.J.P.).
529 Author’s Interview with Lawday, op.cit.
1944. 531 Touroude and Lawday returned, after the Liberation, to daily life, and to their studies, after having fought for a short while with the FFI, which in Lawday’s case, involved working as an interpreter. 532 Shortly after the Liberation, Bernard Lawday was re-admitted to Lycée Pierre Corneille- where he recognised his old History teacher, Lucien M., who had set as homework nearly three years earlier a thank-you letter to Pétain. He was now an ardent Gaullist, and on the welcoming committee for General de Gaulle’s visit to Rouen later that year. 533

Yet despite Lawday’s sense of bitterness about what he considered to be the failed nature of the épuration, there was no sense of disappointment with his resistance action- it was based on a value of republican patriotism- pride in defending France, and more specifically, the liberal republican France. This sentiment was shared by Touroude, and also by Remacle, whose later political journey would have marked him out as a gaulliste de gauche, albeit his political activities after the war being much more limited. 534 This was slightly different from the love of a more mythical France, as we shall see in the next section.

**Resistance- a French destiny? Starting points, 1940-42**

The irony about what we have chosen to call national patriotism is that it is an ideology that refuses to see itself as such- in fact, an ideology whose precise appeal is not being ideological. Instead, faith is placed almost providentially in the nation, the love of one’s country. The ‘state patriotism’ identified by Hobsbawm was something that he also identified in looking at Tudor England, which he referred to as a ‘proto-nationalism’. 535 Nationalism, by

531 Author’s Interview with Lawday, *op.cit.*
532 Touroude, *op.cit.*; Author’s Interview with Lawday, *op.cit.*
533 Author’s Interview with Lawday, *op.cit.*
534 Remacle’s only direct political involvements after the war were chairing a comité du soutien for the Gaullist Rassemblement du Peuple Français in the Pays de Bray, and defending the resistance legacy occasionally in *l’Humanité*. Interview with Remacle, *op.cit.*
the definition of Benedict Anderson, is an ‘imagined community’, impossible for most of those who live within this community to ever meet each other, and yet the communion that links them binds them together and shapes them as a common people with a common purpose.\footnote{Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (London, Verso, 2nd ed., 1991), pp.6-7.} This deep belief in France as a providential nation drew upon a historical narrative that long pre-dated the Revolution of 1789- this imagined France was not that of the Republic and its triptich, but the France of Clovis, Charlemagne and Capet, a nation of *francs* that could find its roots within the early Middle Ages.\footnote{Borne, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-67.}

This belief in a providential history of France was of course badly shaken by the defeat of 1940. Two consequent behaviours can be identified in reaction to this. The first was to accept the thesis of the defeat being a direct consequence of French failings in the years immediately before. The thesis of a decadent, declining France would go on to be the ideological starting point in Vichy’s *Révolution Nationale*.\footnote{Paxton, *op.cit.*, pp. 146-148.} But if the first reaction provided a root for and a route into collaborationism, then the second reaction was to be a root for resistance- the idea that France, although it had been led catastrophically into defeat as a consequence of past mistakes, needed to be restored to former glories, and needed to repel the Nazi occupiers.\footnote{Daniel Cordier, who worked alongside Jean Moulin as his secretary, is a case in point- he entered into resistance motivated by the nationalistic writings of Charles Maurras. See Cordier, *Alias Caracalla: mémoires 1940-43* (Paris, Gallimard, 2009).} That the same sentiment should produce two such violently opposing reactions and trajectories is striking, and ultimately shows the individualistic nature of reactions to the situation.

Even more striking is that this sentiment, one that often ignored traditional party-political considerations, was sometimes also at the heart of the earliest resistance activity. Jacques Hamon was born in 1920 into a family that had a markedly anti-German sentiment,
owing to his father having been taken prisoner in the First World War. However, there was no traditional political ideology in the family, and Hamon never joined a party either before or after the war, stating “I have always wanted to keep my liberty of thought and action”.\textsuperscript{540} Having been based at Caen from 1939-40, he was demobilised, and returned to Le Havre, where he heard de Gaulle’s radio broadcast of June 18. It was at this point that he said he decided to refuse the Vichy acceptance of the Nazi occupier.\textsuperscript{541}

Unlike others, Hamon was not in a position whereby he was directly in professional contact with the occupiers- he had qualified, and was employed as, an accountant.\textsuperscript{542} The first resistance network he was involved with had, much like Georges Brutelle’s own experience of early resistance in Grand-Quevilly in the previous chapter, no name, and concentrated upon discussion of the Occupation, and occasional acts of mechanical sabotage- principally with the radiators of vehicles intended for German military use.\textsuperscript{543} It had one particularity as well which could be interpreted as a usage of Hirschman’s concept of ‘exit’- namely that one of its principal aims initially was to try and find ways of escaping to England and join the Free French.\textsuperscript{544} However, this idea quickly became seen as non-viable, due in no little part to the fact that the entire port had been requisitioned by the Kriegsmarine.\textsuperscript{545} When contact was finally established with Britain by radio in December 1940, they discovered that actually what the Free French and the British really wanted of them was to stay in France and provide intelligence, as well as begin collecting arms.\textsuperscript{546} This was then their first task, and they quickly managed to amass an arsenal of twenty mines, several rifles, and somewhere, according to Hamon, in the region of 3,000 bullets.\textsuperscript{547}

\textsuperscript{540} Interview with Jacques Hamon, ADSM AV09/171, 1984.
\textsuperscript{541} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{542} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{543} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{546} Interview with Hamon, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{547} Ibid.
However, for some resisters, the idea of making contact with the British was not one that they found particularly appealing. The Nivromont family was a family who considered themselves patriotic, at the service of France, but with a military tradition that respected the rule of law and kept party politics and the army separate. Pierre Nivromont admitted that the family had conservative leanings, but were never tempted to join the Croix de Feu. The long military tradition meant that Pierre had done some military training as a young man, paid for by a great-uncle who wanted him to go on to Saint-Cyr, and also meant that the family had a deep distrust of the Germans—one great-uncle of his, born in 1859, could remember the Prussian Occupation of 1870-71, and his father had been in the army in 1914-18. However, his father was also employed as the financial director of the Normandy division of the British-owned manufacturing company Davey Bickford. His regular dealings with them left him with a profound sense of Anglophobia, and convinced that the British were generally unreliable—firmly in the traditional perception of la perfide Albion.

Pierre Nivromont’s entry into resistance activity was chaotic and accidental. It began with weapons collecting, initially by stealing from his father, who in turn had confiscated a revolver off an elderly great-uncle on the brink of committing suicide during the exode. The family returned to their home in Bihorel in the autumn of 1940, and a couple of months later, whilst out in the countryside near Fontaine-le-Bourg, he found a rifle. Rather than hand it in to the gendarmes, he took it home, and hid it in a cupboard.

Prior to this, he and his family had listened to the BBC’s French broadcasts, where they heard de Gaulle, but knew next to

---

549 Ibid.
550 Ibid.
551 Ibid. The term ‘perfide Albion’ is of course, the flip side to the ‘entente cordiale’. Anglophobia was rather prevalent in Normandy throughout the war, as seen in the oral testimony of André Gosse, and also the testimony of Bernard Lawday, though Lawday’s view of that Anglophobia was more critical than Gosse’s, perhaps partly explained by Lawday being of Scots descent himself. For a more detailed examination of the complicated relationship between Britain and France across the centuries, see Robert & Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy (London, Heinemann, 2006).
552 Interview with Pierre Nivromont, op.cit.
nothing about him. By his own admission later on ‘We were in the most complete and utter 
fog as to the Resistance…all we knew was that in resisting, we were only a tiny fringe of the 

553 total population.’ There was no contact with the Free French- Nivromont’s resistance 

activity was inspired purely by his own initiative, and his own sense of patriotic duty. The 

554 collection of arms was intended for use when the Allies landed- but he had no intention of 

using them whatsoever until then.554 

What is striking about this instance is both the precocity and the certainty. The 

precocity because it was at a very early stage of the Occupation- within months of the 

armistice. Public opinion was still largely Pétainist, the National Revolution had not yet 

555 encountered the widespread disillusion that it would. The certainty of the action is more 

striking still- the idea that there would be a liberation in 1940 must have seemed improbably 

unrealistic to many French people, yet not only did Nivromont expect it, he also seemed to be 

actively preparing for it. It was a form of resistance that was easy to carry out, for ‘there were 

all kinds of weapons available within the countryside, where the battles and skirmishes had 

been in June.’556 One can only state that this particular case can be seen as an example of 

556 Gaullist ideology in action- the belief in France, the belief in the future bringing a liberation 

by what de Gaulle referred to as ‘the immense forces against the enemy’,557 the belief in 

providence- the restoration of France’s sovereignty as part of its destiny. That de Gaulle was 

able to persuade at this stage even just a committed but significant minority of French people 

of the unshakeable ability of France to defeat the occupier shows how persuasive the Gaullist 

myth could be- its power lay in its simplicity, in its reassurance, in its rich, evocative 

language. 

553 Interview with Pierre Nivromont, op.cit. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Michel Baldenweck, De la Résistance …, p.824. 
556 Interview with Pierre Nivromont, op.cit. 
557 Speech by Charles de Gaulle on BBC French service, June 22, 1940.
This power can also be seen in the way that it managed to persuade those who might not usually be thought of as sympathetic to Gaullism. Raphaël Mallard described his upbringing as patriotic, but not especially conservative.\(^{558}\) If anything, his father was *rad-soc*, a supporter of the Radical party. Although this was a centrist party (‘Radical’ being one of the great misnomers in French politics), in the rural Normandy village of Saint-Antoine-la-Forêt, near Yvetot, it was considered to be left-wing according to Mallard’s recollection. He recalled the farm next to his holding meetings in support of both the *Croix de Feu* and Dorgères’ *chemises vertes* in the period around 1934-36.\(^{559}\) This reflected the identification of the Pays de Caux as being profoundly conservative.\(^{560}\)

Yet Mallard’s family heard the speech by de Gaulle on June 18, 1940. The speech was not in itself enough to inspire Mallard and his father to resist, but it appears to have had some sort of resonance. For Mallard *père*, a veteran of the trenches, it was a reminder that the Germans remained the enemy, and when they returned from the *exode*, which had taken them as far as the banks of the Loire, he instructed his son, who had been working in Le Havre as a steelworker, to give up his job in the factory, as he would otherwise be helping the Nazi war effort.\(^{561}\) Instead, Raphaël Mallard went to work on his father’s farm, helping the family tractor repair business.\(^{562}\) His father declined any possibility of work for the occupier, therefore avoiding any possibility of aiding the *Wehrmacht*. So though de Gaulle may not have inspired resistance in everyone who heard him speak, many others were at least inspired into a refusal to accommodate, a refusal to actually collaborate or to do anything that would assist the occupier.\(^{563}\)

---

558 Interview with Raphaël Mallard, *op.cit.*
559 Ibid.
560 See Mansire, *op.cit*.
561 Interview with Mallard, *op.cit*.
563 The term is one devised by the author, and is intended to understand a refusal of the attitude of *accommodement* advanced by Burrin in *La France à l’heure allemande*, but stopping short of an actual entry into resistance.
For Raphaël Mallard, this was to be the first step towards resistance, although he maintained
that the decision to resist was taken by him alone.\textsuperscript{564} His motivation stemmed in part out of
anger at the deteriorating economic situation, and in part at anger against the increasingly
collaborationist nature of the Vichy regime.\textsuperscript{565} However, the population of his commune was,
in his recollection ‘overwhelmingly Pétainist’, and he also recalled the Occupation there as
being largely uneventful.\textsuperscript{566} Therefore, though he had pro-resistance sentiments, it was not
until hearing about the Resistance via word of mouth in 1942 that he decided to join. Even
then, to make contact with a network, he had to cycle to the Pays de Bray (a round trip of
over 100 kilometres), and formally join a network- and apart from sheltering a resister in
1942, he recounted that virtually all of his resistance activity took place not in Saint-Antoine-
la-Forêt, but instead in the region around Dieppe, working for Libération-Nord.\textsuperscript{567}

So for the early resisters inspired by de Gaulle, the decision to resist required both
fortune in terms of circumstance (ability to resist, to find arms), but also a leap of faith. De
Gaulle’s call for patience in October 1941 was not universally well-received- though
understandable with hindsight, it was not what many would have wanted to hear on the brink
of what would be the second winter of the Occupation, with both Britain and the USSR not
doing terribly well in the war.\textsuperscript{568} Waiting for Liberation in 1941 would not have felt terribly
dissimilar to waiting for Godot in Beckett’s famous post-war play.\textsuperscript{569} In terms of action, it
was resistance at its most pragmatic; in terms of vision, it was resistance at its most mystical.
Yet none of these resisters seem to have considered the idea of giving up. Indeed, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{564} Interview with Mallard, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{565} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{566} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{567} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{568} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{569} Beckett himself became a resister in 1940. See Beckett, \textit{Lettres I: 1929-1940} (Paris, Gallimard, 2014). \textit{En attendant Godot} was first performed in 1953. Whether or not the play is intended as an allegory of that period in
the playwright’s life is open to interpretation- the play is famous for its sparse setting.
\end{itemize}
Mallard’s case, 1942 was very much a case of redoubling efforts, and formally integrating into the structures of the Resistance.

In 1960, the British novelist Lynne Reid Banks referred to religion as ‘the pinning-up of faith across the ugly vista of logic to fulfill a need’.\textsuperscript{570} In these early years, where logically it seemed difficult to see how liberation could come, the faith in de Gaulle, in France, in its destiny, at least fulfilled a need for resisters to envisage an alternative to perpetual servitude to Nazi Germany. But from 1942 onwards, the need would be to take this idealised vision and carry out more concrete action. From myth disguising reality, myth would now have to re-shape reality.

\textbf{A Conservative Resistance? Actions, Positions & Evolutions}

In terms of recent history, the legacy of the First World War cast a long shadow over collective memory- the long list of fallen names on each village’s monument to the dead saw to that.\textsuperscript{571} Therefore, the rapid defeat by the Germans was taken particularly badly, even more so by some elderly inhabitants who could remember the Prussian Occupation of 1870. The preparations for Operation Sealion meant that some communes were literally outnumbered- Ancretiéville-Saint-Victor had 250 inhabitants in 1940- and found itself lodging 300 German soldiers.\textsuperscript{572} To a rural society not used to dealing with outsiders even if they came from within Normandy, the mass of Germans descending was a shock, and they quickly earned the name of \textit{les doréphores}, or Colorado beetles, for their grey uniforms resembled the insects that devastated many a potato crop.\textsuperscript{573}

But if anti-German, then many locals were essentially pro-Vichy. An investigation into an allegation of a Communist sympathising schoolmaster in the small village of

\textsuperscript{570} Lynne Reid Banks, \textit{The L-Shaped Room} (London, Chatto & Windus, 1960), p.160.
\textsuperscript{572} Author’s Interview with Roger Feray, May 28, 2010.
\textsuperscript{573} Jacqueline Houillé, \textit{La Guerre...quand on a quinze ans!} (Luneray, Bertout, 1988), p.59.
Beaumont-le-Hareng revealed the allegation to be unsubstantiated - the schoolmaster was, if anything, ‘strongly in favour of the Maréchal’ but the report did concede that he had a reputation for ‘forthright and plain talking’ that did not always endear him to his fellow villagers - and that furthermore, there was ‘no terrorist activity in the commune… no dissenting opinions against the Maréchal.’\(^{574}\)

This may have over-estimated the popularity of Pétain in 1941-1942, but it was certainly true that in 1940, it would have been very difficult to find anyone in rural Normandy with a bad word to say about him. He was seen largely as a saviour, even by those who had fought the Germans, such as André Gosse, who fought in the Battle of Biville-la-Baignarde, where the village was destroyed in a German assault, killing 31 villagers.\(^{575}\)

For a leader of a resistance network, Gosse’s background seems so atypical to that of many resisters, that it seems difficult to believe that he ever joined the Resistance. Born in 1909 into a rural, Catholic family, his father was a gendarme. Fervently Catholic, he was a strong supporter of traditional values. “I have always been a patriot, and have always been in favour of order and the family” he said, explaining his opposition to the Communists.\(^{576}\) That he saw them as being contrary to all three explains his political journey in the early 1930s. He supported Colonel de la Rocque’s Croix de Feu whilst he was stationed in Vernon doing his military service, and took leave to go to Paris to take part in one of their demonstrations in February 1934 - though as he was at pains to stress, it was not the demonstration-cum-riot of February 6.\(^{577}\) After being demobbed and returning to Seine-Inférieure, becoming a smallholder in the Pays de Caux, he remained committed to the leagues, and took part in an anti-Popular Front demonstration in 1936. Even after the war started, his far-Right sympathies were still evident - he admitted to relief when Pétain became Premier, and saw

---

\(^{574}\) Report of police investigation, ADSM 51 W 406.
\(^{576}\) Interview with André Gosse, op.cit.
\(^{577}\) Ibid.
this as the beginning of the era that he had hoped for some years earlier. He confessed in
1983 to expressing Anglophobic sentiments in the wake of the bombing of the fleet at Mers-
el-Kébir, and anti-Russian sentiments for much of this period.\textsuperscript{578}

The figure of Pétain, by contrast, seems largely absent from the testimony of Raoul
Boulanger. But then again, Raoul Boulanger was another atypical resister. He worked as a
farmer in the Pays de Bray, between Ry and Saint-Denis-le-Thiboult, but was a farmer who
also worked as an engineer to make ends meet.\textsuperscript{579} At the outbreak of the war in 1939, he was
called up, and saw out the ‘phony war’. His regiment was hopelessly outmanoeuvred in
1940, and went into retreat. He was wounded, and taken prisoner in La Rochelle. However,
having recovered from his wounds, he escaped, but did not report back for duty, instead
going AWOL from the army prior to the armistice.\textsuperscript{580} Thus, he was simultaneously wanted by
both the French and the Germans. With the breakdown of all infrastructure, Boulanger took
advantage of the ensuing chaos, and hitch-hiked from the Charente-Inférieure in the west to
Isère, an Alpine department near the border with Italy. Here, he took refuge, and managed to
meet his wife again, who had fled there during the \textit{exode} of June 1940. With the \textit{zone libre}
returning to something approaching normal, they then travelled from the Alps to the southern
Languedoc region, where they spent the summer working in odd jobs until September 1940,
when the wine harvest finished, and the situation had settled down to the point where
Boulanger could feel safe enough to return to his farm in Normandy and not be arrested by
either the French police or the Germans.\textsuperscript{581}

Upon return, Boulanger used his engineering skills to tunnel underground and build a
rudimentary shelter, for use as a hiding place.\textsuperscript{582} Then, in early 1941, with armaments left

\textsuperscript{578} Interview with Gosse, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{579} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
lying around from the retreat, he began to collect various weapons. He solicited some of the casual farm labourers to help him. Most of these weapons consisted of bayonets, but they did find a few revolvers, which were gratefully accepted. These were hidden in a shallow trench on farmland.\textsuperscript{583} Though this might be interpreted as preparation for violence, Boulanger stated that the revolvers were only for self-defence- it was the bayonets that were more interesting, as they could be used for other purposes, such as sabotage, as ‘bayonets were very useful for cutting phone lines’. 1941 saw an active resistance network take shape under Boulanger, albeit with just five or six men.\textsuperscript{584}

There appears to have been two turning points for this rural resistance. The first had been in the autumn of 1940, and the photographs of Pétain and Hitler at Montoire. This seems to have started the process of disenchantment with Vichy, compounded further by the material hardships experienced, and the realisation that Vichy was hardly any better at delivering than the discredited and distrusted Third Republic.\textsuperscript{585} None of this though served as an actual catalyst for resisting- Boulanger’s group appears to have been far more anti-German than anti-Vichy at this time.\textsuperscript{586} The catalyst did not come until 1942, and the introduction of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), which represents a second turning point, and one with arguably more consequences for actual acts of resistance.

The Eure was especially threatened by the STO, and a large number of Eure resisters appear to have come, in terms of socio-economic categories, from agriculture. That they also had the means to provide shelter also explains the predominance of farmers in resistance there- they made up just 3.8% of the Eure’s population at this time, but 21.3% of all resisters, second only to artisans, who made up 25% of the resisters, and who were similarly threatened

\textsuperscript{583} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{585} Interviews with André Gosse, \textit{op.cit.}, and Norbert Dufour, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{586} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op.cit.}
by the introduction of the STO.\textsuperscript{587} Resistance in the Eure had been limited until then- in 1941 and 1942 put together, there were only four attacks against Nazis and Vichyites put together, and not one single derailment.\textsuperscript{588} But after the introduction of the STO draft, a number of groups took root in the rural western Eure.\textsuperscript{589}

Similarly, the STO draft also spurred Raoul Boulanger into widening his resistance activities. He made contact with an American agent, and the group widened to become a network, and to provide intelligence as well as carry out sabotage, and Boulanger began to welcome a large number of \textit{réfractaires}.\textsuperscript{590} It was at this point that one of the most unorthodox resistance groups in Upper Normandy came into being- \textit{Les diables noirs}.

Because of the increasingly large numbers of men in the network, and the fact that they were carrying out more and more derailments and sabotage, the need arose for disguises. Boulanger took his inspiration from 1930s American gangster movies, and so the \textit{maquisards} wore balaclavas with holes cut out for the eyes, nose and mouth, dressed entirely in black, and wore the wide hats favoured by Al Capone and his contemporaries in Chicago during the late 1920s and 1930s. Boulanger then christened his alter ego ‘Fantomas’, because he only appeared at night.\textsuperscript{591}

It was a curious form of engaging in resistance. On the one hand, Boulanger’s activities seem redolent of the ‘outlaw’ culture identified by H.R. Kedward, or one of the ‘bandits’ of Eric Hobsbawm.\textsuperscript{592} Boulanger cultivated a reputation as an outlaw, man of the people, more like Robin Hood than a robbing, thieving hoodlum. Yet on the other, Boulanger argued strongly against the use of violence:

\textsuperscript{587} Papp, \textit{op.cit}., p.120. Based on ADE, 88 W 26.
\textsuperscript{588} Papp, \textit{op.cit}., p.176.
\textsuperscript{589} ADE, 88 W 33.
\textsuperscript{590} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op.cit}.
\textsuperscript{591} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op.cit}. Photographs corroborating this are exhibited in the collection of the Musée de la Résistance at Forges-les-Eaux, private archive.
Attacking the \textit{boches} was stupid. All it achieved was a hundred hostages, and even more killing… Killing \textit{en masse}, like what happened at Oradour… Even when our people were being arrested and tortured, we did not kill Germans- it served nothing but get more people killed… We would have had another Oradour…It was the one thing that we never did.\textsuperscript{593}

But unlike the outlaws of southern France that interested Kedward, Boulanger represented order. He saw his resistance activity as purely the defence of the nation. Raoul Boulanger considered that this was far greater, and far more important in the development of his \textit{maquis} than politics and ideology:

\begin{quote}
We had no links at all with either the Socialists or the Freemasons. All politics and ideology was forbidden- except for General de Gaulle of course, whose \textit{appel du 18 juin} had all given us much hope… and there were no links with Communist movements. We did have some [resisters] with Communist links, but I felt that 27 months of living together underground was more important [than political affiliation].\textsuperscript{594}
\end{quote}

The ‘living together’ that he mentions was the consequence of the continual revisions and extension to the shelter that Boulanger created. In a territory that was not topographically favourable to \textit{maquisard} activity in the same way as much of the \textit{Midi} was, Boulanger

\textsuperscript{593} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op. cit.} He appears to have been under the apprehension – falsely- that the massacre of 10 June 1944 at Oradour-sur-Glane was linked to the Resistance. This was firmly refuted by Fabrice Grenard in his \textit{habilitation à diriger les recherches}, published as \textit{Une légende du Maquis: Georges Guingouin, du mythe à l’histoire} (Paris, Vendémiaire, 2014), pp. 241-242.

\textsuperscript{594} Interview with Raoul Boulanger, \textit{op. cit.}
created a network that for over two years functioned as a *maquis*.\(^{595}\) This was because the shelter had been widened so that come 1944, it had become an underground bunker. Though it only accommodated twenty or so *maquisards*, it could have welcomed up to seventy. Also included apart from dormitories were a kitchen, a dining room, a lounge, and a gym allowing resisters to maintain their strength underground when unable to roam outside - they maintained their strength by weightlifting. Altogether, the network consisted of some eighty people.\(^{596}\)

By 1944, they had derailed an express train between Amiens and Rouen, destroyed a bridge, severely limiting German train movements for the remainder of the Occupation, and raided a 250 hectare weapons dump at the Château de la Haye.\(^{597}\) It was perhaps this audacity that was their undoing - Alie’s counter-terrorist brigade arrested them in March 1944 in a dawn raid that consisted of Alie himself directing operations, fifty French police officers, and the same again in German soldiers.\(^{598}\)

The STO also drove André Gosse from a state of being dissatisfied with Vichy, to active resistance. He joined a network based in Auffray in 1942 consisting of a newsagent and an engineer. By 1943, this became the network *Léopard*. From a humble start consisting of a handful of members, it had 121 come the Liberation, across two cantons and twelve communes.\(^{599}\) Like Boulanger, violence was rejected, as the network was not really a *maquis* unit, though it did shelter *réfractaires* from the STO draft, and he later recognised the role of them in the network.\(^{600}\) Gosse’s military background advised him of the folly of engaging the

\(^{595}\) Quellien, *op.cit.*, p.300. See also interview with Benjamin Remacle, *op.cit*. Remacle considered that Ry was ‘a lot of effort for not much reward…*un drôle du maquis*’.  

\(^{596}\) Interview with Raoul Boulanger, *op.cit*. See also the Collection Boulanger at the Musée de la Résistance in Forges-les-Eaux. In most counts, such as the police reports (ADSM 51 W 407), the count is much lower than this, and counts just the *maquisards* and the auxiliaries arrested (e.g. the wives of the two Boulanger brothers). Boulanger seems to have defined the numbers in his network by a much wider and looser definition of resistance than that stated in the *homologation* process after the war.  

\(^{597}\) Interview with Raoul Boulanger, *op.cit*.  

\(^{598}\) Interview with Boulanger, *op.cit*. See also report of Louis Alie, March 1944, ADSM 51 W 407.  


\(^{600}\) Interview with Gosse, *op.cit.*
Germans in armed combat. *Léopard* instead made contact via radio with London, and sent intelligence on the railway lines between Rouen and Dieppe, and the line running across from Bosc-le-Hard to Serqueux. 601 Railway workers in rural Normandy, who were more isolated and less exposed to left-wing propaganda than their urban counterparts in areas such as Rouen, helped and carried out their most daring raid when on April 9, 1944, they broke into the sidings at Dieppe during the night and put fourteen trains out of use. 602

Like many of the resisters in the Eure featured in chapter two, they had an *attentiste* attitude, waiting until D-Day to take up arms, when conditions were more favourable. Unlike their counterparts in the Maquis Surcouf or Nonancourt, they did not suffer heavy losses. After the Canadians and the British crossed the Seine at Caudebec and at Mantes-la-Jolie, the *Wehrmacht* retreat generally was quite rapid, and though there were some skirmishes, leading to a handful of resisters being killed, by the time *Léopard* had to fight, the retreating occupiers were disheartened and willing to surrender. 603 Over the course of three days between August 31 and September 2, 1944, *Léopard*, now part of the FFI, took 229 Germans into custody, almost double their own number, before handing them to the Canadians and the British. 604

Gosse returned to farming, but found himself besieged with offers of military commissions and safe seats and posts from a number of political parties. Gosse, though, was interested in none of these, and did not approve of the petty politicking that characterised French politics from late 1945 onwards. In a ceremony to mark the Liberation of Biville-la-Baignarde, the same commune where he had fought in vain against the Germans in 1940, and

---

602 Ibid, pp.64-65. The FTP in Dieppe also claimed this, and it is impossible to verify who really did it, or even if they managed to both target it during the same night without the other noticing. Considering Gosse’s anti-Communism and the nature of resistance networks, this is not altogether impossible, but it must be held to be unlikely that the two co-operated.
603 Interview with Gosse, *op.cit.*
which had been destroyed by the German onslaught, killing thirty-one civilians, he turned to face those gathered, and made the following speech:

From now on, today, August 31, 1946, I will no longer accept either any further military or any further civil honours. Those [honours] of my brothers-in-arms who fell or who were tortured was their blood that flowed from their wounds. I will belong to no political party or affiliation. I will remain, if God is willing, for you all, le Léopard. The people of the Pays de Caux know me. [They know that] I keep my word.\textsuperscript{605}

For Gosse, as for many resisters who belonged to the agrarian and rural working class, ideology, and politics, was something to be rejected. Community structures and identity were far more important to defend, as well as a sense of national identity. For them, they had always had what would later be called ‘a certain vision of France’.\textsuperscript{606}

The resistance networks of rural areas often incorporated notables, and this respect of existing society, the ties and links that bind, was what the most successful resistance networks of the countryside was built on. This was exemplified in the existence of the Organisation de Résistance de l’Armée (ORA). This was a resistance movement that did not exist even nationally until the beginning of 1943.\textsuperscript{607} For the first two years, many of its resisters had been loyal to Vichy, seeing itself as part of the armistice army that had surrendered in 1940, and which was following the orders of what it considered a legitimate regime in Vichy. It was only the events of November 1942, whereby the Allies arrived in the French territories of North Africa, and the southern free zone had consequently been

\textsuperscript{605} Gosse, \textit{op.cit}, p.130.
\textsuperscript{606} De Gaulle, \textit{op.cit}, p.9.
annexed, that many of those who would make up the ORA joined. This was the case for Robert Flavigny, a young cadet at Saint-Cyr, who found himself, along with the rest of his class, demobilised in his freshman term in the autumn of 1942 after the \textit{Wehrmacht} moved to occupy the whole of \textit{l’Hexagone}.\footnote{Interview with Robert Flavigny, ADSM AV09/187, 1984.} Flavigny duly returned to his mother’s home in Evreux, from where he was drafted into the forestry service in the east of the Eure around Lyons-la-Forêt. He initially joined a resistance network created by a former classmate, before joining the ORA in the summer of 1943, which was firstly under the command of Captain Folio, and then, when Folio moved onto take the regional command, an artillery captain named Michel Multrier.\footnote{Interview with Flavigny, \textit{op.cit.} ; dossier d’homologation de l’ORA, SHD 13 P 20.}

The ORA was a resistance network that was always to one side of much of the internal resistance.\footnote{Delmas, \textit{op.cit.}, p.201.} Firstly, they rejected politics ostensibly. Resistance, Flavigny recalled, was conceived purely from an angle of national defence.\footnote{Interview with Flavigny, \textit{op.cit.}} The ideological motivation was clearly one of patriotism, but firmly what we have chosen to call national patriotism. It was the country rather than any values \textit{per se} that counted, and again, a faith in a providential interpretation of France. This tension meant that resistance was conceived differently to many of the other resistance networks and movements in Upper Normandy because there was a stress upon \textit{patria} rather than the community of peoples. Another tension was that military action was designed entirely about the preparation of the battle for Normandy- liberation was conceived uniquely around a military objective rather than a civic objective, that is to say the battle for hearts and minds via propaganda and the clandestine press. The ORA made no attempt to engage in any kind of political debate, or even to offer any fixed modelised conception of the \textit{polis} and French society. A final tension was that whereas the

\footnote{608 Interview with Robert Flavigny, ADSM AV09/187, 1984.}
\footnote{609 Interview with Flavigny, \textit{op.cit.} ; dossier d’homologation de l’ORA, SHD 13 P 20.}
\footnote{610 Delmas, \textit{op.cit.}, p.201.}
\footnote{611 Interview with Flavigny, \textit{op.cit.}}
hierarchisation of many resistance networks was more informal, amongst the ORA, hierarchisation was governed by army grades, and the ranks held prior to 1942.\footnote{Delmas, \textit{op.
\textit{cit.}, p.201.}}

To this end, there was a certain amount of corporatism, which had been a key element of the ideological aspects of the National Revolution led by Vichy. Laurent Douzou and Denis Peschanski, and later, Johanna Barsasz, identified a category of resister called ‘\textit{Vichysto-résistant}’, a label to identify resisters who had supported the Vichy regime earlier on in the Occupation, but who took part in resistance later on, without changing their own opinions.\footnote{Laurent Douzou & Denis Peschanski ‘La Résistance française face à l’hypothèque Vichy’ in Peschanski (ed.) \textit{Vichy 1940-1944} (Milan, Fondazione Feltrinelli, 1986), pp. 3-42; Johanna Barasz, ‘Les “Vichysto-résistants” : choix d’un sujet, construction d’un objet’ in Julien Blanc & Cécile Vast (eds.), \textit{Cheercheurs en Résistance : Pistes et outils à l’usage des historiens} (Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2014), pp. 37-52.} In Barsasz’s study, she focused upon resistance networks that had drawn upon the military and on Vichyite institutions, and in particular the officer class.\footnote{Barasz, \textit{De Vichy à la Résistance : les vichysto-résistants 1940-1944}…}\footnote{Christine Levisse-Touzé & Jean-Marie Guillou, ‘Giraudisme et Giraudistes’ in Marcot et al. (eds), \textit{op.
\textit{cit.}, p. 937.}}

This particular case is slightly different, as neither Boulanger nor Gosse were officers, or even career soldiers, but their trajectories could be identified as bearing similarities to that of many \textit{Vichysto-résistants}. They identified with the image of a strong, sovereign France, and had a certain belief in the Pétainist thesis of a moral decline, but the identification of Vichy as a collaborationist regime, both in terms of ideologies and its policies, caused them to turn away from Vichy, and to take up the struggle once again.

Initially, the ORA identified itself as being \textit{giraudiste}, or loyal to General Giraud, who had escaped to North Africa in 1942, and whom, for a while, was seen by the Allies as an alternative to de Gaulle. Giraud himself did not have a rigourous doctrine, but was both opposed to Nazi Occupation and broadly supportive, at least until 1942-43, of the National Revolution. He proclaimed himself to be above party politics, and acting in France’s interests.\footnote{Yet the repudiation of political parties, and of politics in its broadest sense, was
an element of Vichy ideology and its rhetoric- the National Revolution and the dissolving of the legislature, followed in 1941 by the replacement of most municipal councils with délégations spéciales, ensured this.

It was the exhalting of the nation above all else. Resistance was thus conceived in a nationalistic sense- the sense that had also led to an acceptance of Vichy and Pétain in 1940. Boulanger and Gosse can be interpreted thus as having not changed sides, but simply having modified their means of expression- their ideals remained the same, but by 1942, they felt that resistance best channelled their ideals, whereas in the summer of 1940, they felt as though their beliefs were best expressed by Marshal Pétain. Equally, that nationalistic sense would also lead many away from Giraud, and then onto de Gaulle, after Giraud was marginalised. This can be seen in the Seine-Inférieure, where despite the ORA being dismantled by the Gestapo and the Carlingue in May 1944, two former resisters from its ranks were able to play an important role in the Liberation- Michel Multrier became commander of the FFI in Seine-Inférieure, and Jacques Chastellain became a Gaullist who was elected Mayor of Rouen in 1945. Rather like Boulanger & Gosse, both Multrier and Chastellain after the war adopted a Gaullist stance, conveniently forgetting any embarrassing previous support for Vichy and the maréchal. If resisters such as André Pican represented resistance as a revolutionary element, determined to change society, Raoul Boulanger and André Gosse saw resistance as defending their nation and their immediate surroundings, for whom resistance was the natural outlet for les déçus du maréchalisme.

To this end, although their resistance and their ideological beliefs could be seen as being conservative, and there can be little doubting that these resisters held views that were politically on the Right, what Barasz terms vichysto-résistance was actually remarkably

---

616 Michel Baldenweck, La Résistance ..., pp. 62-63.
617 See chapter one.
malleable in practice.\footnote{Barasz, ‘De Vichy à la Résistance : les vichysto-résistants 1940-1944’ in Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains (2011/2, No. 242), pp. 27-50.} Over the course of four years of occupation, their trajectory went from one extreme to another seemingly. But in another way, their beliefs remained remarkably the same. National patriotism, similarly to the kind identified by Hobsbawm,\footnote{Hobsbawm, Nations..., p.46.} could override any change in ideological direction, provided that the constant of all action remained the defence and the interests of the Nation, and that all political considerations and resistance action were subservient to the Nation. This was the principal difference in resistance between national patriotism, which exalted France, and its providential destiny from the time of \textit{les Francs}, and republican patriotism, which exalted France and its peoples and values.

\textbf{Not the certain idea of France? Immigrants \& Resistance, 1940-44}

The 2010 film \textit{L’Armée du Crime} opens with a roll call of different names. Each name is of differing ethnic origins, whether it be Russian, or Romanian, or Polish. Yet after each name, the chorus is the same- ‘\textit{Mort pour la France}’. The effect is to remind the viewer that not every resister was called Dupont or Dubois.\footnote{\textit{L’armée du crime} (dir. Robert Guédiguian, 2010).}

This was shown in Normandy in 2004, when as part of a series of fact sheets on the history of Rouen and its surroundings, Alain Alexandre wrote a pamphlet on resistance and liberation. In the introduction, there is a photograph of ten people in civilian clothes, consisting of nine men and one woman, five sat around a table, containing three visible glasses of beer. The caption informs us that this was a group of Spanish resisters, photographed in 1943 in Rouen.\footnote{Alain Alexandre, \textit{Résistance et Libération à Rouen, 1940-1944} (Rouen, Agglomération de Rouen, 2004), p.4.}
In numerical terms, immigrants were only a very small minority—Catherine Blanquet’s study, based on a sample of over 800 files at the departmental *anciens combattants* office, found that just 2.6% of resisters were from outside of France. Of these, no one nationality is predominant, although the largest single nationality is Belgians, followed by Spanish. Altogether, nine nationalities other than French are identified in the study, with perhaps the most surprising being an American fighting with the FTP.  

Resistance in the Eure contained a number of people from immigrant backgrounds, who felt threatened by the STO, as they had fled to France to avoid fascist regimes in Italy and Spain. There were Spaniards, in Simone Sauteur’s recollection, working for the forestry service as lumberjacks, who joined the *maquis* as combatants. The Spanish refugees however did not join en masse- instead, they joined individually the *maquis* nearest to them. This was also true of Italian resisters in the Eure, who were implanted in the south-east of the Eure in and around Vernon, and tended to be economic migrants rather than refugees. There was a Franco-Belgian network in Seine-Inférieure called Delbo-Phénix, which specialised in gathering intelligence in the area around Dieppe, and existed between 1942 and 1943. Many of the members were French rather than Belgian, and although the network itself had no formal ideological leaning, at least one of its members was simultaneously in the FTP, engaged in sabotage actions. Albert Pognant however considered these actions to be complimentary, and not contradictory- moreover, neither network knew of the other. This supports the thesis of *résistance-mouvement* rather than the idea of a coordinated organisation.

---

623 Written testimony of Simone Sauteur (AKA ‘Puce’), ADE 88 W 56.
625 This community however was targeted at the Liberation when withdrawing German troops burned down the cotton factory that was the principal employer of Italian immigrants in August 1944. Vittorio Moriggi, *L’immigration italienne à Saint-Marcel et Vernon de 1923 à 1960*, lecture at the Archives Départementales de l’Eure, Evreux, December 5, 2015.
626 Interview of Albert Pognant with Patrick Pognant, August 28, 1977 (ADSM GUE 207).
627 Ibid.
when one looks at the nature of resistance in practice and on the ground— even this late in the Occupation.

Nationality seems not necessarily to have been a deciding factor in the orientation of a network’s activities. It was more a question of circumstance. If Belgian was the largest non-French nationality represented amongst resisters in Seine-Inférieure, it was a reflection of the local sociological composition of the time. The First World War had seen an influx of refugees from Belgium, and the department had the highest number per capita of Belgians of any department in France even in the 1920s and 1930s. Equally, with regard to the participation of Italians in resistance in the Eure, it was limited to areas where the Italian population was already well-implanted.

There was also a concentration of Spanish resisters in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray within the FTP. Felicimo Vicente recounted being part of a small group of Spanish Republicans who from early on the Occupation, decided to try and resist the Nazi Occupation. In 1941, they became part of the FTP, and engaged in the Communist Resistance, whose ideas they were closest to, although in truth, convenience also played a part— it was the resistance network in the commune.

There were two sides of immigrant participation within resistance. There is a Communist, or maybe Communisant, perspective— the clandestine PC representing internationalism in a society that was becoming increasingly chauvinist. Blanquet’s research indicates that a majority of immigrant resisters in Seine-Inférieure were affiliated to the FTP. Gérard Abrahamovici was born in 1925 in Romania, but his parents moved to France

---

629 Colin, op.cit., p.205.
631 Blanquet, op.cit.
for economic reasons in the early 1930s. He joined in 1941 the network of Georges Touroude as a schoolboy at Lycée Corneille, but unlike Touroude and Lawday, had firm Communist sympathies, and joined the FTP proper, involved chiefly in propaganda and sabotage actions. Touroude indicates that he did share anti-fascist, pro-French ideals, but that for Abrahamovici, Communism represented the best expression of these French ideals in the 20th century, and appealed to his desire to defeat Nazism.

The story of Abrahamovici does reflect to a certain extent what Gavin Bowd showed in his study of Romanians in resistance- that they were mostly Jewish in terms of ethnicity and Communist in terms of political outlook, but also that as a consequence of the repression that they suffered, his story has been one relegated from the main narrative of resistance. Bowd identified that the involvement of Romanians raises questions about the role of nationalism and patriotism in the Resistance, and the impact of internationalism, yet in this instance, internationalism appears to have been of secondary importance. In any event, as François Furet has identified at a national level and Claude-Paul Couture in his study of the local clandestine press, Communist resistance at this time tended to stress French concerns over any dimension of a global struggle, preferring Jacobinism over internationalism.

But a significant minority- well over 40% according to Blanquet’s study- were not in Communist-affiliated networks, and saw their cause not as one of internationalism, but of identification as wanting to be French- the politics of identity rather than the politics of ideology. One of the best examples of this was the trajectory of Bronislaw Piontek. Piontek

---

633 Touroude, op.cit., p.36.
635 Bowd, op.cit.
was born in 1913, in Poland. His family only came to France in 1923, as economic migrants who worked (in both Poland and in France) in agriculture. He only took French citizenship in 1934 at the age of twenty-one. Yet when asked in 1982 to describe himself and his identity, he replied that he was ‘un immigré, naturalisé de souche’. The use of de souche is interesting as well as oxymoronic- it implies that one could become “authentically” French via a period or a process of naturalisation- the difference between naturalised as French, and naturalised as ‘native’.

Neither Piontek nor his parents were politically active in the sense of belonging to parties or unions. Their outlooks were formed by past experience and by education. The family history was one already heavily marked by occupations- Piontek said that his parents had lived through no fewer than three foreign occupations in Poland- by Austria, by Russia, and by Germany. This in itself instructed the family that occupation was never a benign experience. The one constant in a family history that was marked by an uncertain sense of national identity was Catholicism. Yet Bronislaw Piontek, at roughly the same time as taking French citizenship, stopped practising. For him, French identity was now the identity that counted above all, and although he worked as an apprentice fitter with the Chantiers de Normandie in the Rouen docks, he was relatively apolitical (unlike his colleagues)- and he saw French education, and moreover French culture more widely, as a process of self-improvement. This included learning about French literature and history in his spare time, but also engaging within popular culture - he cited that the most important thing to retain from his early life-history was that he was the regional wrestling champion for Normandy in the mid-1930s. This would indicate that Piontek believed strongly in the onus being upon

---

639 Interview with Piontek, op.cit.
640 Ibid.
immigrants to integrate within French culture and society, whether it be la culture populaire or la culture savante.

Piontek had done his military service in the French air force as a radio operator, and returned to that role in 1939 at the outbreak of the war, which started with Nazi Germany invading Poland. However, he said that his outlook at this time was French rather than Polish, although the one constant between the two was Germanophobia - a sentiment that he saw as linking both his past heritage and his present engagement.\textsuperscript{641} His unit was evacuated to the south-western department of Gers just a few days before Pétain asked for an armistice, and so despite being a member of the armed forces, he was not taken prisoner - his unit was not disbanded until August, and he was allowed to return to Normandy. He did not join the Resistance straight away, but instead returned to the Chantiers de Normandie, and began resistance activity at the end of 1940 by occasionally sabotaging lorries. The choice of what lorries he sabotaged seems to have been haphazard - he did not sabotage every lorry that he worked on for the occupier, and it depended on his sentiments at the time. He described his over-riding sentiment at this time being one of disappointment - which as 1941 went along, gave way more to a sense of anger - informed by his work, which saw the scale of the Nazi war effort become truly apparent, he decided to start resistance actions, although he did not feel able to go further until comparatively late in the Occupation - the summer of 1943. He described his sentiments as progressing from a \textit{déçu} to a \textit{révolté}.\textsuperscript{642} The reason for him not entering formally into a resistance network until quite late in the Occupation was in part because of his work situation - although a member before the war of the CGT, he called his membership purely a practical matter - a professional adhesion rather than an ideological

\textsuperscript{641} Interview with Piontek, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{642} Ibid.
adhesion, which meant that he never wanted to join the FTP. In fact, he only joined because of his brother joining a network - the intelligence network Salesman-Hamlet.  

Even Salesman-Hamlet were a network quite apart from the rest of the Resistance - they were in close contact with the Special Operations Executive (SOE), but not the other networks within the region. Strictly speaking, they were more of a circuit of SOE than a network of the Resistance. Their activity was motivated purely by a desire to liberate France, and their action revolved entirely around the preparation of Allied landings - including mock invasions (what to do in the event of Allied landings), radio intelligence, transporting arms, and the sabotage of German installations. But they drew the line at attacks against people, which they feared would plunge the country into civil war - they even referred to other resisters who did such actions (e.g. the Front National and FTP) as ‘terrorists’ - the same word as what Vichy used to describe them.

The attitude of Piontek could be described as being one of expression politics, but within a pragmatic approach. His resistance revolved around both his patriotic sentiments, but also his professional competences - as well as sabotaging vehicles and installations, he was also a bodyguard for SOE’s radio operator, Isidore Newman. Furthermore, he was charged with ensuring that Newman did not have to speak in public, owing to the Englishman’s less than competent oral proficiency in the French language. In working for SOE, strictly political sentiments were put to one side in the name of military efficiency. To this extent, Piontek’s trajectory can be seen as moving from accommodation to resistance, albeit a resistance that was slightly apart from the Resistance, and come 1944, was more orientated towards liberation than resistance for the sake of resistance - ultimately a pragmatic approach.

643 Interview with Piontek, op.cit.
644 Michel Baldenweck, La Résistance..., pp.67-68. For further discussion of the SOE, see MRD Foot, SOE in France (London, Chatto, 1966). SOE is not being directly addressed in this thesis because they were answerable to London rather than the internal resistance or the CNR.
645 Interview with Piontek, op.cit.
646 Ibid.
to expressing the sentiment of patriotism, like the approach of André Gosse. This though, was limited in its actual impact upon the Liberation—Salesman-Hamlet was broken up by the Gestapo, and Piontek was arrested on March 11 1944.

Another foreign resister who was keen to establish a French identity from his resistance action was Svetislav Tschitt, born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1889, and resident during the war just outside Le Havre in Sainte-Adresse. He fought in World War One as a volunteer in the Belgian army, and then came to France where he found work in Le Havre as a mechanic. A largely enigmatic figure, Tschitt appears to have never bore arms, or even spoken about his resistance experience, having died in November 1944 from injuries suffered in the bombing raid of September 5 1944. His involvement with the Resistance was with a small group with a bizarre title- Le Vagabond Bien Aimé, which was also the title of a 1937 film starring Maurice Chevalier.

The network started in 1940 as a resistance newspaper called Le Patriote, and seems to have specialised mostly in propaganda. Each edition contained the slogan ‘When one hasn’t given everything, one has given nothing’. The sentiments were patriotic, and largely devoid of any party political ideology. According to Georges Godefroy, Tschitt was largely involved in the writing and distribution of these papers, which led to an incident whereby he was released from custody by the Feldgendarmerie, who arrested him on suspicion of distributing clandestine newspapers— but after having searched his home, and been unable to find any papers, released him— it seems that the idea of an immigrant writing such patriotic texts was not an idea that the occupiers could entertain.

Some other immigrant resisters did not work in networks, but acted alone. In Bolbec, in between Le Havre and Rouen, an Austrian anti-fascist called Wilhelm Weiss settled in

---

649 Facsimiles of Le Vagabond, ADSM 297 J 8.
650 Godefroy, op.cit., p.132.
1938, fleeing the Anschluss. Weiss lived quietly just outside the town, and kept a low public profile during the Occupation. This had a twin effect- it enabled him to provide assistance to individual resisters, and also to réfractaires, but also meant that at the Liberation, he was arrested, having been accused of collaborating and assisting the enemy- an accusation which it transpired was founded on nothing more than an assumption based on his nationality, and of which he was quickly cleared.\

In terms of sheer numbers, foreigners were not a large contribution to resistance in Upper Normandy, as Blanquet has indicated. Their contribution is to show that resistance was not exclusively French in terms of ethnic make-up. Though immigrant resisters fell both sides of the Communist/non-Communist divide, they all seem to have a common motive- a vision of France as a terre d’accueil and a template of civilisation. All had come to France, not always for political reasons, but sometimes for economic reasons. Yet they had adopted France as a home, and conceived and adopted a certain idea of being French. This was something that was key to Piontek in his second interview given to the archivists at Rouen, also in 1982, where he talked about his experience of deportation, and his reflections upon being a resister. It is worth noting that after surviving both Buchenwald and Auschwitz, he returned to Normandy, and eventually to the Chantiers de Normandie, but then became a teacher of History and Geography in a technical lycée, and correspondent for the CH2GM, so this may help to explain the nature of his observations:

The Resistance was, for me, at first a disappointment with the defeat of 1940, and then it was every French person needing to defend their country, wherever they may be, by whatever means…I would have liked more French

---

652 Blanquet, op.cit, p.15.
people to have resisted… The Resistance was an issue of conscience… We were alone, an individual facing up to a problem alone, it was not always easy… [it was] not a political or social project.⁶⁵⁴

For immigrant resisters, resistance was about belonging to a vision of France, the country that had welcomed them. It was also about proving themselves to be French, proof to have integrated into a society that, ironically, was governed by a regime set on demonising them. For Piontek, resistance was not something that should be measured numerically. It was an engagement of the individual, which frames the question even further in terms of identities and where one belonged. To define being French and being a resister depended on the individual visions, and highlights again the importance of applying Koselleck’s twin emphasis upon expectation and experience (Erwartungshorizont) when it comes to the understanding of resistance mentality and action.⁶⁵⁵ The inability to understand what he called ‘the philosophy of the Resistance’ was what Piontek reproached in the work of Raymond Ruffin.⁶⁵⁶

So the nightmarish vision conjured up by the Vichyites of a foreign-backed army of bandits and brigands is quite false. Firstly, resisters of immigrant origin were a minority strand within a movement that was, in itself, within a minority strand of French society. To use the word ‘army’ would itself be linguistically inappropriate under the circumstances. But also, in the case of Upper Normandy, most resisters of immigrant origin did not engage in violent action (and were condemning of violence), and were determined to lead lives that were respectful of their adopted homeland. Furthermore, they were not all Communists as depicted by Vichy, and this section shows that immigrants in the Resistance were more than

⁶⁵⁴ Interview with Piontek, op.cit.
⁶⁵⁶ Interview with Piontek, op.cit.
just the FTP-MOI. Many were simply determined to prove that they were as French as the French, if not more so. What they lacked in ethnicity, they attempted to make up for in conceptions, visions, and actions. To them, unlike Vichy, être français was about values, not racial purity.

A reflection of this is a comparison between immigrants in resistance in this region, and the picture at a national level. Writing a history of immigrants in resistance nationally is, as Denis Peschanski noted, difficult, because they were mainly concentrated in a geographically small area of France- namely the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the Lorraine, and the area around Paris. But he notes that immigrants tended largely to fight in groups defined by their immigrant identity in these areas, and this is reflected also in the work of Rolande Trempé in the south-west. This is not the case with immigrants in Upper Normandy- they joined the groups nearest to them or the ones that they identified with the most according to circumstances or beliefs, just as ‘native’ French people did. Occasionally they joined together, but even then, it has not been possible in this research to identify any group vaguely equivalent to the MOI, or any unit of the MOI, present in Upper Normandy during the course of this period. It is perfectly possible to talk about immigrants in resistance in Upper Normandy, but it is not possible to argue that there was an immigrant resistance in Upper Normandy.

However, the conclusion that Peschanski arrives at for immigrant resisters is one that is shared by this analysis- namely that resistance was linked clearly to the process of integration into French society for these resisters. What immigrant resisters had in common

---

657 Stéphane Courtois, Denis Peschanski & Adam Rayski, Le Sang de l’étranger- les immigrés de la M.O.I dans la Résistance (Paris, Fayard, 1989). The Main d’œuvre immigrée (MOI) was the immigrant wing of successively the Communist CGT trade union, and then the FTP during the years of occupation and resistance.
was a desire to be seen as French, a feeling of being French, or at the very least of knowing and sharing what they held to be French values, and an identification with being French. There is a clear sense of patriotism that runs through this current, whether the resisters in question were with the Communists or not, and this was the patriotism of those who were integrating into France, and proving their worth to French society. This integrational patriotism was, like the patriotism of those who were native-born French, born out of an affection for France, but rather than the France of republican legacies in republican patriotism, or the providential France of national patriotism, this was the France of the *pays d’accueil*.

**Modern ephebes? Resistance as Remasculation**

Having identified multiple patriotisms amongst patriotic resistance, what is it that binds these different patriotisms, despite sometimes stark differences? To some extent, the ‘imagined communities’ argument advanced by Benedict Anderson could apply to describe patriotic resistance as much as what it does nationalism. Despite all of these differing strands and conceptions of resistance, and the fact that each resister had their own conception of what resistance was, “the Resistance” was something that each resister felt as though they could share amongst other resisters- the very fact of resistance, of engagement within a mass struggle, was what bound resisters more than anything.

But what bound resisters specifically who felt involved in resistance primarily as a patriotic struggle was that they were restoring France and French sovereignty, not just legalistically, as implied in the title of Michel Baldenweck’s doctoral thesis, but also

---


psychologically. We have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter how 1940 represented the crisis not just in French identity, but also in French masculinity, and France’s sense of self-worth. The Resistance, and the ensuing liberation in 1944, gave these men a chance to redress this.\textsuperscript{663} For many FFI units, their armed action after D-Day essentially consisted of intensifying their existing actions of sabotage, and at the Liberation, acting as guarantors of law and order and securing local landmarks in the case of Le Havre, or mairies in the case of several villages in the Pays de Caux.\textsuperscript{664} This allowed for resisters to pose as liberators of their villages and towns, and gave the Resistance an important social function- as having restored French (and local) honour. This was apparent in the post-war rhetoric of André Gosse, hailing the virtues of the cauchois, and framing his action within loyalty to them, and also, at a national level, in the speech made by de Gaulle at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris on August 24, 1944.

What then links patriotic identity and the expression of this patriotism as resistance? The answer is a gendered construction of self-identity and the nation. In this chapter, female resisters have largely been absent, though we will be looking at them in chapter four. The argument is that resistance was gendered in the same way that French society at large was gendered, and that the resisters that we have covered here in this chapter were the masculine, virile, representation of the Resistance- young men rising up and fighting for their country.\textsuperscript{665} Patriotism is anything but a gender-neutral concept; the word’s etymology comes from patria, meaning ‘fatherland’. Paternalism was re-established after the Revolution by the Napoleonic Code, and Napoleonic society also revered the army.\textsuperscript{666} At the beginning of the

\textsuperscript{664} Damien Neveu, Deux léopards: un réseau de résistance à Yvetot (unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, université de Rouen, 1999).
\textsuperscript{665} This gendered nature of resistance will be explored further in chapter four.
20th century, military service became universal for all young men, enshrining the concept of the *levée en masse* further into the French psyche (having its origin in the Battle of Valmy in 1792).\textsuperscript{667} 1940, with the swift shock of defeat, and the armistice reducing the French army to a very small role, was an emasculating experience, or possibly a “de-masculinising” experience. Fabrice Virgili has written about how the Occupation forced France into a submissive, unmasculine, relationship with Germany- and the Liberation with its purges was seen as a process of restoring French national pride.\textsuperscript{668} I would like to contend that the Resistance can be seen in much the same light- the resisters examined in this chapter were motivated by a sense of anger at the shame of occupation, and many had either not fought or fought all too briefly in 1940. For these resisters, resistance was their chance to fight for the nation, and atone for the errors and the defeat of four years previously.

Moreover, at the beginning of this chapter, we talked about the nation and the community as structures of family and of kinship. Military service was not simply a case of enough men to fight off a foreign invader or quell any trouble in the colonies- it was also a case of bringing young French men into society as fully-grown men. The resisters in this chapter were often aged in their late teens or early twenties, and they were seeking the approval of their peers, and in the case of resisters of immigrant origin, seeking *appartenance*, or belonging. In the process of forging a self-identity, resisting was a form of initiation into adulthood, and with it the assumption of paternal, or masculine, roles in a masculine society. These resisters were now *les hommes de famille*, and could take part in political affairs within their communities. They had proved their masculinity by engaging in the forefront of the struggle with the Nazi occupier, during it seemed the violence of the final months of the war, and helping to drive them out of Normandy and France- the heirs to the


poilus of 1914-18, or those who had fought for the Republic in the 19th century - which as John Horne has argued, was in itself an inherently masculine institution.\textsuperscript{669}

We have talked in the introduction about framing resistance within the structure of polis, or what the French call la cité. The work of Raoul Lonis shows how the polis was structured by a series of circles that functioned inside the greater collective of the polis, which was essentially a group of men, then bound together by bonds of family and of association.\textsuperscript{670} One of the most important characteristics in ancient Greece was the concept of ephebos. This was a two-year period of military service where young men not only fought for their polis, and proved their masculinity, thereby proving not just their capacity for military service, but also their citizenship. Once their service was complete, usually at around the age of twenty, they were considered as having become full members of the phratria, or brotherhood, and were then considered full citizens, and admitted to what Lonis terms as the ‘first circle’ of the polis.\textsuperscript{671} Immigrants were not considered citizens unless they had proven their service to a polis.\textsuperscript{672}

A parallel process can be seen to be operating here with resistance. It is worth noting that many, even most, of the resisters in this category were young, and only just coming of age. By fighting in resistance, and being seen to be liberating both the nation and their surroundings, these resisters could be seen as finally restoring national pride, but also of having finally come of age themselves, and having finally become les hommes de famille. After a period whereby the French military, for so long important to the French collective identity, had been, in turn, humiliated, emasculated, then dissolved, the Resistance, and their mutation into the FFI, represented the renaissance of what Dominique Borne has termed le

\textsuperscript{669} Horne, \textit{op.cit.}, p.29.
\textsuperscript{671} Ibid, pp. 32-41.
citoyen-soldat, the citizen fighting for the Nation, a concept that he traces back to Valmy in 1792.673

This show of masculinity then led to a certain element of mysticism and distancing of women. When I interviewed Bernard Lawday in 2011, the interview took place in a consulting room with walls so thick that I concluded afterwards that no-one outside the room could have heard. It was only much later that I realised that one of the likely reasons was that it would have meant his wife would have been unable to hear us. Later correspondence with Monique Lawday, after his death, indicated that they had met shortly after the war, and Mme Lawday seemed surprised that someone should want to pay tribute to his qualities as a resister, although she was aware that he had been in the Resistance.674 Equally, Tony Larue testifies that many resisters were keen for their wives not to know very much about their resistance activities, either during or after the war- and when it came to designing a monument to those who had been executed on the site of the shooting range at the Madrillet gardens in Grand-Quevilly, the monument was of a man about to be shot, displaying a naked torso.675 The symbolism was clear- the Resistance was meant to be seen as masculine virility, fighting against the subjugation imposed by the German other. Masculine virility was also an important aspect in the self-identities of many resisters cited here: the wrestling of Bronislaw Piontek, the weightlifting of Raoul Boulanger and his diables noirs, the réfractaires working on the land to cite but three. There was also the sense of fraternity of the maquisards that Boulanger lauded after the war- which he considered far more central to the maquisard identity than party politics.

So this was how the mystical, masculine nature of the resistance identity was acquired- the lauding of the country above all else, the resisters collectively inscribing

674 Correspondence between the author and Mme Lawday, July 2014.
675 Interview with Tony Larue, ADSM AV09/ 020, 1985.
themselves in a tacit narrative of what Thomas Carlisle called ‘Great Men’. What was implicit in this was that those who had not actively resisted were weak, and thus to be marginalised, or at the very least, to be distanced from the Resistance legacy. This also reflected Athenian citizenship in its own way- Lonis identifies women as belonging to the second circle of the polis, not benefiting from the same privileges of citizenship as those in the first circle. The Liberation was the re-assertion of the masculine and the virile, whereby the French stood proud again militarily, with a newly victorious generation of younger men who could properly assume their roles within the patriarchal society. Meanwhile, those whose ‘Frenchness’ had been doubted or had reason to be doubted prior to the war could show that they had proven their affiliation to France, and that they merited acceptance into a new form of what Lonis called le premier cercle, and thereby asserting their own sense of masculinised self-identity.

In summary, this was resistance as “remasculination”, the reversal of emasculation, the restoration of masculine pride/macho psyche, reprising their roles as the masculine protectors of the nation after having been emasculated and devalued by defeat and occupation. In achieving this, resistance became a modern form of ephebos, service to the nation carried out in sometimes hazardous conditions, at the end of which resisters, who had entered into resistance as ephebes, had acquired and re-gained a sense of masculinity, and with it, what they could feel and hold to be a more complete sense of citizenship.

---

676 Horne, op.cit., p.29.
677 Lonis, op.cit., p.47.
678 For a further understanding of this concept functioning in other, but similarly comparable environments, see Susan Jeffords, The remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1989) for the gendered nature of political and military discourse in the United States throughout the 1970s and the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.
Conclusion

Behind the simple explanation of resistance as patriotic action, this chapter has uncovered a greater series of complexities. Firstly, this chapter has shown that if all the resisters within this chapter were fighting for their country, then it is more accurate to talk about patriotisms in the plural rather than a singular, essentialist patriotism. This is because resistance could be viewed as being the communion of the imagined community, and yet its image varied according to the resister. Therefore, it cannot be said that resistance was purely about patriotism, because as the other chapters of this thesis show, the reality was more complex than that. When there are multiple images and visions of France at work, as this chapter has shown, patriotism, and with it, national identity, has to be conceived heterogeneously, with a variety of different identities and different patriotisms, yet all of them laying claim to the same word and same idea- being French, and fighting for a restored, sovereign France.

Secondly, patriotism was a subconscious reflex of the masculine domination of French society at this time. The Allied landings allowed for the Resistance to become the incarnation of masculine virility restoring a national honour that had been devalued four years earlier, and to attempt to exorcise the spectre of debacle and defeat that clearly haunted the psyche of so many of these resisters, and gave these resisters a sense of self-identity, maybe even self-worth. For many, resistance played an important part not just in shaping their lives, but in shaping their citizenship and their identity. Resistance as such took upon the representation of a form of apprenticeship, by which a resister could integrate into the phratria, or brotherhood, becoming a French, masculine, citizen, or citoyen-soldat.

680 For a further understanding of the multiple forms of French identity, and how these forms have been incarnated across both French history and memory in France, see Pierre Nora (ed.), Les Lieux de Mémoire (3. Vol., Paris, Gallimard, 1984-1992).
681 This is also something which Cécile Vast has talked about in her study of the Mouvements Unis de la Résistance (MUR), where she looks at the emergence of a resistance identity over the course of 1940-1944, but also beyond. Interestingly, though she also identifies patriotism as being amongst these traits, she cites as the most striking characteristic of resistance identity to be intransigence, something which she sees as a product of their experiences. See Vast, op.cit. pp. 297-303.
Finally, this chapter has shown the role of patriotism within the larger picture of resistance as a political engagement. Bronislaw Piontek stated that resistance was not a political project. Yet if one looks at expression politics, or what this thesis defined in the introduction as the personalised political, one can see that a political engagement can be the expression of a sentiment and a belief without necessarily being the elaboration of a political project such as *le grand soir* presented in chapter one, or the *après-Vichy* being envisaged in chapter two. This was resistance that more often than not was not concerned with the desire to either revolutionise society or exercise power, but instead act for a personal, deeply-held belief, and to serve the community, both imagined and real. As such, the patriotic resistance examined in this chapter can be seen as being political, because it was very much an action for the *polis*, both as proof of integration and initiation within the idea of *la cité*, but also as an idea of serving it in the sense that *ephebos* had been a service to the *polis* in the era of antiquity. The memoirs of Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who himself had been a resister, contain the phrase ‘Remind yourself that France is your mother, and that you must serve it’. Chaban-Delmas’ words could be seen as summing up the views of the resisters examined in this chapter; their resistance was a service to the *polis* of France and French society.

---

Chapter Four

In the Shadow of the Army of Shadows? Auxiliary Resistance

In the previous three chapters, we have seen different kinds of resistance action and resistance ideals. But what made resistance possible? Moreover, this thesis has tended to focus on acts of resistance that confronted either Nazism or Vichy. Yet resistance was not always about confrontation; it could just as easily be about subversion, as is shown by James C. Scott’s *Weapons of the Weak.* It could also be in defiance of the occupier and the collaborator, and the sinister ideologies of both National Socialism and the National Revolution.

It is at this point that we are obliged to consider a definition of resistance within not just *la guerre*, but also what Alya Aglan & Robert Frank have called *la Guerre monde*. The Second World War was a war that touched every aspect of society, every aspect of daily life, particularly in a country that was occupied. It was not just soldiers, administrators and rebels who had to make their own individual arrangements with the wartime situation, it was virtually every person in the country who had to make these decisions- a situation that led to John Sweets to call his 1976 study of Clermont-Ferrand *Choices in Vichy France*. So in this situation whereby even everyday life, *le quotidien*, became politicised, aiding and abetting an act of resistance was, in itself, resistance. With this in mind, François Marcot broadened the scope of study for the Resistance. He chose to insist upon *résistance-mouvement*, and to look at resistance as a social phenomenon within the broader context of the French population and French society. Equally, Alya Aglan, in *Le temps de la*

---

686 François Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance?’ in *Le Débat* (No. 177, 2013/5), pp. 177-197.
Résistance, looked not just at accélérateurs and planificateurs, but also at a third group, sauveteurs, whose action was inscribed purely in the present, and whose action could be qualified as largely phenomenological, because it did not engage directly with the future— in Aglan’s definition, the future could only be saved if there was salvation in the present.\textsuperscript{687} This final group concerned itself with humanist actions, such as rescuing and sheltering resisters, airmen, and those targeted by Vichy, such as Jewish children.

So the object of this chapter is to examine this wider definition of resistance, and show how these indirect acts of resistance, not always carried out under the official auspices of organised resistance, are critical to a full understanding of resistance within Upper Normandy, and the struggle against Vichy and Nazism. At the start of the previous chapter, we introduced the idea of expression politics, and used this to frame the idea of patriotism within resistance. In this chapter, we aim to look at the idea of auxiliary resistance, resistance designed to help other resisters and those fleeing persecution, to represent another dimension of expression politics within resistance.

The Importance of Gender

One of the more interesting developments in French historiography over the last twenty-five years or so has been the shift away from histoire des femmes to histoire du genre.\textsuperscript{688} This can be seen in the shift from women’s history, seen in the works of Michelle Perrot or Françoise Thébaud,\textsuperscript{689} to gender history, which has been charted by the journal CLIO, founded in 1995. This chapter aims to try and incorporate the use of gender into analysing resistance. Central to this thesis is the argument that the understanding of resistance can only be achieved by the

\textsuperscript{687} Alya Aglan, Le temps..., pp. 259-260.
\textsuperscript{688} For an explanation of this evolution in late 20th-century French historiography, see Fabrice Virgili, ‘L’histoire des femmes et l’histoire des genres aujourd’hui’ in Vingtième Siècle (No. 75, 2002/3), pp. 5-14.
understanding of the action undertaken by individual resisters. This relies upon comprehending their roles. The idea of agency being shaped by the role played by a social agent is not a new one—it is famously a key argument in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. But the argument advanced by Joan Scott when trying to define the difference between gender history and women’s history is that gender is ‘power relations between men and women’. So this chapter proposes to use gender to look at how resistance roles were shaped by relations between male and female resisters, as well as look at men whose resistance roles were less active than the resisters examined in chapter three.

This analysis is highly relevant because Inter-War French society was itself a gendered society, as was shown by Sian Reynolds in her 1996 book. Moreover, the power relations were governed by an extra factor; women still did not have the vote at the outbreak of the Second World War. So as such, the idea of women as citoyennes was slightly absurd, because they were not full citizens. In addition to not having the right to vote, French women did not have the right to work, have a passport, or even to have their own bank account without the permission of their husbands. Ultimately, the citoyenne was an oxymoron, describing a situation whose effective existence was denied realisation by regulation and legislation of the day, this denial being further reinforced by contemporary mores. This alone meant the idea of women engaging in resistance was a social transgression, even without considering any further ideological factors such as the contestation of the National Revolution. So once again, there is a further need to understand resistance as a political action, but in the sense of le politique rather than la politique—because as far as the latter was concerned at this time, women and the female condition were at best marginalised, and at

693 Ibid.
worst non-existent. This chapter aims to show that one of the impacts of resistance action was to show the ability of women to act in the public sphere, and their potential capacity to resist, in spite of the legal, institutional and social apparatuses of the day.

Furthermore, if men made up the entirety of chapter three, it should also be pointed out that many men were also involved in roles that were on the fringes of resistance, and did not bear arms except at the Liberation. Jean-Marie Guillon & François Marcot have written that the Resistance was ‘a man’s affair, in a society dominated by the masculine’, but if it is true that resisters were mostly male, it is equally true that a significant minority were women, and that a significant proportion of the men were not resisting in ways that were especially masculine, and conforming to the stereotype of the masculine resister. Because many of the activities covered in the first three chapters could only be made possible by activities being covered in this chapter, resistance is therefore only possible to understand by understanding the roles of resisters in relation to each other, which means that male resisters and female resisters cannot be understood in isolation from each other. This means that an understanding is required of the interplay between the two groups, which is why gender, the study of power relations between the sexes, is proposed here as a paradigm.

A lot of this conditioning was not just the consequence of gender. There were other influences too, such as cultural capital, and individual, as well as local, circumstances. Resisting in a rural area required a different set of skills to resisting in an urban area, because ultimately the circumstances and the opportunities, as well as the structures of the communities, were very different. H.R. Kedward has always been careful to stress the importance of local context and environment in understanding resistance, and that is still the case here. The usage of gender however is intended as a compliment to this

---

696 See H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis*....
understanding. If environment permits us to situate and understand the nature of resistance, then gender allows us to situate and understand its functioning and its realisation- which is critical to the understanding of a movement whereby action was pivotal.

Aiding the Allies: the Rescue of Allied Airmen

Resisting was as much about opportunity as it was about the desire to act, and where this was a factor was in rural areas. Whereas, as we have already seen, the urban areas of the region offered an environment reasonably favourable to resisting, through the presence of organisations such as the former trade unions, the écoles normales, or the civil service, rural areas of Upper Normandy posed an altogether different environment. Firstly, the countryside was more likely to be disposed towards supporting the National Revolution. The testimonies of Raphaël Mallard and Roger Cressent indicate that both the Pays de Caux and the Pays de Bray had been hostile to the Popular Front; further testimonies account for the fact that rural society was much more receptive to Catholicism than urban areas. The social environment needed for fostering resistance was often lacking, and so too were the opportunities- it was difficult, if not impossible, to distribute resistance tracts within the villages. Anyone wanting to resist who lived in the countryside was likely to find difficulties meeting many, if any, others who shared the desire for resistance during the early years of the Occupation, and opportunities were few and far between for perpetrating any resistance activities.

These were problems that Roger Cressent in particular encountered. It is interesting to note how Cressent defined himself and his background as ‘presque insurgé contre la société’. Born in rural Normandy in 1911, his father was killed at Verdun in 1916.

697 Author’s Interview with Roger Feray, op. cit.
698 Interview with Raphael Mallard, op. cit, and with Roger Cressent ADSM AV09/100, 1982.
699 Interview with Raphael Mallard, op. cit.
700 Interview with Roger Cressent, op. cit. A translation might be ‘almost an insurgent against society’.
Consequently, his background was poor, and his upbringing dominated by the Catholicism that was prevalent in the Pays de Bray at that time, but he rejected Catholicism on the grounds that he could manage for himself without the need for divine assistance. Yet as a *pupille de la Nation*, he was able to go on to further education beyond his leaving certificate; *cours complémentaires* at Neuchâtel-en-Bray, and then, from 1927-30, teacher-training at the *école normale* in Rouen. In 1930, he returned to the Pays de Bray to take up his first teaching post, at Gournay-en-Bray, to where he returned again in 1933 after completing military service in the Navy in Toulon. Here was a paradox—someone whom was in revolt against society, but whose background had much to be grateful for to the French state, and who felt deeply and strongly about the values of the French Republic, even if he refused, in his words, to be a traditional *instituteur*. He joined the SFIO in 1934 because of the perceived danger that he saw posed by the leagues, but did not consider himself to be especially anti-clerical, even if he was an atheist. Likewise, he was a member of the *Syndicat National des Instituteurs* (SNI), the teaching union, but only for ‘practical reasons’. Perhaps the biggest contradiction came in his attitude to the war— he mixed within pacifist circles, but still did his military service (although he worked as a teacher in the Navy), and volunteered to fight at the outbreak of war in 1939, having been opposed to Munich. Despite having been initially rejected, he was then later admitted, but was not taken prisoner.

It was this experience that led him to a peculiar stance in the summer of 1940— he was convinced that the Armistice was necessary, because he had seen at first-hand how badly overrun the French army had been, but he did not support the Vichy regime. In August 1940, Cressent returned to his post as *instituteur-secrétaire de mairie* in the small village of

---

701 Interview with Roger Cressent, *op.cit.*
702 Ibid.
703 The status of *pupille de la Nation* did not always entail obedience to the state- Georges Guingouin, the famous resister in the Limousin, was also a *pupille de la Nation*. See Grenard, *op.cit.*
704 Interview with Roger Cressent, *op.cit.*
Nesle-Hodeng just outside Forges-les-Eaux. This again posed both advantages and difficulties for him. The advantage was that it was a fixed post, which equally provided employment for his wife, who was equally a schoolteacher, and a home for his family. The difficulty was that he could not resist too overtly from this post, in part because the alternative to Vichy was still ill-defined, and in part because his views meant that many in the villages considered him to be a Communist. 705 Had he entered into the distribution and preparation of tracts at this time, he would have been easily traced because he was one of just a handful of people to whom such Left-wing views could have been attributed. Consequently, Roger Cressent testified that the Resistance in the Pays de Bray never once prepared or distributed any kind of propaganda. 706

What he could do at this stage, if resistance was not possible, was refuse to co-operate entirely with Vichy. He did not display the portrait of Pétain in his classroom, nor did he confiscate books that the regime had prescribed as forbidden. 707 More active forms of resistance came in 1941-1942 with the forgery of ration cards. But it was only in the summer of 1943 that his resistance became more active still, with his engagement in the Bureau des Opérations Aériennes (BOA).

The BOA was set up as a response to the need of the Allies to keep hold of as many pilots and air crew as possible. Sir Arthur Harris, the Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air Force, later estimated that it was cheaper to send someone to Oxbridge for three years than to train a British aviator. 708 It had initially a forerunner in the southern zone, but as the number of raids on the northern zone began to increase in 1943, the need for a counterpart in northern France became greater, and it was created by Jean Moulin in April of that year as part of the

---

705 Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid.
Free French forces within metropolitan France.\textsuperscript{709} Firstly, it was charged with organising parachute drops and landings of agents, but as the war intensified, missions that had originally been considered as secondary, such as the recuperation of Allied airmen, became more and more of a feature of their activities- in Seine-Inférieure, a coastal department, it seems as though this activity became the dominant co-operation with the Allied military forces.\textsuperscript{710}

The recuperation of Allied airmen was not just the exclusive domain of the BOA. It also became one of the prevalent forms of activity for groups that already existed and engaged in active resistance. \textit{Le Léopard} was primarily a network engaging in sabotage and intelligence as we have seen in chapter three, but there was also a wing of the network that looked after crashed Allied aviators. This extra resistance activity required a new approach and a new structure for them.

The approach that André Gosse decided upon was to separate the two in all but name. Those carrying out sabotage and those carrying out shelter were unknown to each other, and only Gosse knew both.\textsuperscript{711} The latter became almost a shadow network within the so-called ‘army of shadows’, and even for a way of life that was secret by its definition, it required the combination of discretion, extensive knowledge and contacts.

The population of the countryside being largely Roman Catholic, priests had both knowledge of their surroundings and their parishioners, and were capable of secrecy through their regular hearings of confession. They also had means, at least in the short-term, to accommodate aviators, and could escape the attention that others might have attracted. However, whether priests actually engaged in resistance themselves or not was a question for

\textsuperscript{709} Bruno Leroux, ‘Bureau des Opérations Aériennes’ in Marcot et al., \textit{op.cit.}, p.168.

\textsuperscript{710} Interview with Raphael Mallard, \textit{op.cit.} See also Mason Norton, ‘Les résistants et les bombardements alliés en Seine-Inférieure, 1940-1944’ in Andrew Knapp, John Barzman & Corinne Bouillot (eds.), \textit{Bombardements 44 : Le Havre, Normandie, France, Europe} (Rouen, PURH, 2016).

\textsuperscript{711} Interview with André Gosse, \textit{op.cit.}; Interview with Claude Gricourt, ADSM AV09/140, 1983.
individual priests. There was certainly no command for the priesthood to engage in acts of resistance, or politics for that matter.\textsuperscript{712}

This sentiment of isolation characterised the early recollections of one priest who did engage in resistance, Claude Gricourt. In fact, he described his early years as being outside of society and politics in general- his seminary education closed him away from questions such as the Depression of the 1930s, the Leagues of the Far Right, and the Popular Front.\textsuperscript{713} He had had a brief stint outside of the seminary, which he had joined upon leaving school in 1925 at the age of 14, when he did his military service in 1932-33. But though he was aware of such things happening, his background and way of life, he said, did not permit him to understand fully these events.\textsuperscript{714} His first parish, in a poor part of Le Havre, came as a culture shock, and he only lasted a year after ordination in 1937 before being sent to La Crique, a village in the Pays de Caux, which was also a parish that administered several churches in surrounding villages, which was near to his childhood home in the Varenne valley, and where, by contrast, he remained for the next four decades.\textsuperscript{715}

But a year after arriving in La Crique, the war broke out, and Gricourt was mobilised into the \textit{150e d’infanterie}. The war of 1939-40 was short, but it was enough to show him the scale of the defeat suffered by France, stating that even before May 10, the army was marked by a combination of poor morale and poor equipment.\textsuperscript{716} It was also enough to show him the scale of man’s inhumanity to man. Whilst on patrol with two other soldiers, they found themselves in a wood. Near to a clearing, Gricourt spotted the dark grey of a \textit{Wehrmacht} uniform, just before the soldier spotted him. In the space of a few seconds, a brief shoot-out

\begin{footnotes}
\item[713] Interview with Claude Gricourt, \textit{op.cit.} For an idea of seminary life in the Inter-War years, see Stéphane Cauchois, \textit{Joseph Kérébel, Prêtre, résistant, mort en déportation} (Louviers, Editions Ysec, 2012).
\item[714] Ibid.
\item[715] Interview with Claude Gricourt, \textit{op. cit.}
\item[716] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
took place, and the Wehrmacht soldier fell. Gricourt approached him, and found the soldier dead from one of Gricourt’s bullets. He pronounced the last rites, and then returned to base, dazed and distressed. Over forty years on, he referred to it as ‘un mauvais souvenir’. Very shortly afterwards, Gricourt himself was wounded, and evacuated to a military hospital in Biarritz, and from there to Montpellier, where he heard about the armistice- meaning that he was able to return to La Crique, and was not taken prisoner. He was stunned to find that his vicarage had been taken over by Wehrmacht soldiers, who were now billeted there, and remained so until the spring of 1941.

Gricourt’s starting point with regards to Vichy was very different to that of Roger Cressent. Whereas Cressent refused to show Pétain’s portrait in class, Gricourt considered le Maréchal to be a symbol of resistance against Germany. At this point, Gricourt did not really distinguish between Germany and Nazism- only after laws against Jews came in, and he had experienced the Occupation at close hand in the winter of 1940-41 did he begin to distinguish between the two. The same period of time led him to question Pétain’s stance, with evidence of collaboration being provided by the photograph at Montoire. But it was not until the end of 1942 that he began to enter into a more active kind of resistance. Firstly, he helped some of those who came to his door searching for assistance in fleeing the STO by finding them work upon farms in the area. Word of this may well have established Gricourt as someone whom André Gosse could depend upon, because it was that summer that the latter contacted him, and recruited him to help in the shelter of Allied airmen. This was presumably also a result of instructions from London, because at the same time, Raphaël

---

717 Interview with Claude Gricourt, op.cit. The phrase means ‘a bad memory’, but can also mean ‘a bad recollection’- the tone of Gricourt’s voice in the interview indicates that he still found the incident very troubling even in old age.
718 Ibid.
719 Ibid.
720 Ibid.
721 Interview with André Gosse, op.cit.
Mallard was instructed by radio from London that Libération-Nord in the region around Dieppe should now prioritise the rescue of Allied airmen over the collection of intelligence and the spreading of propaganda, which had been the network’s primary activities in the Dieppe region in 1942-43.\textsuperscript{722}

This shows that resistance activity, which was often decided upon by the resisters themselves, could also be governed by external factors, such as the demands of the Allied forces. It also reveals something about the military aspect of the relationship between resisters and the regular military. Although the ultimate aim was the same in the sense that the defeat of Nazi Germany was the overriding priority, the relationship between these two was sometimes strained because of differences in approach. Speaking about his 2014 book \textit{The Cruel Victory}, Paddy Ashdown stated that what amazed him the most about the resisters of the Vercors was that their patriotism— as he put it ‘Professional soldiers do not go to war for their country, no matter what our politicians would like to believe; they go to war for their mate stood next to them’.\textsuperscript{723} This conception can be transferred to the situation in Upper Normandy in 1943-1944— the British military as a collective agent wanted to defeat Nazi Germany because in Normandy, they were a clear danger to them; the resisters in the Normandy countryside wanted to defeat Nazi Germany because they were occupying the area, and subjugating the interests of France and the French people, ultimately destroying the local economy and livelihoods. These two aims did have an overlap in the sense of a common enemy, but defeating this enemy would manifest differences between the two approaches and tensions.

In his 2014 work \textit{La France sous les bombardements alliés}, Andrew Knapp talks about the Liberation showing a ‘\textit{partenariat manqué}’, or missed partnership, between the

\textsuperscript{722} Interview with Raphael Mallard, \textit{op.cit.}
Allies and the Resistance- in Knapp’s argument, had the Allies been interested in establishing a genuine partnership with resisters on the ground, they would have learned about the futility of bombing Le Havre so heavily in the summer of 1944.\textsuperscript{724} The switch from intelligence to rescuing Allied airmen shows that Allied military strategy was moving away from the conception of a partnership even in the summer of 1943, and that for the Allies, the defeat of Nazi Germany was more important than the liberation of occupied France- it was simply that the latter was an especially useful means of achieving the former.\textsuperscript{725} This shows a clear difference in vision between London and the resisters in Normandy. It also shows that for London, there was a view that resisters were useful for London’s purposes, but that London’s view did not go beyond that, that there was a definite limit in that usefulness, and that their concern for the political situation in France at this time only extended as far as how it would impact upon the Allied military objectives.\textsuperscript{726} The ‘partenariat manqué’ was therefore not just something present in the combats of the Liberation- it characterised, at the level of organisational contact between the two, relations well before that.

Yet if this mistrust was present in the register of organisational relations between London and the Resistance, then the register of individual relations between Allied airmen and resisters in Upper Normandy reveals a different history, one where the sense of partnership was not a missed opportunity, but in fact a vital and real part in establishing relations across the divides of language and culture, or in establishing a resistance version of the concept that Philippe Burrin called ‘îlots de rencontre’, or ‘isles of contact’\textsuperscript{727} These contacts with Allied air crew helped to show resisters that as individuals, British and American airmen were not necessarily motivated by the imperial ambitions or Francophobia

\textsuperscript{725} Relations between London and the Free French were often strained- see Julian Jackson, \textit{De Gaulle} (London, Haus Publishing, 2003).
\textsuperscript{727} Burrin, \textit{op.cit.}, p.205.

190
that Vichy propaganda accredited to them. The structure of how the resisters operated when rescuing airmen was also indicative of a human element being considered, but also taking into account operational considerations such as security. Resisters would try to keep an observation of aircraft in the local area, knowing that the first moments after the crew parachuted out of the plane were when the aviators were at the greatest risk. They were also at risk from injury, or from locals whose motives may well have been less than pure, or from anything hazardous in the local landscape. Observation became more important, but also easier, during the summer of 1944-firstly, the number of aircraft that the Allies were flying over Normandy was more significant; secondly, the hours of sunlight were longer; and finally, as many of the members of the BOA were instituteurs, they were able to have more time available for plane-watching.

Roger Cressent was keen to ensure that there were no misunderstandings between the aviators and himself, and so, in what might retrospectively seem like recklessness, he was accompanied in his missions by his son, Guy, who at the time was aged only 10. The justification was that this was evidence of his sincerity, and as the aviators were hidden in the Cressent house for a time, there seemed no point in trying to conceal the existence of the airmen from young Guy. An example of how a typical recuperation proceeded can be seen in this extract from Roger Cressent’s diaries, which he kept in order to detail all of the events that occurred to him during his engagement in resistance. On August 8, 1944, a plane crashed in the Pays de Bray, in some fields in between Cressent’s village of Nesle-Hodeng and the neighbouring village of Saint-Saire:

---

729 Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.
730 Author’s Interview with Guy Cressent, March 30, 2013.
731 Ibid.
I left with my son. Guy went towards the nearest aviator (the parachute was already hidden under the wheat). Contact rapidly established. The usual phrase: the French Resistance at your aid. Guy took his escapee towards the wood, a few hundred metres away.  

Having then taken hold of the airmen, they were then provided with civilian clothes, and hidden for a few days, before then being repatriated. The extract shows that though this may well have been an auxiliary form of resistance, it was certainly well-organised, and performed with an almost perfunctory briskness, which seems to have been born out of regularly carrying this out. Though not necessarily part of the ‘military’ resistance, the BOA carried out their actions with the efficacy one might expect of military routine.

In the Pays de Caux, with *Le Léopard*, the structure appears to have been slightly different, in the sense that whilst resisters recuperated crashed airmen, they were hidden for a few days, and then, in Claude Gricourt’s testimony, hidden on neighbouring farms with families. Repatriation seems to have been less of a priority for them, and also for the few individuals in the *Deux Léopards* network in and around Yvetot. There, a young woman is reported to have hidden an Allied airman for four months between April and August 1944. The reason for this lack of prioritisation of repatriating airmen by comparison to the BOA was possibly because these networks were not in contact so much with London. In a sense, this form of resistance is even more remarkable because it is one of a humanist motivation.

---

732 Diary of Roger Cressent, Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation, Forges-les-Eaux (private archive).
733 Ibid.
734 Interview with Claude Gricourt, op.cit.
736 Neveu makes no mention of contact between ‘Deux Léopards’ and London. By contrast, the BOA, which was active in the area, were in frequent contact, and as such helped to arm the local resisters, as they organised the arms collections parachuted in during the summer of 1944. See Neveu, op.cit., p.46.
entirely- the desire to save the life of an ally, at considerable risk to one’s own. Yet conversely, which shows yet again the divergence between French resisters and Allied military, this form of resistance was not especially useful to the Allies- an airman hidden by the Resistance in French territory could not execute the missions of a pilot that had cost their country several thousand pounds at the time (worth considerably more in today’s money).

The success of these actions is worth reflecting upon. The research carried out by Michel Baldenweck for the Seine-Inférieure show that although resisters rescued 155 airmen in 1944, there were still 497 killed, and 215 taken prisoner. The research carried out by Julien Papp in the Eure gives a slightly more complex picture, because he does not distinguish between air crew who had been shot down and parachutists from special British forces (the latter number is estimated by Papp to be around 100, which would leave roughly 200 for the former in 1944 alone), nor does he give numbers as to how many were killed or captured, although he states that 119 aircraft were shot down in 1944 (107 between D-Day and the Liberation), with a further 53 shot down in 1943. But what these studies show is that resisters were not always able to help air crew- in fact, it seems that even allowing for those who were killed and therefore could not be helped, they were unsuccessful in more than 50% of cases.

Recuperating air crew in the cities was particularly difficult, not least because planes that did crash in towns and cities usually struck houses, thereby increasing the chances of death, but also their chances of capture even if they did survive. But this form of resistance allowed those whose civilian duties prevented them from taking up more active, more direct, 

---

738 See Terraine, op.cit., for the reference to Arthur Harris’ estimation of the cost of training air crew.
739 Michel Baldenweck, Les actions de la Résistance ..., p.51.
740 Papp, op.cit., p.189. For a more detailed history of rescue of Allied airmen in the Eure, see Papp’s ‘L’aide apportée aux aviateurs alliés dans le département de l'Eure pendant l'occupation, 1940-1944’ in Connaissance de l'Eure (No. 53-54, 1984)
resistance to engage in the struggle against Nazism in their own way. Roger Cressent as a secrétaire de mairie knew that he could not leave his post without arousing suspicion, and it was similarly the case for Claude Gricourt. The dilemma was perhaps best summed up after the war by Roger Madec, the instituteur-secrétaire de mairie for the commune of Les Essarts in the Eure, near Damville. Writing in 1945 to the authorities determining whether or not resisters merited a Combattant Volontaire de Résistant (CVR) card, he apologised for a lack of active resistance during the war, stating that his commune was too remote to make contact with other resisters frequently, and that he found himself too often burdened by the twin duties of teaching and local government administration (which had enabled him to falsify some identity papers)- but that in the spring of 1944, an American airman had crashed in his commune, and he had managed to hide him on his property for the last few months of the Occupation. He regretted though, not being able to do more than that.741 It would seem that the apologetic nature of his letter indicated that some found their resistance roles as being limited, as if they regretted, in hindsight, not having done more.

Yet this form of resistance was one valued by the British, whom after the war, corresponded with local authorities in Normandy to establish those who had helped to hide Allied airmen. For the Rouen area, 140 resisters were honoured by the RAF in late 1945.742 It was also a form of resistance that was at great risk of persecution- many who hid Allied airmen in both departments were arrested; in the case of the Eure, a network of fifty sauveteurs were arrested in the region of Louviers as part of a Nazi round-up in January 1944.743 The risks were elevated compared to other resisters because the sauveteurs were often more ‘fixed’ than other resisters, who had a larger degree of mobility- their resistance action was ultimately carried out in their own homes. Roger Eliot, writing to the Prefecture of

743 Papp, La Résistance dans l’Eure, op.cit., p.183.
the Seine-Inférieure in September 1945, stated that a number of his fellow contacts, some of whom he had taught in his capacity as an *instituteur*, had been either deported or shot.\textsuperscript{744} Testifying after the war, Francis Eonin, one of the fifty resisters arrested in Louviers & Acquigny in January 1944 for helping Allied airmen, stated that out of those fifty, forty-five were deported.\textsuperscript{745} It seemed that the greater the intensity of the *guerre-monde*, the greater the level of repression and persecution that resisters encountered from both collaborator and occupier alike.

A final element of this danger needs to be underlined. Because these activities often took place in people’s own homes, the greatest danger, which often led to arrests, was denunciation. Roger Cressent only narrowly escaped arrest on three occasions- one of which was when a neighbour denounced him in a letter to the *Feldkommandantur* in Rouen. It seemed as though the neighbour did not trust the local *gendarmerie*, who were based in nearby Gournay-en-Bray, and who themselves would have been entitled to arrest anyone sheltering airmen. However, the neighbour’s letter was intercepted by the Nesle-Hodeng postmistress, who ran the commune’s PTT, and was responsible for all communications in and out of the commune- and who was part of the BOA, and so handed the letter to Roger Cressent.\textsuperscript{746}

This form of resistance that was both ordinary, in terms of the relative banality of the activities undertaken, and extraordinary, in the sense that the risks faced were considerable, and that the bulk of people undertaking it by 1944 were fully aware of the risks that they were facing. They were also flying in the face of not just the occupier, but also the virulent Anglophobe propaganda of Vichy, either in the form of locally-produced posters, or the

\textsuperscript{744} ADSM 51 W 281, letter of Roger Eliot, September 22, 1945.
\textsuperscript{745} Papp, *op.cit.*, p.183.
\textsuperscript{746} Interview with Roger Cressent, *op.cit.*; Author’s Interview with Guy Cressent, *op.cit.*
nationally-broadcast radio talks of Philippe Henriot. They were also risking the wrath not just of the occupier and the collaborator, but also the potential treachery of their neighbour. It was a resistance against the occupier, against the cultural hegemony of Nazi Germany and Vichy, and within the everyday society that they lived, motivated by the desire to do something. This shows an element of resistance that was within the framework of organised resistance, yet was not primarily concerned with either the idea of combat, except perhaps in an abstract sense, nor was their resistance necessarily driven by any ideological vision, beyond a simple aim of defeating the occupier. It shows the expression politics of resistance, because it demonstrates a sentiment of resistance, despite limitations on their individual capacities to resist.

**Resistance as aiding resistance: women resisters**

Women played a critical role in the networks that helped Allied aviators to escape, but also more generally amongst resistance networks throughout Upper Normandy. Yet they often seem to be forgotten in resistance histories, which seem to be a male-dominated narrative, even in the oral histories that have been carried out. This is no surprise- Guillon & Marcot stated that resistance was often a man’s affair in a masculinised society, and the decision to give a legal status to resisters was taken through a masculine perspective- the awarding process for the CVR favoured the military over the civil, and by extension, the male over the female, and the masculine over the feminine.

Unlike other European resistance movements, such as Yugoslavia and Tito’s Partisans, where women did engage in active combat, known as the *partizanka*, women rarely

---

748 Guillon & Marcot, *op. cit.*, p.915. See also Gildea, *op. cit.*
bore arms in occupied France. An explanation can be seen in how French society viewed women - Vichy propaganda saw womanhood as synonymous with the family, one of the key values lionised by the regime, along with work and the fatherland. Politics was not seen as a feminine domain - or when it was, as Anne-Sarah Moalic-Bouglié pointed out, it was limited to so-called ‘women’s issues’, such as the family. Robert Paxton summed up that Vichy saw a woman’s place as “barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen”.

But if 1940 was ‘the World turned upside down’, then the role of women was also brought into question, particularly in a society where so many men were either imprisoned or in camps. It meant that whilst Vichy was preaching a policy of female submission to a male breadwinner, the reality meant that women felt the necessity to go out and try to earn a wage, and in some cases, this extended to assuming the roles played by men in the polis. This was a motivation for many working-class women close to the underground Communists, of which the women’s wing would become known as the Union des Femmes Françaises (UFF).

The story of Yvonne Jouvin is one that represents the role played by many female Communist resisters. Her husband Louis had been one of the underground Communists in Grand-Quevilly after the PC had been banned in 1939, and meetings were often carried out at their house on the rue Thiers. After Louis Jouvin had been arrested in 1941 for sabotage, Yvonne Jouvin continued to act as a resister, organising meetings of female Communists in secret, but also more overt protests, albeit not in the name of the PC. In late 1941, she and a

---

749 For an examination of the role played by Yugoslav women as partizanka, see Jelena Batinic, Women and Yugoslav Partisans (New York, CUP, 2015). Female SOE agents did bear arms, but as SOE were answerable to the British Crown rather than the Free French in London, and agents were parachuted in from the UK, this thesis will not be examining the SOE.


752 Paxton, op.cit., p. 168.


754 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
group of fifteen other women protested outside the Prefecture in Rouen about poor material conditions. Their houses were scarcely fit for habitation, bread rations had been cut, and making ends meet, a sometimes precarious task even in peacetime on the rive gauche, was becoming impossible. Her son Pierre had passed the School Certificate the previous year, but was obliged to go to work at 14 because there was now no other source of income other than what she could make via knitting and sewing. Their protests were directed firmly against the Vichy regime, lobbying for their husbands to be released from captivity, either in France or in Nazi Germany, as soon as possible. The protests were not dispersed- in fact, they were allowed inside the Prefecture in order to present their petition for better material conditions. What this did allow for was, of course, the local police to take her details and put her (and others) under surveillance. She continued to be active in the Communist underground in Grand-Quevilly, until late 1942, when the Police came to arrest her.

H.R. Kedward has remarked upon the phenomenon of ‘the woman at the doorway’, whereby women held up either the police or the occupying authorities for a few moments, allowing the male resister to escape. Yvonne Jouvin engaged in a female appropriation of this for herself. She requested a moment to go into the bedroom to pack some belongings. Instead, she escaped via a condemned door in the shanty bungalow that she and her family inhabited. The door was not guaranteed to open, and in fact, forcing it open could have resulted in the entire structure collapsing. But she forced it open, having used the small amount of time that she could buy (no male policeman wanted to be seen prying upon the intimacy of a female suspect), and escaped into the back passage. This involves a double agency- using a man at the doorway for reasons of decency, whilst she herself escaped via the

---

755 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op. cit.
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid.
758 Ibid.
759 Kedward, In Search of the Maquis....., p.11.
back: the combination of gender and ingenuity. She then passed a message to the pharmacy where Pierre Jouvin worked, and then passed into clandestinity: she would join a Communist Maquis, but only as a liaison agent, and in the Somme department in the Picardy region, where Pierre Jouvin rejoined her in 1944 after deserting his STO camp in Normandy.  

The attitude of French Communists towards women was a contradictory one. At times, they had encouraged female suffrage; at others they had considered it less of a priority compared to class struggle. Like other organisations, women’s affairs were considered a different sort of politics by the PC. Women were given lessons in political economy (as we have seen in chapter one, the classes that Jean Basille called ‘Catechism Classes’), but these were separate to male members. The role of female Communist resisters, in the testimony of Yvonne Dissoubray, was always secondary to that played by male Communist resisters. They were never given roles that could be given direct action, although, in contrast to other groups, the Communists did allow female resisters to be equipped with revolvers, for the purpose of self-defence. It is worth adding though in the case of Yvonne Dissoubray that although she was a liaison officer, she would never have actually fired (and never did) because of her pacifist convictions, and consequently refused to bear arms.

The roots of Yvonne Dissoubray’s engagement in resistance were very different to those of Yvonne Jouvin. Firstly, she was unmarried, so was not engaged in resistance by virtue of her husband, but rather as an ideological commitment. Secondly, she came from a background with greater cultural and social capital than Yvonne Jouvin: she was an institutrice. Thirdly, there was a difference in date of adhesion. Whilst Yvonne Jouvin had belonged to the Communists before the war, although Yvonne Dissoubray saw herself as

---

760 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit.
761 Moalic-Bouglié, op.cit.
762 Interview with Jean Basille, op.cit.
763 Interview with Yvonne Dissoubray, op.cit.
764 Ibid.
765 Ibid.
working-class, her family had been more traditionally allied to the SFIO, and her father had remained in the party even after the scission between Socialists and Communists at the Tours Congress of 1920. The family only moved further to the Left in protest at the Popular Front’s inaction over Spain in 1936, and she only joined the PC when it had been already declared illegal (she joined in the summer of 1940, under the influence of Valentin Feldman). For her, the Third Republic was discredited, and the only alternative to Nazi occupation was Communism.

Yvonne Dissoubray’s main tasks, as someone with an intellectual background, were to take responsibility for propaganda, and to help found, along with Lucie Guérin, the UFF in the summer of 1941, although this was really a case of unifying a series of different committees that already existed for women’s rights in the party, and had been founded in the autumn of 1940 and the winter of 1940-41. But the UFF as an organisation did not engage in the political narrative that other Communist organisations did (although as an individual, Dissoubray did contribute to the clandestine regional newspaper L’Avenir normand, where she recalled contributing to the editorial discussions). Instead, they focused firmly on welfare issues. Yvonne Dissoubray was also involved in the demonstrations over bread rations in Rouen, and was actually arrested in April 1941 for refusing to disperse from in front of the prefecture. Even differences in terms of cultural and social capital did not massively or fundamentally alter the role of how Communists saw women in politics- the idea that the female condition was in itself a condition subjugated to the male condition does not seem to

---

766 Interview with Yvonne Dissoubray, op.cit.
768 ADSM 51 W 404, report on wartime female Communist activity, 1945.
769 Interview with Yvonne Dissoubray, op.cit.
have crossed the thoughts of the party. Women clearly had a gendered role, and the
Communists did not see any point in questioning this role.\textsuperscript{770}

Even when operating outside and performing resistance activities, women were still
defined in relation to male resisters. Yvonne Dissoubray recollects that the groups of resisters
who put up posters under cover of darkness in Rouen were always constituted of groups of
four, and always three men and one woman—this was as a cover should they be intercepted by
a police patrol, which would entail the woman and one of the men acting as a couple.\textsuperscript{771}
Jacqueline Desjardins had a slightly greater role in the Resistance in Elbeuf, where as well as
distributing tracts, she also collected intelligence on troop movements by the Occupier, and
then, from 1943, decided to go into hiding and become a liaison agent, working across the
whole of the northern zone, because she wanted a greater involvement in resistance.\textsuperscript{772} Until
that point, her father had ensured that her resistance activities were limited—although a
resister himself, and in the clandestine PC, he did not want Jacqueline participating in
resistance, presumably because it went against his view that resisting was a matter for men.
Between 1940 and 1943, she considered her role as being more ‘sympathisante’ than
résistante.\textsuperscript{773}

Simone Sauteur, known as ‘Puce’, was the only woman who was fully part of the
Maquis Surcouf in the Eure. Her account of the actions of the Surcouf, at over 200 pages, is
an extremely detailed and moving account of their activities, their lives, their attitudes, but
also the realities of being a female resister.\textsuperscript{774} Yet even as a woman who could be considered
a maquisarde, her role was very much gender-defined. She had been a schoolmistress in a
village in western Eure who had left her post to join the maquis. But although she was

\textsuperscript{770} Hanna Diamond, \textit{Women and the Second World War in France, 1939-1948: Choices and Constraints}
(Harlow, Longman, 1999), pp. 122-123.
\textsuperscript{771} Interview with Yvonne Dissoubray, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{772} Interview with Jacqueline Desjardins, ADSM AV09/137, 1981.
\textsuperscript{773} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{774} Written testimony of Simone Sauteur (AKA ‘Puce’), ADE 88 W 35.
working at close quarters with Robert Leblanc, her role was that of a ‘secretary’, assuring liaisons with other networks and typing orders. On occasion, she would accompany male resisters in their duties, but never bore arms- although she did witness, and later describe in detail, the attack and killing of suspected collaborator Violette Morris. She seemed content to be another sort of ‘woman at the doorway’- the observer noting, remembering, cajoling, the witness to the struggle, switching between roles such as supporter, active resister, fellow traveler, and chronicler. Parts of her testimony are written in the form of letters to her mother, and it is here that one detects the greatest tension- ‘Puce’ was not behaving in the way expected of a daughter, and she knew it. But in these letters, she stresses resistance as a greater calling, one that broke down the usual rules and divisions, and prompted her to resist, even if it went against conventions of society and her family.

Some resisters actually considered that resistance was not a place for wives and daughters. Césaire Levillain thought that if his wife knew about his resistance activity, she would end up facing a firing squad. Claude Gricourt recounts of women being kept at arm’s length in the villages where he was a resister, in order to keep the running of the group simpler. Whilst Simone Fagot, who carried out resistance activities herself, and who was married to François Fagot, who led the OCM in Seine-Inférieure in 1943-44, said in 1984 that she knew relatively little about her husband’s activities, and was never asked to undertake any missions by him.

However, this was not universally replicated across Normandy, and a large number of women carrying out resistance actions approached resistance activity as being what Guy

775 Sauter, op.cit.
776 Sauter, op.cit. ‘Puce’ also seems to have considered Morris to have been a collaborator- refuted by Marie-Josèphe Bonnet in her work Violette Morris, Histoire d’une scandaleuse (Paris, Perrin, 2011).
777 Sauter, op.cit.
778 Interview with Tony Larue, op.cit.
779 Interview with Claude Gricourt, op.cit.
780 Interview with Simone Fagot, ADSM AV09/167, 1984.
Cressent termed ‘une affaire de famille’. That is to say, they were in the Resistance because their husbands or other male relatives happened to be. This was often the case in rural parts. Guy Cressent’s mother Madeleine was an active resister, and according to Guy ‘at the heart of all the resistance activities, and well-informed about them’. Her role was largely to act as a support for her husband’s activities; she maintained the clothes that the airmen seeking shelter were obliged to wear, talked to the airmen in order to ascertain intelligence about them, such as where in either America or Britain they came from, and cooked for the family and for the airmen being sheltered. Yet she was more than just an auxiliary- in the 1983 interview with her husband, she speaks for almost as long as her husband, and if she was ‘the woman at the doorway’, she was also the equal of her male resister husband, a schoolteacher as politically active as her husband was, with views formed independently of the marital home, and she held the CVR in her own right. In the case of the Cressents, resistance appears to have been taken as a joint decision, with her political views clearly formed, and with herself very much responsible for her own agency- the decision to resist seems to have truly been a case of joint enterprise rather than something totally framed and conditioned by marriage and gender.

The case of Madeleine Cressent was slightly more isolated though in terms of agency. Amongst les diables noirs in Ry, it was the wives of the Boulanger brothers, Henriette and Augustine, who helped organise the complex operation of feeding a maquis of twenty men, almost all of whom were living underground in the daytime, and this maquis in itself required a network of five or six women in the local villages manipulating the ration coupons and obtaining food from neighbouring farms. They also helped to unravel the parachutes that

781 Author’s Interview with Guy Cressent, op.cit.
782 Ibid.
783 Ibid.
784 Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.; Collection Guy Cressent, Musée de la Résistance, Forges-les-Eaux (private archive).
785 Interview with Raoul Boulanger, op.cit.
were sent down to the *maquisards* from the Allies, a task that Raoul Boulanger referred to as ‘delicate and difficult’.\(^\text{786}\) This role of auxiliary to a male, military resistance was also present in the Pays de Caux, where Denise Lebras hid an airman for four months in 1944,\(^\text{787}\) and where four women also helped to provide material support for *Les Deux Léopards*- all four women were related to male resisters in the group- and equally in the town of Eu, near to the frontier with Picardy, where Andrée Beauvisage, the daughter of Edmond, provided domestic support to the activities of her father.\(^\text{788}\) But their roles were all defined by relation to the male resisters in their family circle. To use a gender terminology in film and literary studies, resistance in Upper Normandy more often than not failed the Bechdel test.\(^\text{789}\)

Even women who were nominally in a role of authority were liable to be subject to the influence of a male. Anne Derrien’s dissertation uncovers what she states to be the only instance of a female resister in a role of command within a resistance network. Suzanne Savale was the wife of Henri Savale, and in 1941, entered into contact with Césaire Levillain and Michel Corroy.\(^\text{790}\) The network, known as the *centre de Darnétal* was affiliated to Libération-Nord. She provided the supporting role mainly, and although she did participate in the running of the ‘centre’, it would seem that her role as a co-leader was defined purely by the fact that her husband had been hospitalised for part of this time, and that Levillain and Corroy saw her to some extent as Henri’s proxy.\(^\text{791}\) Even for a woman whose biography presents her as headstrong,\(^\text{792}\) it seems that her resistance activity was perceived in her role as

\(^{786}\) Interview with Raoul Boulanger, *op.cit.*  
\(^{787}\) Neveu, *op.cit.*, p.46.  
\(^{788}\) Interview with Edmonde & Andrée Beauvisage, ADSM AV09/173, 1984.  
\(^{789}\) Alison Bechdel, *Dykes to Watch Out for* (New York, Firebrand Books, 1986). The criteria in the test involve whether a work features at least two women, who in one scene talk to each other about something other than a male character.  
\(^{790}\) See chapter two.  
\(^{791}\) Derrien, *op.cit.*, p.61.  
\(^{792}\) Catherine Laboubée, *Suzanne Savale* (Rouen, éd. De la Rue, 2011).
“Madame Savale” rather than “Suzanne, résistante”- a perception confirmed in her obituary in 1952, which described her as ‘the ideal companion of a man devoted to public life’.793

Advancing a figure for how many resisters were female is difficult, as it revolves in large part around the debate about precisely what is a resister- a debate alluded to in the introduction to this thesis. Anne Derrien advances a statistic of around 10%.794 Michel Baldenweck, by contrast, puts it at just 5%.795 Though women made a considerable contribution to resistance activity, they were acting in a masculine-led and masculine-defined society, which the Resistance faithfully reflected. Some Communist resisters did engage in an attempt to advance women’s rights, and the meeting of the CDL for the Seine-Inférieure in April 1944 does show that the FN and their representatives were pushing for universal suffrage to include women.796 But women resisters existed in relation to their male comrades, and as such, their roles and resistance activities were often defined by the gendered organisation of French society.

We can observe here another parallel between the polis in ancient Greece and the structure of resistance. Raoul Lonis identified women as being members of the ‘second circle’ within the polis in ancient Greece- that is to say they played no political part in the life of the cité, but did have a certain amount of rights and participation- and that although they had no formal role in the defence of the cité, they did sometimes play an informal role in defence and in wartime.797 So likewise in resistance, women did play a role, but it was one that was never formally defined, rather it was conditioned, and in official resistance, women’s agency was something that denied, or at best, limited. Resistance challenged Vichy on many things and in many ways, but with the exception of elements of the Communists, there does

793 Cited in Derrien, op.cit., p.61.
794 Derrien, op.cit., p.72.
796 ADSM 54 W 276/8011, minutes of meeting of the CDL of the Seine-Inférieure, April 8, 1944.
797 Lonis, op.cit.
not seem to have been a conscious challenge to the Vichyite conception of the female condition.⁷⁹⁸

Yet how would resistance have functioned without their supporting role? In the view of Raoul Boulanger, a resister not noted for his progressive political tendencies, it would not have been as effective.⁷⁹⁹ In the case of the BOA, where Roger Cressent was by no means the only resister to draw upon such support from his wife, it might not have been realisable at all. Resistance covered a multitude of activities as well as a multitude of motivations, and women resisters played a multitude of roles. These included maintaining structures and activities that might have otherwise lapsed in the case of the housewives of the UFF, or distributing propaganda to an audience that male resisters might not have been able to reach, or liaising between groups. But they also involved roles outside of organised resistance, such as making clothes for those on the run, or forging papers, or even ensuring that maquisards and airmen had somewhere to sleep and something to eat (in the case of the Maquis de Barneville, the site was chosen because it was near to the farm where Albert Lacour’s sister lived, and she helped to provide food for the maquisards). Without these résistantes, these tasks would probably not have been as accomplished as well.⁸⁰⁰ Can one imagine a man in wartime society doing large quantities of shopping, ostensibly for a famille nombreuse, without arousing suspicion? Could a male resister, searched for by the ‘anti-terrorist’ police of the Vichy regime, have moved with as much ease as a female resister? Probably not. Les résistantes provided the practical glue that ensured the stability of the everyday for many of their male comrades, and the lubricant that facilitated the resistance activities that the Resistance would become best-known for.

⁷⁹⁸ See Diamond, op.cit., pp. 112-124.
⁷⁹⁹ Interview with Raoul Boulanger, op.cit.
⁸⁰⁰ Michel Croguennec, ‘Le Maquis de Barneville entre mythes et réalités’ in Feiertag (ed.), op.cit.
What the involvement of women resisters does show is a development in the role of the 
citoyenne. Prior to 1944, the citoyenne was an oxymoron, and even in Vichy’s constitutional 
project of January 1944, the role of women in French politics was formally gendered, and 
limited to a small range of issues (such as the family) which were considered to be a 
woman’s domain.\footnote{Reynolds, op.cit. See also Loi constitutionnelle du 30 janvier 1944, Vichy’s proposal for a constitution for the État français, which prescribed a role for women in politics- one limited to matters such as education and the family. The law was never promulgated.} The female political role under Vichy was not unlike that of the woman 
at the time of the ancient Athenian cité.\footnote{Nadine Bernard, Femmes et société dans la Grèce classique (Paris, Armand Colin, 2003).} Yet les résistantes did show that women could 
make a contribution to polis, and in a much wider range of ways than what Vichy’s National 
Revolution and Nazism’s Kinder, Kirche, Kürche foresaw.\footnote{Johann Chapoutot, La Loi du Sang : Penser et Agir en Nazi (Paris, Gallimard, 2014).} The Liberation brought with it 
women’s right to vote, and although social regulations still constrained the woman’s place in 
society after the war, female citizenship was now far more tangible after the war than what it 
had been before.\footnote{See Diamond, op.cit, pp.155-203, for a discussion of female roles within both politics and everyday life in France in the immediate post-war period.}

The role of women in resistance was therefore one usually governed by social 
condition, and regulated by the gendered norms of French society at that time, and therefore 
should be understood by taking into consideration the considerable constraints upon their 
individual capacity to resist. But the role of women and their importance to the functioning of 
resistance is not something that should be underestimated. Above all, if women were largely 
absent from the Resistance, women were important to the workings of resistance, and were 
discreetly present within resistance.
The Moral Economy of the Réfractaires?

Aiding resisters was but one part of female resisters and their actions- they were also involved in aiding and sheltering réfractaires, or those fleeing the STO in 1943-44. This also involved many of those who were implicated in the shelter of Allied airmen. Not everyone has seen rescue as worthy of recognition as resistance- Olivier Wieviorka’s Histoire de la Résistance is an example-805 and fleeing the STO did not automatically mean joining the Maquis, but the STO was another form of repression imposed by the Nazi occupier, as the economic impact that it had on France was ultimately punitive, depriving it of the most vital resource of manpower, which meant that rural Normandy was just as threatened by the relève as urban Normandy.

In grounding the causes of resistance within both the moral context of the Occupation (the threat posed to the sense of patriotism by permanent subjugation to Germany) and also the economic context (namely that the STO could never have fulfilled the exigencies of the German war effort, and so would have ultimately finished with the total destruction of the French economy by slowly depriving it of all manpower), and by looking at other forms of resistance both in France and outside of France, and both during and outside of the Second World War, the question of the moral economy is of a certain relevance. What many resisters were doing was, effectively, subverting the Nazi war effort by economic means.806 The more réfractaires came to the Eure, the less assistance that the Nazi war effort received. Moreover, food was provided and sold outside of the normal Vichy price regulations and rations- thereby indicating the existence of a ‘just price’ as opposed to the increasingly exorbitant prices that were being charged either by the regime or by black-marketers.807 As 1943 went on, it seems more and more as though the area around Saint-Georges-Vièvre was engaging in

806 For more detail about Guingouin and his maquis in the Limousin, see Grenard, op.cit.
807 Archive on the activities of the Maquis Surcouf, ADE 88 W 56.
small-scale resistance by trying to subvert slightly the economic power of Vichy and of the Nazi occupiers.

Like the peasant farmers cited in E.P. Thompson’s study of eighteenth-century England, or in James C. Scott’s study of twentieth-century Malaysia, the motivations for this moral economy were simply to protect the survival of their existence. After three years of occupation and rationing, which in itself followed a twenty-year demographic slump and the damage sustained by the war of 1914-1918, the French economy was in a parlous state, and was now having its most vital resources threatened by deportations and internments- namely manpower. The provision of an alternative for those wishing to flee the STO draft or the construction sites for what would become the V1 missiles was ultimately a form of economic resistance, and by keeping French workers in France, and away from Nazi Germany, was resisting the economic subjugation that Nazi Germany wished to impose upon occupied France. This was patriotism engaged at an everyday level, where the humanistic and the mythical crossed, complimented and coincided.

Likewise, André Gosse saw the réfractaires as being critical to the functioning of le Léopard, making up a large proportion of those who fought. Whilst Boulanger’s underground maquis in Ry was an attempt to hide as many réfractaires as possible- as much as it was an engagement to liberate France in its intentions, in its practices, it was a response to an acute situation in the local area. Moreover, it was Boulanger who showed the full extent of the moral economy of the réfractaires. As well as depriving the STO and the Nazi war machine of much-needed labour, to support a network that contained more than a dozen

---

809 Henri Amouroux’s *La Vie quotidienne des Français sous l’Occupation* (Paris, Fayard, 1961) shows the harsh realities of everyday economic struggle in wartime France, including on p.6 a table that shows the devaluation of the Franc throughout the war.
810 Gosse, op.cit., pp. 138-139.
811 Interview with Raoul Boulanger, op.cit.
men escaping the relève required considerable effort, means, and organisation.\footnote{812} Thus, the wives of the Boulanger brothers, Lucienne and Augustine, along with three or four other women, established a supply network providing food.\footnote{813} Boulanger himself liaised with other villages, in particular with secrétaires de mairie, to ensure a supply of false identity papers and extra rationing coupons.\footnote{814} Neighbouring farmers also provided help, and it was this obtaining of food at source in the countryside helped foster a rural culture of subversion- not only was there a nourishing of the réfractaires, but there was also the fact that this also denied the occupier rural produce to nourish themselves.\footnote{815} An economic system was required to support the réfractaires that was firmly outside of both the price controls of the Vichy regime, and the profiteering hyper-inflation of the black market, and was founded upon principles of kinship, of community entraide.\footnote{816}

The question of the réfractaires and the résistants, and how many of those fleeing the STO became resisters, is a question sometimes evoked. It is certainly true that most did not take up armed action- the research of Dany Lejeune in the Seine-Inférieure shows that only a minority actually became active resisters.\footnote{817} To a certain extent, the idea of young men flocking en masse to the hills and woods in order to become maquisards is one of the myths upon which the concept of résistancialisme is founded.\footnote{818} But whilst the idea of an armée des ombres composed fully of réfractaires is one that is at best an exaggeration when examined

\footnotesize{812 Interview with Raoul Boulanger, op.cit.}
\footnotesize{813 Written testimony of Mme Lucienne Boulanger (undated), Musée de la Résistance, Forges-les-Eaux (private archive).}
\footnotesize{814 Interview with Raoul Boulanger, op.cit.}
\footnotesize{815 Written testimony of Simone Sauter (AKA’Puce’), ADE 88 W 56.}
\footnotesize{816 Robert Leblanc and the Maquis Surcouf enforced this economic regulation rigourously, and punished those who profited from the black market or tried to take advantage of the Resistance, at one point fining a shopkeeper 4,000 Francs for such irregularities. ADE 88 W 56.}
\footnotesize{817 Dany Lejeune, Le STO en Seine-Inférieure (unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1975).}
\footnotesize{818 For a further discussion of the construction(s) of résistancialisme, see Laurent Douzou, La Résistance, une histoire périlleuse (Paris, Seuil, 2005).}
in terms of sheer numbers, the critique also rests upon the idea of réfraction and resistance being separate concepts.\textsuperscript{819}

Yet the contention here is that réfraction is itself resistance. Scott highlights as more common, and more successful, forms of resistance actions such as foot-dragging, shoddy work, and sabotage.\textsuperscript{820} The foundation of all economic systems lies within its resources- and the most basic of human resources is the workforce- only in the highest-skilled, most technologically-advanced economies can the workforce be marginalised or eliminated without a knock-on impact upon the exploitation of the natural resources or manufacturing. This was why the STO was necessary- it provided extra manpower, and thereby extra workforce- to sate the ever-expanding needs of the Nazi war economy. So by refusing to aid this Nazi war effort, and fleeing the relève, there was an individual act of resistance.

Whether other acts of resistance then followed is questionable- the research of Lejeune, and the fact that the Resistance was never more than a minority of the population, indicates that most did not become active maquisards.\textsuperscript{821} but the fact that the STO never achieved the targets set by it or requested of it suggests that nationwide, non-compliance was widespread. So even if a réfractaire did not then go on to perform sabotage or bear arms at the Liberation, their very refusal to take part consists, for this study, an act of resistance. The difference between these two categories of réfractaires can be encapsulated within the two concepts of Hirschmann that we examined in the previous chapter, namely ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, but both of these concepts can be identified as forms of non-compliance- opposites to the third form of behaviour identified by Hirschmann, ‘loyalty’.\textsuperscript{822} In fact, whereas in chapter two, we have distinguished between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, in this instance, ‘exit’ is a sort of ‘voice’, because both were intended to harm the Nazi war effort and the Vichy policy of

\textsuperscript{819} See Lejeune, \textit{op.cit.}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{820} Scott, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{821} Lejeune, \textit{op.cit.}, p.69.
\textsuperscript{822} Hirschman, \textit{op.cit.}
collaboration. Moreover, there was a tangible result of refusing to go and help the Nazis—
the ensuing limits that lack of manpower imposed upon the Nazi war effort impeded the
manufacture of weapons or of coastal defences against an Allied invasion.

Furthermore, to successfully achieve this form of resistance, it required, for those not
lucky enough to possess a medical certificate or to be in a reserved occupation, a certain
amount of guile, the means and the ability to make a living, and support. That support was
often provided, as we have seen, by resistance networks, particularly within the countryside.
So that made, in the increasingly polarised society of 1942-44, réfractaires into the role of
résistants par association. It was resistance networks that found them jobs as farm labourers,
or as mechanics, or in other lines of employment if they were not actually resisters directly. 823
So a new economy, one that possessed both legal illegitimacy and moral legitimacy, had to
be developed in support of the Resistance, by the Resistance, and by its indirect harm to the
Nazi war machine, represented a form of resistance.

This can be seen in the case studies of réfractaires in the Eure. In the first instance
René Gérard, a railwayman from Evreux, was officially designated as ‘skilled’ (he held a
Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnel in mechanics) and his skills and domestic situation
(young, in good health, of the age of majority and without children) drew him to the attention
of the Reichsbahn. 824 In September 1942, he was designated as having been requisitioned as a
“specialised worker” to work in Nazi Germany. The next day, he did not turn up for work,
providing a medical certificate stating that he had bronchitis. 825 He then requested a year’s
exemption, which the Vichy administration granted. This, however, did not satisfy the
Feldkommandantur, who sent him to see a doctor in Evreux, and from there, to the

823 Written testimony of Robert Leblanc, AN 72AJ/122.
Service du Travail Obligatoire dans l’Eure (unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 2003),
p.107.
825 Ibid.
dispensary of the city infirmary. Both the doctor and the nun administering the dispensary could see that he was not truly suffering from a severe pulmonary condition, but provided a forged radiography, and a report stating a catalogue of bronchial and cardiac complaints, which sufficed for the Feldkommandantur.826

This was not only enough to ensure that he avoided being sent to Germany, but was also enough that he was sent home to his family in Conches, no longer able to work for the SNCF (which was the reason for him being in Evreux).827 There, he found alternative employment as a lumberjack, which would have been the end of his difficulties, until a law of February 1943 widened eligibility to include unskilled workers.828 He received papers requisitioning his labour, and requesting that he be examined again. However, the doctor charged with examining him was Dr Mathieu, the family doctor who had initially provided him with a sick certificate for bronchitis, and so again, he was able to avoid going to Germany, thanks to the aid of Dr Mathieu and the unwitting assistance of a German doctor.829 His firm was requisitioned though to work on the air base at Conches, and it was in this form that he worked for the occupier for almost three months digging trenches.830

This then shows the first element of the moral economy- it went beyond manual labour, and also involved the complicity of the clerical professions, such as civil servants and doctors. Though they were not directly involved in operating it, unless they had contacts amongst the farmers in order to take some réfractaires- which was actually the case in Conches as we shall see- they played a key role in facilitating this moral economy and in negotiating some of the bureaucratic obstacles for those who were involved in making the moral economy function. A similar role could also have been played (although this thesis has

826 Oral testimony of René Gérard, op.cit., cited in Met, op.cit., p.108. The original reports were kept by M. Gérard in his personal archives, and were reproduced by Met in Annexe 10 of his dissertation.
827 Oral testimony of René Gérard, op.cit.
829 Met, op.cit., p.108.
830 Oral testimony of René Gérard, op.cit.
not uncovered any evidence of this happening) by work inspectors turning the proverbial blind eye to extra workers on farms- although in practice, such visits were rare.\footnote{Oral testimony of René Gérard, \textit{op.cit.}}

Then, in July 1943, the \textit{Feldkommandantur} decided to review all instances of exemption- out of sixty exemptions, over forty were cancelled, including René Gérard’s.\footnote{Met, \textit{op.cit.}, p.109.} The next day, along with 247 others, he was herded onto a train at Rouen, and sent to Paris. It was at St-Lazare station that he saw his chance to escape, which he did by striking up a conversation with a former colleague he knew who worked at the station. From there, he went to a nearby barber to change his hair, and went into clandestinity.\footnote{Oral testimony of René Gérard, \textit{op.cit.}} He returned briefly to Conches where he made contact with the town pharmacist, a Monsieur Dagiral, whom was rumoured to be in charge of a network responsible for organising placements for deserters.\footnote{Ibid.} He found a farm near to Conches, where he worked on the harvest, but after the harvest, worried about the risk of being denounced,\footnote{This was a very real risk, particularly amongst women whose sons were in Germany, and whom particularly resented \textit{réfractaires}. See Lejeune, \textit{op.cit.}, p.76.} fled to the department of Mayenne, where he spent the rest of the Occupation working as a farmhand, and after the Allied landings, aiding the Resistance with the administration of the railways and sending Allied troop trains towards Paris.\footnote{Oral testimony of René Gérard, \textit{op.cit.}} Here we can see that the moral economy of the \textit{réfractaires} was essentially an agrarian one- it was farmers and the countryside to where most fled, and upon whom there was also a demand for food via the black market to circumvent the regulations around rationing.

The Eure’s geography and topography made it more helpful for resisters trying to organise evasion from the STO. But the problem lay really for resisters in those who wanted to evade the STO, but not become a \textit{maquisard}. Their situation in some ways was something
of a halfway house—rejecting both the obedience of legality and the culture of being an outlaw— but even if they rejected life as a maquisard, then they certainly needed the help of resisters in order to make their new life feasible.\footnote{This problem was typified in the case of Fernand Février, a worker from St-Etienne-du-Rouvray in the Seine-Inférieure, and whom, like René Gérard, was hidden on a farm in the Eure, and paid five francs per day for twelve hours work each day. In October 1943, he was offered the possibility of becoming a maquisard by the farmer employing him, but declined. Interview with Fernand Févier, ADSM AV09/143, 1983.} The first issue was the problem of identity—police checks were regular amongst both French gendarmes and the Nazi Feldgendarmerie.

Réfractaires thus needed a new identity upon fleeing. This was provided by resisters from the same bases as the shelter of Allied airmen, and the false identities were often drawn from lists of people who had died or been reported missing—this drew upon the links of the resisters within the mairies.\footnote{Oral testimony of René Gérard, op.cit.. He was given the new identity of ‘René Gerboise’. See also Michel Boivin, Les réfractaires au travail obligatoire : essai d’approche globale et statistique in Jean Quellien et al. (ed.), La Main d’œuvre française exploitée par le IIIe Reich (Caen, Centre de Recherche d’Histoire Quantitative, 2003), pp. 493-515.} It was also preferable for resisters to keep a list of towns and mairies that had been bombed—they could then make cards for réfractaires saying that they belonged to these communes, and it would be impossible to carry out any double-referencing, as the records had been destroyed.\footnote{Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.} Following on from this was the problem of ration cards, which were also forged by resisters in the beginning.\footnote{Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.} However, the influx of réfractaires meant that this became unsustainable in itself from 1943 onwards—it was from this point onwards that groups such as Maquis Surcouf, Diables Noirs, and Maquis de Barneville turned their activities towards breaking into mairies—on 13-14 January 1943, no fewer than four mairies in the Eure were broken into during the course of one night.\footnote{La Dépêche Normande, January 15, 1943, ADE 101 J 18.} That the authors of such acts were rarely apprehended for these acts in themselves shows a certain connivance amongst the local population and police alike. Indeed, on occasion, it was the mayors themselves who staged the break-ins. George Filet of Gisay-le-Coudre was one example—\footnote{Papp, op.cit., p.194.}
over the course of his resistance in 1943-44, he stole almost 2,000 ration cards from his own mairie.\textsuperscript{842}

There then came the problem of placement- very often this was on farms, because this served several purposes. The first was the obvious issue of concealing- farms were more remote, and less susceptible to inspections du travail than factories.\textsuperscript{843} The second issue was that those who had gone left a gap to be filled. So a consequence of the phenomenon of the réfractaires was actually to protect the rural French economy from the damage that the STO would wreak upon it- and in return, gave the resistance groups that were fighting a maquis campaign a valuable source of food that was outside of the state-regulated food market.\textsuperscript{844} So a ‘hidden economy’ built up to serve this society that was clandestine et résistante. It was an economy of forgery, document manufacturing, prices set outside of Vichy’s controls, and a workforce regulated by resisters themselves. Housewives found themselves employed and engaged to carry out such activities, as were male secrétaires de mairie, for whom this was often the heart of their resistance activity, and farmers found themselves no longer working simply to meet the demands of the market and the authorities, all of which were subject to influences and pressures by and from both the collaborating state and the Nazi occupier. Everything about this, from its existence to its functioning to its subversion, was done in resistance to both occupier and collaborator.

When Thompson presented his concept of moral economy in a seminar at the London School of Economics in 1969, the critique raised against it was whether or not the moral economy was truly moral after all. The seminar convenor, F.J. Fisher, asked if it was simply self-interest that led the peasants of the eighteenth century to riot over grain prices.\textsuperscript{845}

similar question could be posed of the réfractaires. Was it not simply a desire to remain in
France rather than a desire to defeat Nazism that caused them to flee the relève?

Though this question is understandable, the parallels between Fisher’s critique of
eighteenth-century peasantry and suspicions of the ulterior motives of the réfractaires are
limited, and perhaps also a little inexact. The French economy was in dire straits indeed in
1942-44 - the French franc was becoming worth less and less, workers wages were rapidly
losing their purchase power, unemployment was a major issue, and food rationing and other
material conditions becoming harsher. In contrast, as Tony Judt has argued, living
conditions in Germany did not deteriorate until very late in the war. The Office du Travail
promoted working in Germany as a way of re-launching the French economy, of providing
much-needed revenue to ordinary French households. From a perspective of naked self-
interest, even avarice, the more remunerative option was that of taking the offer and giving in
to the lure of the Reichsmark- even if once in the Reich, the reality did not match the
advertising.

As for the understandable emotion of wanting to stay in France, and not wanting to
live in a country that quite besides being the traditionally perceived enemy, was also a way of
life, a language and a culture that was alien to most French people, there needs to be a caveat
added that is especially pertinent to the regional history of the war in Upper Normandy. The
STO did not automatically equate to working in Germany, despite both popular perceptions
and the propaganda of both Vichy and the Resistance. From 1942 and 1943, the Nazi
occupier began to construct coastal defences against Allied attacks, which as the daring raid
on St-Nazaire showed, were no longer confined to the Channel ports, but the ports of the
Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay. Furthermore, 1943 saw work begin in earnest upon the V1

846 See Amouroux, op.cit., p.6.
848 Rossignol, op.cit.
missile sites, which were heavily concentrated upon the Seine-Inférieure. The supply of slave labour from the Todt Organisation could not meet demands, so the consequence was that most requis in Seine-Inférieure, particularly in the north of the department, carried out their service in the department- they never left Normandy, even less so France. So the critique of réfractaires simply wanting to remain within their home country is slightly negated by this local factor.

Therefore, fleeing the STO was no easy option, and involved a certain amount of sacrifice, one that even some committed resisters, such as Pierre Jouvin, did not feel able to carry out in 1943. Self-interest may have come into the equation in the sense that Germanophobia was an important factor, but that did not equate to financial gain. In a society with war as its defining characteristic, resistance was not purely an armed struggle- when the war and the fight against Nazi Germany permeated all aspects of society, resistance had to be performed in all domains of society. This was resistance not as armed conflict, or propaganda, or targeting military installations, or the collation of intelligence- this was ordinary French people using the time-honoured tradition of système D as a form of resistance, often because it was the only form of resistance open to them, the only way by which they could oppose occupation and collaboration, and the only way by which their capacity to resist could function and be manifested.

If the culture of the outlaw is one often perceived via the prism of violence, then this shows an outlaw culture that was well-developed at a very small scale, only perceptible at the micro-level, and which was often built upon non-violence (although violence was sometimes

852 Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit. He only joined the Maquis in early 1944 (in the Oise), when his mother Yvonne sent a message saying that she had found a Maquis for him
a necessary part of *maquisard* life).\(^854\) This also shows us about the potential for banditry to be non-violent, and that whilst many of the case studies examined by Eric Hobsbawm did involve a mixture of both social conscience and violence (hence Hobsbawm’s term of ‘social crime’),\(^855\) life as an outlaw, on the fringes of both society and legal norms need not automatically entail violent crime. This was especially the case whereby the consent and aid of the local population, outside of the organised Resistance, was necessary to the continued success of such banditry.

Above all, it was the fusion of both a struggle for the future of France as a nation and a struggle for human dignity. Just as clandestine newspapers and the discussions for *l’après-Vichy* represented a form of resistance in the war of ideas, and violent action represented a form of resistance within warfare, then the moral economy of the *réfractaires* represents an engagement in economic combat, challenging and undermining the governance of the Vichy regime and the war economy of the Nazi occupier - a resistance within a world of total war. This was resistance as an expression of individual refusal and individual non-compliance with the regimes of occupation and collaboration, and resistance that helped the bigger and greater struggle against Nazi Germany and Vichy France by undermining the strength of the Nazi war machine, and undermining the competence of Vichy as an administration.

**The Kindness of Strangers? Humanist resistance and rescue**

Aglan’s final category of *sauveteurs* rests purely on those who were engaged in acts of humanism concerned entirely with the present.\(^856\) These acts were not directly concentrated against the enemy, but aimed at helping those targeted by collaborator and occupier alike.

This has led to some historians, such as Olivier Wieviorka, to omit these resisters or this form

---

\(^854\) Boulanger, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was strongly opposed to violent attacks upon the occupier, and so was Robert Leblanc until D-Day. Written testimony of Leblanc, AN72AJ/122.


of resistance from their analyses, but considering the risks involved, such as arrest or deportation, it is felt here worthy of considering them as part of resistance.

Very often, these acts were small-scale. Often, they served as a form of entry into resistance, before going onto more organised acts. Claude Gricourt was not recruited into the Léopard network until 1943, but said that from 1941 onwards, he had been providing false certificates of baptism for Jews. Roger Cressent used his role as a secrétaire de mairie to provide forged papers from that time onwards, and that had been his sole resistance activity until the formation of the BOA. Equally, we have already seen that this was the entry into resistance for Henri Savale and Michel Corroy into what would become the Darnétal cell, a part of Libération-Nord.

However, there were others for whom this was their only form of resistance, and who did not wish at all to be a part of the militarised structure of resistance. These acts had roots which were spontaneous, and remained so even if being done at the service of an organisation or network that had much wider and much larger activities than what was being undertaken on the face of it.

The village of Bézancourt lies on the very eastern fringe of the Seine-Inférieure, bordering the Oise department in the Picardy region. It is not obviously on the main road to anywhere major, and has a population of only around 200 people. It was only in the 1990s that an extraordinary story became known. Elisabeth Besnard was a teacher living in Bézancourt. She had never married, and led a seemingly anonymous life. Somehow though, it seems that she had been in contact with a Protestant pastor called Paul Vergara, who lived and preached in the Ile-de-France region. He was also a leading member in a network that

857 Wieviorka, Histoire de la Résistance....
858 Interview with Claude Gricourt, op.cit.
859 Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit.
860 See Chapter two, and above.
aimed to provide shelter for Jewish children from the Paris region in villages outside of Paris. Between the end of 1942 and 1945, she sheltered five refugee children. One of them, Denise Vartin, recalls seeing Pastor Vergara occasionally, but also recalls being brought up under the Occupation as Catholic.\textsuperscript{862} They led lives which were like those of the other children in the village, which included catechism on Thursday and Mass on Sunday. They went to the village school, but were also taught by Mlle Besnard, who made them read aloud each day, before hiding them in an upstairs room, because for a short time in the autumn and winter of 1943-44, the house was also requisitioned as a billet for the Wehrmacht.\textsuperscript{863} It was in many ways a typical rural French upbringing; the combination of republican schooling and religious upbringing. They remained in Bézancourt after the Liberation, but were collected by their father after the war ended, and they never returned to Bézancourt again.\textsuperscript{864} For her family, it was considered a brief interlude. Mlle Besnard’s story was only discovered in the mid 1990s, and in 1997, she was posthumously awarded the title of Righteous Amongst the Nations. No surviving member of her family was there to collect the award.\textsuperscript{865}

In this instance, it is easy to see how Elisabeth Besnard could disappear into (and even beyond) the margins of history. An elderly woman was not the ‘ideal-type’ of a resister that fitted in with the national meta-narrative that was quickly being constructed in the post-war period. She never married nor had children. Moreover, Denise’s father considered the Occupation an episode that belonged in the past, and was not to be evoked.\textsuperscript{866} She herself, along with a sister, emigrated to Israel in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{867} Like much of resistance history, it

\textsuperscript{862} Interview with Denise Vartin, featured in Marc Epstein, ‘Le long chemin des enfants cachés’ in \textit{L’Express}, February 27, 2008.
\textsuperscript{863} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{864} Interview with Denise Vartin, \textit{op.cit}.
\textsuperscript{865} \url{http://www.ajpn.org/juste-elisabeth-Besnard-244.html} (Consulted November 23, 2015).
\textsuperscript{866} Interview with Denise Vartin, \textit{op.cit}.
\textsuperscript{867} Ibid.
rested upon diffusion and dissemination- if there was no-one to do either, then history and memory omitted these episodes.

Elisabeth Besnard’s entry into resistance appears to not have been spontaneous as such (it seems that she was solicited by Pastor Vergara), but there were instances of more spontaneous acts of sheltering. Edouard and Joséphine Vain of Sotteville both hid two boys who fled to them from their neighbour when the police came to search for their mother. Their mother was arrested, but the police did not search other houses for the children. Their forenames were changed- ‘Isaak’ became ‘Jacques’- and new identities were created for them via the aide of resisters- but the decision by Monsieur and Madame Vain to take them in was done spontaneously. In their case, the adoption became permanent- their mother perished in Auschwitz- though after the war, they maintained their ‘French’ forenames but reverted back to their original surname of Mizrahi.

Sometimes, the decision to shelter was actually taken as an opportunity to intensify resistance engagement. Louis and Marguerite Grenouillet lived in the Eure in the commune of Saint-Georges-Motel, whose population was only 380, but where the chateau was requisitioned by the Luftwaffe for the duration of the war, even welcoming, on occasion, Hermann Goering. Louis Grenouillet had been a mechanic, but not wanting to be in a position where he could do anything to aid the Nazi war effort, he left his job and took work as a lumberjack. The permanent presence of the Nazi occupier made active resistance dangerous, and Grenouillet’s resistance action was further limited by his age- born in 1885, he was already fifty-five by the time France fell in 1940. In 1943 though, he and his wife

---

868 Lecouturier, op.cit., p.178.
were approached to look after a young boy whose parents had been arrested and deported, and had been hidden in various locations across northern France.\textsuperscript{872} Despite the constant presence of the occupier, Grenouillet agreed, and the boy, Simon, was hidden in the house, although attending the village school as normal, through to the end of the war.\textsuperscript{873}

Not all rescue and assistance was carried out in response to Vichy’s role in what would become known as ‘The Final Solution’. It was sometimes carried out in relation to resistance itself. Simone Fagot recalled hiding, of her own initiative, a deserter from the Wehrmacht- not, as she stressed, Rudolf Pfandhauser, the Austrian who became a maquisard, whom we have seen in chapter one, but another Austrian altogether.\textsuperscript{874} Other Catholic priests hid resisters as well as réfractaires and airmen- Joseph Kérébel of Montville was viscerally anti-Communist, but by dint of the fact that he hated “les Boches” even more, aided the Front National in the Cailly valley.\textsuperscript{875} He accommodated Paul Le Goupil, a Communist teacher, in 1942, as well as recruiting members of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC) in the area. Kérébel knew that his role was not one that easily leant itself to resisting, but realised that sheltering resisters was the best way for him to resist the occupier, even if their own politics were rather different to his own. In both of these instances, the acts of resistance were spontaneous- Kérébel had been expecting Le Goupil in mid-September, only for him to arrive in July- and motivated by what may well have been patriotism, but had undeniably a hint of humanism informing the action that was carried out.\textsuperscript{876}

This was not totally a contradiction in itself- humanism being seen as one of the defining traits of the French Republic, and a reference to France having been the home of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. It was another strand amongst the tapestry of resistance

\textsuperscript{872} http://www.yadvashem-france.org/les-justes-parmi-les-nations/les-justes-de-france/dossier-12511/ , op.cit.,
\textsuperscript{873} http://www.ajpn.org/juste-Louis-Grenouillet-3727.html , op.cit.
\textsuperscript{874} Interview with Simone Fagot, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{875} Cauchois, op.cit., p.95.
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid, pp. 97-109.
against the anti-republicanism of Vichy and the anti-humanism of Nazism. This strand operated on the fringes of, if not totally outside, the organised Resistance, and was a sudden manifestation of a desire to resist and combat the enemy, even in the smallest and most miniscule way.\textsuperscript{877} Again, this was resistance designed to help those resisting Nazism and Vichy, but also those who were being persecuted by these regimes, even if they themselves were not active combatants. Finally, this was resistance as an expression of the humanist challenge to Nazism, a defence of mankind against what they held to be an ideology that was profoundly anti-human.\textsuperscript{878}

**A Civil Resistance? Categorising Non-Violent Resistance**

The shelter of those fleeing the persecution of the Jews was also an example of what Jacques Sémelin meant when he made the important distinction between different kinds of \textit{résistance civile}. In his 1989 work \textit{Sans armes face à Hitler}, Sémelin distinguished between civil resistance that was actually designed to help and further military objectives, and civil resistance that was designed not to facilitate military objectives at all, but was conceived of from a purely peaceful perspective as defiance of an oppressive regime.\textsuperscript{879}

The shelter of the Jews fits this latter kind of \textit{résistance civile}, which was what Sémelin primarily dedicated his work to. However, not all of this auxiliary resistance in this chapter falls into that category. The role of women in organised resistance largely fell into the former category of civil resistance facilitating military objectives, because even those who simply hid resisters temporarily knew that if the resisters evaded arrest for long enough, they would be able to bear arms against the Nazis. Whilst the assistance given to Allied airmen also falls into that category, even if the intentions were sometimes humanistic rather than

\textsuperscript{877} Jean Quellien used the term ‘\textit{le périmètre de la Résistance}’ to talk about such resisters. ‘Comment écrire l’Histoire de la Résistance ?’, round table at Université de Rouen, December 9, 2015.

\textsuperscript{878} Kedward, \textit{Resistance in Vichy France}…, p.23.

military, and in some cases, where there appears to have been no actual attempt to help the airmen to be repatriated, such as the case of Denise Legras, one could categorise it as purely the peaceful, non-violent resistance which is the object of study for Sémelin’s theory of non-violent resistance. Equally, much of the early female Communist resistance, such as the protests organised by Yvonne Jouvin in 1941-42, was genuinely intended to be non-violent- it was designed to be a protest over the conditions of working-class women in occupied France. Only after she fled into clandestinity and then passed into the maquis in 1943-44 did her action become more military-orientated. In the case of Suzanne Savale, whose resistance consisted largely of forging identity cards, the same activity could serve both forms of résistance civile.

Robert Gildea evokes a divide between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘organised’ resistance, which also leads him to talk about a ‘pénombre de la Résistance’.880 Yet in the instance of non-violent resistance, this divide does not work fully. Organised resistance could be (although rarely was) purely non-violent in the sense of Sémelin’s paradigm. Equally, so-called ‘spontaneous’ resistance, though usually totally peaceful, could aid a military objective. In truth, forms of resistance were of a spectrum rather than a binary, one where the penumbra could well and truly exist when acts of resistance spanned across divides.

The object of Sémelin’s work was to formulate a theory of non-violent resistance and apply it to one of the most violent periods of the 20th century in Europe.881 To that end, he was less interested by résistance civile that aided a military (and thereby violent) objective, and did not include this kind of resistance in his study.882 The auxiliary resistance studied in this chapter may well have been a form of resistance that owed far more to the civil than to the military, but it spanned across both kinds of résistance civile as defined by Sémelin, and

881 Sémelin, op.cit.,
882 Ibid, p.44.
across both conceptions of resistance as imagined by Gildea. It was not directly violent, but only a part of this auxiliary resistance could be categorised as being totally non-violent, whilst auxiliary resistance could be both spontaneous, as in the case of Edouard & Joséphine Vain, and yet highly organised, as in the case of the BOA organised by Roger Cressent. Its common denominator, as the categorisation advanced here in this chapter suggests, was that it was intended to facilitate resistance, whether it be the military struggle against Nazism, or the survival of individuals whom were being persecuted by the agents of Nazi and Vichyite ideology.

**Le Masculin-Féminin? Interpreting gender within resistance**

What is worthy of note about these acts is that they involved both men and women, but were, in the cases of both sexes, the auxiliary roles that in Kedward’s analysis had often been assigned to women. This is where gender becomes crucial, particularly when men are performing roles that could be seen as ‘non-masculine’ in terms of resistance action, and where intersectionality, or the crossing of a series of different determining factors, becomes relevant to the analysis.  

The men in this chapter were often of a particular kind of class and structure- not wealthy and middle-class, but occupying jobs that required a level of education. They were sometimes too old to fight- in the Eure, in the area of the Plateau du Neubourg, one resister was born in 1868 or in professions that would have meant that were sometimes exempt from being conscripted, such as teaching or the priesthood. They did not always possess the greatest of cultural and social capital, either because of lack of education or lack of opportunity, in remote, rural areas. So to some extent, these were men who were willing to

---

884 ADE 88 W 26. Levillain and Grenouillet were both born in 1885, so would also have been too old to have been conscripted into the army.
engage in the resistance struggle, but who were sometimes to one side in both the political and the military resistance, which did not always sit well with the masculine ideal-type that emerged at and after the Liberation. Yet these men were better remembered as resisters- both Claude Gricourt and Roger Cressent experienced no trouble in gaining official post-war recognition, from both France and the United Kingdom in the case of the latter. Moreover, these men were often the people who led resistance networks, even when the purpose was auxiliary and not at all military, and could also have fitted in with Sémelin’s paradigm of résistance civile. This reflects the gender politics in many other domains at this time- in the docking industry in France for example, the roles of the office workers were usually carried out by men who were considered too old and too ill for manual work, rather than women, as the docks were not considered a working environment for a woman.

Therefore, we can use the intersectionality of gender, profession and age to see a hierarchisation of resisters, a social organisation that was based on the relations between masculine and feminine, but that was more than just a simple binary. Whereas the male resisters of chapter three were part of the image that gave France back a sense of masculinised self-identity, and the male resisters of chapter two prepared the après-Vichy and assumed the mantle of future leadership, the male resisters in this chapter were in ‘weaker masculinities’, affected by age and by social function. For example, no-one could reconcile the image of the virile masculine warrior with the image of the priest in an environment that mixed particularly with women parishioners and which was defined by the vow of celibacy- the very antithesis of virility.

885 Documents at the Musée de la Résistance, Forges-les-Eaux, Collection Guy Cressent (private archive). Shown to the author in interview with Guy Cressent, op.cit.
887 See also chapter three, and the theory of ‘remasculisation’.
Meanwhile, those resisters who were female were characterised by their sex and obliged to follow a gendered role— their role as resisters very often mirrored the roles that were expected of women in society more generally at this time. Yet in taking on responsibilities within resistance, as was the case with resisters such as Suzanne Savale and Yvonne Jouvin, women were acting in roles that went beyond what was seen as socially acceptable for women, and beyond the role typically expected of women at that time, demonstrating, by contrast, ‘strong femininities’, that is to say greater agency than most French women at this time.

It is also worth noting that their very engagement in resistance was seen as particularly transgressive by Vichy, and singled out for particular punishment. An examination of the photographs of female resisters who had been arrested (and who in some cases would be deported and defined as Nacht und Nebel, the Nazi term for their political prisoners) had their hair cut short, and were reduced to a very unfeminine look—a treatment that would be a precursor to the punishment handed out at the Liberation to those women who were judged to have collaborated with Germans ‘horizontally’.\(^{888}\) It is also worth noting that of the women who survived deportation, very few were able to bear children after returning from the camps—the conditions of their detention had caused irreparable damage to their menstrual cycles.\(^{889}\) In daring to challenge what was expected of them, and to demand a greater place in society than what Vichy had wanted to condition for them, we can see the cases of those deported as Nacht und Nebel as being indicative of ‘strong femininities’ challenging traditional gendered roles of French womanhood at this time. We can also see that these résistantes encountered repression that was particularly cruel and degrading, and that a challenge to gendered norms by women was also a challenge to the National

---

\(^{888}\) Derrien, *op.cit*, pp. 115-129 contains photographs of imprisoned résistantes and their prison mugshots.  
\(^{889}\) Ibid.
Revolution and a challenge to the ideological order and assumptions of National Socialism, and therefore a challenge that had to be stamped out.

If masculinity was key to the traditional vision of resisting, then this traditional idea would not have been possible without those in weaker masculine or in feminine roles who facilitated resistance activity. Resistance was heavily gendered, just as French society at large was at this time. However, gender also permits us to see that there was more than a simple binary of *masculin-féminin*, but that in fact gender within resistance was nuanced by an intersectionality of factors, such as age, location, professional situation and political beliefs.

The consequence of these nuances was a variety of masculinities and femininities, which affected both social condition, and in turn, the capacity to resist. Where gender acted as an enhancer, as in the case of the hegemonic masculinity seen in chapter three, it allowed for a greater capacity to resist; where it had an inhibiting effect, as seen in this chapter, it often constrained and conditioned this agency, forcing many of the resisters as seen in this chapter into resisting in a different manner to the resisters seen in the previous three chapters.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that resistance in Upper Normandy was much broader than the idea of an organised, male and militaristic organism of networks and groups. Though there was a *résistance-organisation*, there were many different forms of resisting, across many walks of life. This is where the *résistance-mouvement* becomes important, implanted within French society at large. Indeed, not all of these resisters were classified as such by the state when it came to the distribution of the CVR, the official recognition of a resister in the immediate

---

890 Marcot has even gone as far to use the term *résistance-mouvement social*, in order to stress the social dimension. See Marcot, “Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance?” in *Le Débat* (No. 177, 2013/5), pp. 173-187.
post-war period. So this chapter shows that understanding resistance in 1940-1944 requires going beyond the military and the *dossier d’homologation*, and towards the everyday and the individual testimony.

This chapter has also shown that resistance, and in particular the idea of auxiliary resistance, was something that went beyond the idea of direct combat and challenge, and expanded far from the domain of the military- it seeped into the social, the economic, and the everyday. It was not simply about fighting, it was also about surviving, and helping others to survive, in order to thwart the ambitions of both Nazi Germany and the Vichy regime.

This chapter shows that auxiliary resistance, as we have outlined it here, cannot be simply conceived as either ‘violent’ or ‘non-violent’, or as ‘spontaneous’ or ‘organised’. It spanned across all of these explanations and conceptualisations of resistance, and across and beyond the range of politicisations of resistance as identified by Henri Michel. It was resistance designed to help the challenge and contestation of Nazism and Vichyism, and oppose the oppression of these regimes, shaped by the limitations imposed by societal factors upon individuals and their capacity to resist.

Finally, if the capacity to resist played a key role in defining the resistance of resisters, then a limited or constrained agency, which was the case for many of the resisters here, did not automatically result in not resisting, as the variety of ways of resistance shown in this chapter shows. Although unable or unwilling to engage in resistance like that outlined in the first three chapters, these resisters still found a way to manifest their refusal of both occupation and collaboration, and helped others to find a way too. If not necessarily part of organised resistance, then by their acts of resistance, and their contributions towards those operating within the Resistance, they supported the cause of resistance, and worked for the

---

891 Correspondence with granddaughter of Yvonne Jouvin, Catherine Vorganger, December 10, 2015. In the case of Yvonne Jouvin, she was not accorded the CVR until she was aged 75, in 1982.
polis, and the cause of the polis. As such, their resistance was a form of expression politics, expressing their refusal of both Nazism and Vichy, and their resistance a political engagement, designed to help the polis.
Conclusion

The liberation of Upper Normandy came in late August and early September of 1944, except for Le Havre, where it was not until the German military surrender on September 12, after ferocious bombing by the Allies. In many ways, the liberation of Le Havre represented the problem for evaluating the impact of the Resistance, either at a regional or a national level. In Le Havre, the role of the Resistance was limited to a few combats in the suburbs, and the clearing of some Wehrmacht positions, as well as liberating the hôtel de ville at Sanvic.893

This, though, is a facile way of evaluating resistance. Rab Bennett demonstrates this by stating that although Eisenhower famously claimed that the Resistance had been worth fifteen army divisions, and had shortened the war by two months, there was also a need to evaluate the contribution of resistance from a view of moral worth as well as strategic worth.894 Resistance needed to be considered from a perspective that was broader than just a consideration of the military situation.

This is what this thesis has aimed to do throughout all four chapters. Rather than look at resistance from a purely organisational and military perspective, the thesis, unlike previous analyses of resistance in Upper Normandy, has tried to frame resistance within a broader context, considering factors such as class, gender, politics, education, location, and age. Instead of analysing “the Resistance”, a purely military and organisational concept, the thesis has chosen to analyse “resistance”, a social concept situated at the intersectionality of many different societal factors. These factors shaped the nature of resistance in Upper Normandy, and ensured that it was an engagement that went far deeper than a simple militaristic activity-resistance was not an activity in Upper Normandy, but a way of life, even for those who never went into clandestinity.

In order to re-discover the lived experience of what was resistance, this thesis has attempted to be a ‘history from below’. This has been done by looking at the testimonies of individual resisters primarily, either spoken or written, and these show that patriotism, though an important part of resistance history, was not the sum of resistance in Upper Normandy, and on its own, too facile an explanation for resistance. Rather, there were a whole range of other ideologies and influences that also have to be considered, such as humanism, republicanism, and Communism. As such, resistance as a behaviour was much more heterogenous than the Resistance as an organisation, and this analysis allows for a greater diversity of attitudes, and for the collective agent of ‘the Resistance’ to come apart, as well as the great diversity of perspectives that resistance testimonies shine a light upon to come through. Resistance as a behaviour differs from the Resistance as an organisation because in large part, the voices that tell it are wider and more varied than the ‘resistance aristocrats’ that we identified in chapter two as key to the shaping of much traditional resistance historiography.

If resistance was composed of a variety of different motivations, then how it was carried out was also varied and numerous. The intersectionality of factors cited above has been shown to be important precisely because it impacted directly upon the history of resistance, both as it happened at the time, and as it came to be written and portrayed after the war. Social and societal factors clearly shaped the agency of individual resisters and their ‘capacity to resist’. Resistance as such should not therefore be interpreted through the narrow parameters of ideology or organisation, but by action, and the factors that shaped these actions. This is the biggest difference that can be seen between an analysis of “the French Resistance” and an analysis of “resistance in France”, or what François Marcot would term as the difference between résistance-organisation and résistance-mouvement. The former analyses resistance by formal groupings and organisations, agendas determined by the

895 Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance?’, op.cit.
ideologies of leaders- indicative, one could say, of Thomas Carlyle’s ‘Great Man theory’. The latter analyses resistance by the actions and sentiments of individual resisters, and the factors that shaped these actions and sentiments- an analysis that owes far more to history from below, especially when this analysis looks at those resisters who have usually been excluded or marginalised within the resistance narrative. It was via these factors that resistance in Upper Normandy manifested itself, and the actions that resistance involved were numerous, and ranged from the violent to the critical and eventually actions that were only acts of resistance indirectly, such as fleeing the STO or sheltering Jewish children.

But by using the concept of the cité, or polis, throughout this thesis, resistance has been interpreted differently to either of the concepts evoked by Marcot in 2013, whether it be l’organisation or le mouvement social. Copeau himself talked about resistance as ‘la cité clandestine de l’honneur’. La cité or polis, is usually translated into English as ‘city-state’, yet Raoul Lonis states that above all, and before anything else, it was a group of citizens, which then inhabited a territory, and which was an independent and sovereign political entity. The thesis has shown, especially in chapters three and four, how the inner workings of resistance often reflected functions analogous to an ancient Greek polis, so what this thesis wishes to suggest is to go beyond the models advanced by Wieviorka and Marcot, and formulate the idea of a résistance-cité. Though there were different strands, actions and objectives within resistance, resistance was still conceived as a singular entity- the testimonies examined here show that resistance was conceived of as la résistance rather than les résistances. Though they may have often been working in isolation, resisters felt part of something much larger. This meets the first characteristic of a polis.

---

896 See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (London, James Fraser, 1841) for how Carlyle uses this theory to write history.
897 Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance ?’, op.cit.
898 Copeau, op.cit., p.953.
899 Lonis, op.cit., pp.7-8.
The second characteristic is met by dint of the fact that resisters, by and large, operated within their own locality. One of the specificities of resistance in Upper Normandy, as opposed to much of the resistance in the southern zone, especially in the period 1943-1944, is that resisters were usually based in their own areas, only regrouping when it came to carrying out their activities, before then going their separate ways and back home again. So resistance was locally implanted, and sometimes, it was implanted at a micro-level. Yet there was also another territory that resistance made their own - la clandestinité. The clandestine nature of resistance meant that they were operating outside of the structures of Vichyite legality at that time. This meant that they had to construct their own rhetoric, their own vision, and their own structures - in short, they had to construct their own world and society in parallel to the Vichyite and Nazi-occupied society within which they lived. So there was a clearly defined territory to the résistance-cité in Upper Normandy at this time. It was la Normandie clandestine, a territory that was designed in parallel to the occupied territory in which they lived, with the eventual aim and hope that the structures of this hidden world could be replicated, in some sort of way, in the post-liberated world that they would inherit upon victory. Though they also went about everyday activities, the clandestine newspapers, the committee discussions, and the hideouts and small resistance cells meeting behind closed doors testify that for resisters, la clandestinité was very much a ‘lived space’, and therefore conforming to Raffestin’s definition of a territory. The understanding of resistance requires the understanding of this territory, which this thesis, by using the paradigm of ‘history from below’, has demonstrated the functioning of resistance as this secret world.

---

900 See Kedward, In Search of the Maquis..., for an examination of resistance activity amongst the maquisards in the southern zone at this time.
902 Raffestin, op.cit.
The third and final characteristic is that of resistance as an independent and sovereign political entity. Above all, resistance aimed to defeat the Nazi occupier, and with it the collaborationism of Vichy. This involved refusing all forms of individual, collective, economic, political, cultural and social subjugation. We have seen that the activities of resistance, such as undermining the STO, or protesting against poor living conditions, or contesting the military and political power of the enemy either by acts of sabotage or by propaganda, could be classified as the assertion of their right to be independent and sovereign, not just as resisters, but as French citizens. Resistance, in that sense, was about refusing oppression and subjugation by the means that they judged available to them—thereby manifesting their independence as a force from both National Socialism and Vichyism, in line with the criteria of resistance outlined by Kedward in 2015 which we cited in the introduction to this thesis. This nature of resistance thereby meets the third characteristic of a polis.

The cumulative effect of using résistance-cité as a concept is to show that although patriotism was an element of resistance, as a whole, resistance was about polis, not patrís or patria. The understanding of resistance as polis means that in order to write its history, it has to be written as a political history. But this is political history as understanding of the polis, not as the story of political parties and politicians. This is politics situated at the intersection of a variety of social factors. Resistance should be understood as a political history because resistance, by its very nature, was an inherently political act—it was action taken for the good of society, for the public interest, for the polis.

The idea of the résistance-cité also shows also the dynamics of the relationships between individual resisters and the larger body of both la résistance and French society. In the first chapter, we have seen resisters attempting to revolutionise France, and wanting the
polis to be revolutionary, whilst in the second, we have seen resisters wanting the polis to forge itself and be forged more gradually, and to be more carefully prepared, thereby avoiding widespread bloodshed. These two chapters oppose the instinctive convictions and the dispossessed nature of the ‘resistance subalterns’ with the more methodical approach and the social advantages of the ‘resistance aristocrats’. Then, the idea of patriotic resistance in chapter three shows a form of service onto the cité, of proving admissibility and belonging to France as a country, whether that was France as a republic or France as a nation, whilst chapter four shows resistance action that put the emphasis less upon service, and more upon aid, this in part being because the ‘auxiliary resistance’ examined in chapter four had a different capacity to resist to those resisters in chapter three. As such, these stances within resistance did not correspond exactly to a Gaullist-Communist-Social Democrat trinity, or the categories outlined in the seven chapter headings of Henri Michel’s analysis of courants de pensée, but instead, they divided into four traits: revolutionaries; gradualists; service; and auxiliaries.

Political action though can be divided into two forms. On the one hand, there was the desire to change society, split between the revolutionary approach to resistance, typified by Communists, outlined in chapter one, and a gradualist approach to resistance, typified by more moderate left-wing resisters, whom we have examined in chapter two. This was resistance concentrating on politics in order to seize power and shape society, either to revolutionise the polis, in the case of the resisters examined in chapter one, or to merely reform it and slowly forge the polis of the future in the case of the resisters in chapter two. This can broadly be qualified as institutional politics, as per the analysis of Moses Finley, or what we called in the introduction the politicised political.

---

905 Finley, op.cit.
Yet if we are saying that all resistance is political, it must also be said that not all resistance was concerned with power or with changing society. This leads us to examine expression politics, which is political action simply intended to achieve an ideological goal and express a sentiment of belief, or what could also be termed as the personalised political - the statement of the beliefs of the individual resister. Our analysis in chapter three has shown that it is more accurate to talk about patriotisms in the plural than patriotism as a singular, essentialist concept. Yet what these patriotisms had in common was about proving belonging to France. Beyond restoring sovereignty to France, their primary conception of France was about serving the polis and restoring a sense of its pride and honour, as well as their own self-worth - an expression of identity. Whilst the resisters examined in chapter four were equally indicative of a wide range of motivations and ways of resisting, but what they had in common was that their resistance was an expression of their refusal of both collaboration and occupation, in spite of their restrained capacity to resist - the expression of the sentiment of indignation that Stéphane Hessel identified in his later work as being key to resistance.\(^{906}\) So resistance spanned across two political domains - the exercise of power and the expression of belief and ideology. This explains the breadth of resistance which we have seen in this thesis, spanning across (and perhaps beyond) the political spectrum.

In the introduction, we posed a problem - the political history of the French Resistance and its politics had been much written about and charted, but the political history of resistance in France still remained to be explored. This thesis has explored, in contrast to a political history of the Resistance in Upper Normandy, what the politics of resistance in Upper Normandy were. They were rooted firmly in social and societal factors, and the social world that Bourdieu defined as ‘accumulated history’,\(^{907}\) and were not defined by the narrow,

\(^{906}\) Hessel, *op.cit.*

‘top-down’ ideological parameters. They were defined by action and vision, both of these being shaped by an intersectionality of different factors, particular to the individual life-history of the resister, which shaped and formed the consciousness and agency of the resister as an individual, and the individual as a resister.

Resistance was therefore a strand of wartime France, engaged within the struggle to create a better polis and a better society, and a hybrid between resistance action geared towards institutional politics and resistance action geared towards expression politics. This thesis has shown that there was resistance in Upper Normandy, thereby putting ‘history from below’ into resistance in Upper Normandy, and Upper Normandy into an understanding of resistance using ‘history from below’, by stressing the importance of understanding local factors. Equally important is that this thesis has also shown that whilst ‘resistance in France’ is a different object of study to ‘the French Resistance’, political history still has a place within it, but that it has to be written by using le politique rather than la politique. So this thesis has also shown that the politics of resistance were a combination of the search for power and the search for expression, of the institutional and the personal. Resistance was inherently political, and that, with the idea of action for, about and within the polis, was the thread that linked together all forms of resistance in Upper Normandy between 1940 and 1944.
Annexe A: After Resistance: Selected Resisters Biographies

**Marcel Baudot:** After the liberation, returned to his position as chief archivist for the Eure. Left in 1948 to become Chief Inspector of Archives in France, a post which he held until his retirement in 1967. Wrote a series of works such as *L'opinion publique d'un département sous l'Occupation* (PUF, 1960), *La Libération de la Normandie* (Hachette, 1974) and *Encyclopédie de la Guerre, 1939-45* (Casterman, 1977). Died in Paris, 1992.

**Famille Boulanger:** After their arrests in March 1944, all four (Raoul & Henri, two brothers, and their wives, Lucienne & Augustine) were deported to concentration camps. Henri Boulanger was executed on March 8, 1945 at Flossenburg. The other three survived, but Augustine, Henri’s widow, suffered with health problems, and died in 1952. Raoul Boulanger established in Ry a tourist attraction called ‘Maquipare’, and was active in the memory of the Resistance in the local area. He died in 1982. Lucienne Boulanger aided Raoul with the running of the business and the farm, and after Raoul’s death, continued to be involved with *anciens combattants*. She was also involved, in 2003, in a campaign against the opening of a young offenders centre in Saint-Denis-le-Thiboult. She died in 2004.

**Georges Brutelle:** Arrested in 1943, and deported the following year to Buchenwald. Whilst there, he established a cell of the SFIO within the camp, along with the former deputy Eugène Thomas. Freed in 1945, he became general secretary of the FNDIR, one of the largest unions of ex-resisters and deportees, which opposed the Communists. He was also secretary of the SFIO in Seine-Inférieure, and also became the national vice-chairman in 1947, taking part in the party’s post-war reconstruction, and establishing contacts with the Tito regime in Yugoslavia and its ‘third way’ between capitalism and Stalinism. He left politics in the late
1960s, after failing in his bid to be elected to the National Assembly, and the dissolution of the SFIO in 1971. Served as President of the French association of chartered surveyors, and non-executive chairman of *Paris-Normandie* between 1972 and 1974, and then worked as managing editor for several titles for the Hersant media group. Died in 2001.

**Michel Corroy:** Arrested in 1943, tried in February 1944, and sentenced to death by a German military tribunal. Executed by firing squad at Le Madrillet, March 4, 1944.

**Famille Cressent:** Roger and Madeleine Cressent returned to teaching after the summer of 1944. In 1954, they moved to Le Havre, where Roger became Headteacher of a primary school in the city suburbs. After retirement, they moved back to Gournay-en-Bray. Roger died in 1989, whilst Madeleine died in 1999. Their son, Guy, went to Rouen to complete his studies in 1949, but dropped out after a year. He eventually joined the Merchant Navy, and upon returning to Le Havre, he became a travelling salesman. He retired in the 1990s, and moved back to Gournay-en-Bray after his mother’s death, where he continues to live at the time of writing.

**Raoul Dauphin:** Although arrested in July 1944, Dr Dauphin was amongst those who escaped in the retreat of the Nazis in August 1944. After a brief spell overseeing the transition in the area of Nonancourt, he returned to his medical practice. He was elected as a councillor in 1945, and although he refused initially to run for mayor, eventually became mayor in 1950, serving until 1965 as a member of the Socialist SFIO.

**Madeleine Dissoubray:** After being arrested in 1942, she was sent to Compiègne, and from there deported to Auschwitz in January 1943. She was transferred to Ravensbruck in 1944,
and Mauthausen in 1945, where she was liberated by the Red Cross in April 1945. Although she returned to Rouen, she did not return to teaching, instead working in journalism, trade unionism, and political activism, moving to the Paris region upon her marriage in 1948 to Louis Odru, who for over thirty years between the 1950s and the 1980s, was a leading figure in the PCF in its stronghold of the Seine-Saint-Denis. She remained involved in the PCF until the late 1980s, when she left the party to join the reformist wing led by Pierre Juquin, but continued to defend the legacy of the Resistance, and the memory of deportation. She died in Paris in 2012.

**Yvonne Dissoubray:** Unlike her sister, Yvonne Dissoubray was not deported, but instead released in 1943, and resisted in Brittany during the last year of the Occupation. She returned to Rouen, and became the leader of the Communist women’s organisation (UFF) in Rouen from 1945-48, serving as a city councillor during the transitional period of 1945-47. Transferred from teaching in the primary sector to become a secondary teacher working in technical schools in the Rouen area until her retirement in 1969. Remained active as a trade unionist and within *anciens combattants* organisations. Died in Rouen in 1996.

**André Duroméa:** After his arrest in 1944, he was deported, and was imprisoned in Neuengamme. Upon returning to Le Havre, he quickly rose through the ranks of the PCF, and was a member of the city council between 1947 and 1995. He served as an assistant mayor between 1956 and 1959, deputy mayor between 1965 and 1971, and mayor from 1971 to 1994. He also represented Le Havre in parliament, as a deputy from 1967 to 1986, a senator from 1986 to 1988, and then again as a deputy from 1988 to 1993. He died in Dieppe in 2011.
**Louis Eudier:** Arrested in 1941, and was detained successively at Bonne-Nouvelle prison in Rouen, Compiègne detention camp, then deported. He survived both Auschwitz and Dachau. He worked principally in trade unionism and political activism after the war, and remained a councillor in Le Havre until his death in 1986.

**Marie-Thérèse Fainstein (née Lefebvre):** Arrested in 1941, and deported in 1944 after being involved in a riot in Châtols-sur-Seine prison. Liberated in May 1945. The following year, she returned to teaching as a special needs teacher. She served as a councillor in both Dieppe and Avremesnil, the latter commune being where she began her career, and where she lived until her death in 2013.

**Valentin Feldman:** Arrested in late 1941 for causing the death of a German soldier, and for Communist resistance activity. He was executed by firing squad at Mont-Valérien on July 27, 1942.

**André Gosse:** Returned to farming upon being demobbed, and refused all involvement in local politics, making a public speech criticising the political instrumentalisation of the Resistance and its legacy in 1946. Active amongst *anciens combattants* organisations in the Pays de Caux until his death in 1993.

**Louis & Marguerite Grenouillet:** Louis returned to working as a mechanic, retiring in 1950. Louis died in 1960; Marguerite passed away in 1975.

**Claude Gricourt:** Remained as priest of La Crique and four surrounding villages until his retirement in 1978. Upon retirement, he went to live with his sister near Le Havre.
Jacques Hamon: Hid in Paris between 1943 and 1944, where under a pseudonym, he worked in the Paris art scene. Returned to Le Havre in 1944, and in 1946, opened a gallery and dealership in portraiture and landscape painting in Le Havre, in particular Raoul Dufy and painters linked to the movement known as *le fauvisme*, and the business gained an international reputation. In 1978, his son Jean-Pierre joined the business, having worked in photography and fashion in Carnaby Street in London, then in art in Bond Street, after which point the business embraced modern art and photography too. The *galerie Hamon* celebrated 70 years in business in 2016 with a retrospective exhibition in Le Havre. Jacques Hamon died in 1989 after a long illness.

Famille Jouvin: Louis Jouvin was arrested in 1941, and deported to Auschwitz the following year. He was also interned at Sachsenhausen, and Dachau. He was repatriated in May 1945, to discover that he had been elected Mayor of Grand-Quevilly in his absence. He served until 1947. He died in 1995. Yvonne Jouvin, after fleeing arrest, became a liaison agent in the FTP in the Somme department, returning to Normandy in the autumn of 1944. She died shortly before her husband, in the same year. Pierre Jouvin worked as part of the STO building ramps for the V1 missiles on the Normandy coast. He deserted and rejoined his mother in the Somme, where he fought in the Resistance. He then joined the FFI, and took part in the liberation of Dunkerque in May 1945. After being demobbed in October of that year, he worked for the SNCF until he retired in 1982. He still lives in Grand-Quevilly.

Tony Larue: Returned to Normandy in September 1944, and to local politics. However, he lost to Louis Jouvin in the municipal election of 1945. He won back the mayorality in 1947, and held the post until retiring in June 1995. He continued to work as a chartered accountant until 1970. He was elected as a deputy in 1956, after his former colleague in resistance, Jean
Capdeville, was deselected. Larue served in the National Assembly until 1977, when he became a senator, a post he held until his death in July 1995.

**Bernard Lawday:** After participating in the Liberation, he volunteered for the FFI, where he served as an interpreter in Rouen between the American forces and French authorities. After being demobbed, he returned to complete his studies, and became a doctor, specialising in gynaecology, before becoming director of the medical centre at Oissel in 1971, a post he held until his retirement in 1990. He joined the PS in 1974, and was elected as a councillor in Sotteville in 1977, resigning through ill health in 2012, having served as deputy mayor for public health between 1989 and 2008. He died in 2014.

**Raoul Leprettre:** Arrested in May 1944. Returned from Buchenwald in June 1945. After running briefly a publishing firm, he then became commercial director of *Paris-Normandie*, the newspaper that replaced the collaborationist *Journal de Rouen*, owned and edited by Pierre-René Wolf, a friend and fellow resister. He went into local politics with the SFIO, but left in 1968, at the same time that he resigned as a city councillor in Rouen. He organised the commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Rouen in 1969. In 1972, after the death of Wolf, Leprettre became Chairman and Chief Executive of *Paris-Normandie*, a position he held until 1982, when the newspaper was restructured following the takeover of the paper by the Hersant publishing empire. He died in 1991.

**Césaire Levillain:** Arrested in 1943, tried in February 1944 and sentenced to death by a German military tribunal. Executed by firing squad at Le Madrillet, March 4, 1944.
**André & Germaine Pican:** André Pican was arrested, along with his wife, in Paris on February 15, 1942. He was executed as a hostage at Mont-Valérien on May 23, 1942. Germaine Pican was deported on January 24, 1943, as part of the ‘convoi des 31 000’. Liberated from Mauthausen in 1945, she briefly served in the French Senate from 1946 to 1948, and worked as a teacher in Maromme until retiring in 1955. She remained an activist for the Communists, for *anciens combattants*, and for the memory of deportation. She died in Rouen in 2001.

**Bronislaw Piontek:** After his arrest in March 1944, he was deported the following month, firstly to Auschwitz, and then to Buchenwald. He was repatriated in May 1945, and after a period of convalescence, embarked on a correspondence course, and eventually qualified as a teacher, teaching History and Geography at Lycée Blaise Pascal, a technical school in Rouen. He was also chair of the judges panel for many years of the *Concours de la Résistance et la Déportation* in Seine-Maritime. He died in Rouen in 2005.

**Benjamin Remacle:** Was deported to Buchenwald in June 1944, after the infiltration of the CDL in Rouen the previous month. He was repatriated in May 1945. He was accused of being responsible for the infiltration by Raoul Leprettre in 1946, who made a complaint to the police after Remacle refused to accept Leprettre’s ultimatum of leaving Normandy. The police enquiry found no evidence to support this, and no charges were brought. He was active in the Gaullist RPF in the Pays de Bray, but left in 1953. Though a practicing Catholic, and a Gaullist, Remacle also remained active in the ranks of Communist veterans organisations, and wrote on occasion (either collectively or on his own initiative) for *L'Humanité*. Worked in engineering, but no active political role after 1953.
**Simone Sauteur:** Became a second lieutenant in the FFI, serving in Normandy and then in Germany, until 1945, when she returned to Normandy. She later passed the competitive CAPES examination, and became a French teacher in a middle school (*college*) in Pont de l’Arche, a small town in the west of the Eure. She originally intended to publish her diaries in the 1950s, but decided against after concerns were raised by fellow ex-resisters. The diaries were eventually published in 2016 as *Au cœur du Vièvre avec le maquis Surcouf*, and edited by Alain Corblin, although the original testimonies are available for researchers to consult at the *archives départementales* in Evreux. After retirement, she remained active not only amongst *anciens combattants*, but also active locally as a painter and poet, and staged exhibitions in Pont de l’Arche for over twenty years. Died in 2012.

**Henri & Suzanne Savale:** Suzanne Savale was arrested on May 29, 1943, and deported to Ravensbruck soon after. Henri meanwhile escaped from the Gestapo in September, and went into hiding in the Eure. He returned to Darnétal after the Liberation. In 1945, Suzanne returned to Rouen, and Henri was elected mayor of Darnétal. Suzanne died of complications from typhus in September 1952. Henri Savale remained in his pre-war position of chief accountant of the infirmary at the Hôtel-Dieu in Rouen until January 1953, when he became briefly a deputy for the centrist Radical party after winning a by-election, a position he held until 1956. He remained mayor of Darnétal until his death in July 1971.

**Christian Sénard:** Participated in the FFI in the battle of Normandy in the summer of 1944. Returned to his job as an electrician in the Chantiers de Normandie in 1945, having been honoured with the *croix de guerre 1939-45* (*étoile bronze*). However, he had difficult relations with fellow ex-resisters, some of whom suspected him of having provided names to the Nazis. He was charged with collaboration, and tried in Metz in 1949, where he was found
not guilty. Left the PCF in 1956 after the crushing of the Budapest uprising. Maintained a
distance from fellow resistors, and rarely spoke publicly, though he gave an interview to
ARTE in 2005 as part of a documentary on the battle of Normandy. Retired from the docks in
1982, and lived the remainder of his life in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray. Committed suicide in
2012.

**Georges Touroude:** Participated in the Liberation of Rouen in August 1944. However, his
family were made homeless by the bombing of Le Havre in 1944. He qualified as a teacher in
1945, and moved to the Charente-Inférieure (now Charente-Maritime) to rejoin his family
who had moved there and settled in La Rochelle, where he met a family made homeless by
the bombing of Royan- whose daughter, Gisèle, he married, and with whom he moved back
to Royan in 1947 where she founded a music school. He taught in Royan until his retirement.
He joined the PCF after the end of the war, but left in 1956. As well as a teacher, he was also
a committee member of the local union of teachers (SNI), president of the departmental
branch of the *Ligue des Droits de l’Homme*, an active amateur historian who worked
principally on the history of the Charente and Charente-Inférieure in the 19th century, and a
writer, who also wrote novels, poetry, and children’s stories. He died in 2001.

**Edouard & Joséphine Vain:** After the war had finished, they adopted Isaac and José, the
two boys they had sheltered (Isaac changed his name to Jacques during the war, and kept that
name), as both of the boys’ parents had died in the extermination camps. Both Edouard &
Joséphine continued to work as street traders until the early 1960s. Edouard died in 1969,
whilst Joséphine passed away in 1972. José Mizrahi lives today in Mont-Saint-Aignan.
Annexe B: Maps

Fig. 1: A map showing the departments of metropolitan France, and the geographical situation of Upper Normandy within France. (Source: reflectim.fr, consulted 19/07/2016).
Fig. 2: A Map of Upper Normandy, showing principal towns and cities as well as geographical relief (Source: Conseil Régional de la Haute-Normandie, September 2010).
Bibliography

Archival Sources:

Archives Départementales de l’Eure (ADE):

Fonds Marcel Baudot:
ADE 88 W 26
ADE 88 W 29
ADE 88 W 35
ADE 88 W 49
ADE 88 W 53
ADE 88 W 56

Fonds du Musée Départemental de la Déportation et de la Résistance, Manneville-sur-Risle
ADE 101 J 3

Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM):

Fonds du Cabinet du Préfet:
ADSM 51 W 281
ADSM 51 W 404
ADSM 51 W 405
ADSM 51 W 406
ADSM 51 W 407
ADSM 51 W 427
ADSM 51 W 445
ADSM 54 W 256/8011

Fonds Paul Pasteur:
ADSM 297 J 8

Fonds de l’Office National des Anciens Combattants (ONAC):
ADSM 3848 W

Archives Nationales (AN):

Fonds du Comité d’Histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (CH2GM):
AN 72 J/122
AN 72 J/191

Fonds Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay:
AN 516/AP1
National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK):

Cabinet Office Papers:
CAB 66/7/48

Service Historique de la Défense (SHD):

Fonds de l’Armée de Terre :

SHD 13 P 20

SHD 13 P 131

Private Archives:

Archives of the Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation, Forges-les-Eaux :

Collection Boulanger

Collection Guy Cressent

Diary of Roger Cressent

Personal Archive of Thierry Lamiraud:

Transcript of interview with Georges Brutelle
Transcript of interview with Germaine Pican

Personal Correspondence of the author:

Letter received from Monique Lawday, July 2014.

Letter received from Catherine Voranger, December 2015.

Exhibitions:

Exhibition *D’une guerre à l’autre, 1914-1944*, held at the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM), Rouen, April 7-July 12, 2014.

Interviews:

Author’s Interviews:


Bernard Lawday, March 25, 2011.

Norbert Dufour, March 26, 2011.


Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime:

Albert Castelli, ADSM AV09/242, 1985.
Albert Pognant, August 28, 1977 (ADSM GUE 207).

André Duroméa, ADSM AV09/004, 1982.

André Gosse, ADSM AV09/148-149, 1983.


Claude Gricourt, ADSM AV09/140, 1983.


Fernand Février, ADSM AV09/143, 1983.

Georges Templier, ADSM AV09/084, 1981.


Henri Levillain, ADSM AV09/130, 1983.

Jacqueline Desjardins, ADSM AV09/137, 1981.


Jean Basille, ADSM AV09/165, 1983.

Louis Eudier, ADSM AV09/007, 1982.

Marie-Thérèse Fainstein, ADSM AV09/102, 1982.

Pierre Nivromont, ADSM AV09/159, 1983.
Raoul Boulanger, ADSM AV09/004, 1982.


Raphaël Mallard, ADSM AV 09/256, 2012.


Roger Cressent ADSM AV09/100, 1982.


Archives Nationales:


Written Primary Sources:


Chatel, Fernand, ‘Le Maquis de Barneville’ in L’Humanité, August 24, 1968.


Houlé, Jacqueline, *La Guerre...quand on a quinze ans!* (Luneray, Bertout, 1988).


Secondary Sources:


Aglan, Alya, *Table ronde : Ecrire l’histoire de la Résistance*. Part of *Histoire et Mémoire de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, study day at the Université de Rouen, December 9, 2015.


Baldenweck, Michel, *Les Actions de la Résistance en Seine-Inférieure (1940-1944)* (privately published, ADSM GUE 231, 2014),


Blanquet, Catherine, La Résistance en Seine-Inférieure : un essai sociologique (unpublished mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1979).


Cauchois, Stéphane, Joseph Kérébel, Prêtre, résistant, mort en déportation (Louviers, Editions Ysec, 2012).


Croguennec, Michel, ‘Le Maquis de Barneville entre mythes et réalités’, in Feiertag (ed.), *op.cit.*


Feiertag, Olivier & Marec, Yannick, *Pour une histoire de l’axe Seine*, Seminar at the Université de Rouen, October 2, 2013.


Ferry, Jules, *Lettre aux Instituteurs*, November 16, 1883.


Gildea, Robert, ‘Lettres de correspondants français à la BBC (1940-1943) : une Pénombre de la Résistance’ in *Vingtième Siècle* (No. 125, Jan.-Mar. 2015), pp. 61-76.


Guillon, Jean-Marie, ‘Résistance et action politique’ in Marcot et al., (eds.), *op.cit.*. pp. 567-574.


Halfin, Igal, *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, & Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).


Hessel, Stéphane, *Indignez-vous!* (Montpellier, Indigène Editions, 2010).


Laborie, Pierre, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Résistance ?’ in Marcot et al. (eds.), op.cit., pp. 29-38.


Laboubée, Catherine, Suzanne Savale (Rouen, éd. De la Rue, 2011).


Lagny, Céline, L’opinion publique en Seine-Inférieure pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (unpublished mémoire de Maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1999).


Lecouturier, Yves, L’épuration en Normandie (Caen, Editions Ouest-France, 2008).


Levisse-Touzé, Christine & Guillon, Jean-Marie, ‘Giraudisme et Giraudistes’ in Marcot et al. (eds), *op.cit.*, pp.937-938.


Norton, Mason, 'A la recherche de la toile d’araignée et de la cité clandestine : Résister en Seine-Inférieure, 1940-44’ in Feiertag (ed.), *op.cit*.


Quellien, Jean, ‘Comment écrire l’Histoire de la Résistance ?’, round table at Université de Rouen, December 9, 2015.


Shtasel, Rebecca, ‘Syndicalisme et résistance ouvrière à l’usine Bréguet du Havre 1943-1944’ in Feiertag (ed.), *op.cit.*


Tournier, Maurice, ‘«Le grand soir», un mythe de fin de siècle’ in *Mots* (June 1989, No 19), pp.79-94.

Trempé, Rolande, ‘La Résistance dans le Sud-Ouest’ in Bartosek et al. (eds), *op.cit.*


Internet Sources:


Newspapers:

Journal de Rouen, December 22, 1941.

Journal de Rouen, September 24, 1943.

L’express, February 27, 2008.

La Dépeche Normande, January 15, 1943.

Le Patriote de l’Eure, July 1943.

Le Patriote, January 1943.

Paris-Normandie, June 14, 1980.

**Films:**


*Lacombe, Lucien* (dir. Louis Malle, 1974).


*Papy fait de la Résistance* (dir. Jean-Marie Poiré, 1983).

**Songs:**

‘La Marseillaise’ (written Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle, 1792).

‘Le Chant des Partisans’ (written Maurice Druon; recorded Anna Marly, 1942).